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Miranda Yaver
This dissertation provides a novel evaluation of the extent to which, and the conditions
under which United States administrative agencies are able to push policy toward their pref-
erences rather than being wholly faithful to their legislative principals, in ways that I refer
to as noncompliance. I evaluate this bureaucratic behavior in the context of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency and the Department of Interior from 1973 to 2010. I collected
extensive original data on institutional responses to these agency actions, and using these
new data found robust support for the core separation-of-powers hypotheses that legislative-
executive conflict, polarization in Congress, and disagreement with the delegating legislation
powerfully contribute to agencies stepping outside their discretionary windows rather than
exercising regulatory compliance. To evaluate the policy consequences of this bureaucratic
behavior with respect to policy volatility and long-term bureaucratic discretion to imple-
ment public policy, I created an additional original dataset of statutory amendments to the
legislation under the jurisdiction of the Environmental Protection Agency. I find strong sup-
port for noncompliance in the prior period leading Congress to considerably revise agency
discretion in the way of adding specificity to the texts or imposing additional oversight pro-
visions that constrain agency actions moving forward. Thus, agencies’ willingness to step
outside of their discretionary windows so as to achieve shorter-term policy goals has im-
portant longer-term consequences with respect to their range of discretion and the scope of
administrative capacity in a world of bureaucratic governance. The dissertation has broad
implications for our understanding of the factors shaping de facto policy outcomes in a con-
flictual separation-of-powers setting, and the evolving scope of the American administrative
state.
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Chapter 1: Bureauracratic Noncompliance in the
Separation of Powers System
The needs of mass administration make it today completely indispensable.
The choice is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of
administration.” - Max Weber (1921)
A complex problem at the heart of American political science is that of the implementa-
tion of the policies set by members of Congress engaging in such dynamics as logrolling and
bargaining to secure resources for their districts, in ways leading to laws becoming highly
complex and fractured, and as Wilson (1989: 297-301) characterized American policy imple-
mentation, a “barroom brawl.” Amid the birth of the modern regulatory state, congressional
delegation can be seen as inevitable in order for Congress to play a central role in American
society with the provision of sweeping social and economic programs – as well as efficient in
taking advantage of agencies’ substantive and technical expertise – though some (e.g., Wilson
1989) see delegation as constraining congressional control over the ultimate implementation
of the laws it passes. It is this pattern of regulation and delegation that led Lowi to declare
that law has become “a series of written instructions to administrators rather than a series
of commands to citizens” (Lowi 2009: 106), and claims that such delegations to bureaucracy
are contrary to the public good given the influence of organized interest groups.1 Thus, these
patterns in congressional lawmaking in recent decades has produced disparate views with
respect to the role of interest groups and to what extent they have captured the agencies that
they are intended to regulate (Huntington 1952), are dominated by powerful committees in
Congress (Weingast & Moran 1983), or advantaging certain groups over others (Moe 1989).
The United States government experienced two major periods of extraordinary growth
1However, see Wood & Waterman (1994), who view delegation as inevitable and the ongoing influence of
interest groups as indicative of a healthy democracy.
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in the twentieth century: the New Deal effort to regulate the economy out of the Great
Depression, and the 1960s efforts to eliminate poverty, pollution, and inequity, with both
periods contributing in important ways to American political and legal history. Roosevelt and
those engaged in the New Deal reshaped the character of American politics and the modern
presidency, with the 1930s yielding a rebirth of issues politics and ideological splits, as well as
the growth of policy domains in which the government was actively involved (Leuchtenburg
1963: 326). In taking on this broad issue agenda, the Roosevelt Administration vastly
expanded the President’s legislative functions in addition to the creation of the Executive
Office of the President, expanding the role of the executive branch in policymaking (Id
at 327) and yielding an “elephantine growth of the federal government” amid the crises
that local and state governments had been facing (Id at 333). Indeed, not only had the
federal government vastly expanded its reach, but few questioned the right of the government
– more specifically, the administrative apparatus – to intervene in a variety of domains
in which it had not previously been involved, and even developed consensus around the
“conviction that government both should and could act to forestall future breakdowns”
(Id at 335). Thus, there became not just a resignation but an expectation of sweeping
government involvement across policy realms, with that regulation carried out through the
swelling American administrative state.
With the expansion of national policy programs and the growth of legal complexity in
recent decades (see, e.g., Schuck 1992) and the vital impact that bureaucracy has on our
daily lives (e.g., Brehm & Gates 1999), it is all the more crucial to examine with close
scrutiny the extent to which congressional delegation and mandates map on to agency ac-
tions in practice. Such issues strike to the core of representation and its limits in a setting
potentially conducive to drift. Little work to date has undertaken this question, and this
dissertation seeks to fill that deficit through a combination of quantitative and qualitative
historical qualitative methods to uncover these inter-branch battles over implementation and
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the policy outcomes that emerge. A common justification for bureaucratic policymaking is
that bureaucrats possess and utilize greater expertise than one can reasonably find in the
president, judges, and legislators, a fact that is all the more important amid more technically
challenging policy matters taken on by the state. If at the heart of the critiques of congres-
sional delegation or “abdication” is a concern about the nature and quality of representation
afforded the public – with legislators directly accountable to the electorate while agencies
are operated by political appointees and civil servants – then what emerges is a dialogue
about the important relationship between representation and administration. With much
scholarship on delegation assuming Congress to have a role in overseeing agency actions
(e.g., McCubbins & Schwartz 1984; McNollgast 1987, 1989; Epstein & O’Halloran 1994,
1996, 1999), we must consider closely the extent to which we ultimately observe democratic
responsiveness in statebuilding when Congress is operating under more constrained political
conditions.
The chapters that follow argue that a number of little-recognized conditions expand bu-
reaucratic capacity to shift (and sustain) policy at or near the agency’s preferences, and that
these inter-branch battles over statutory implementation have powerful effects in shaping
the location and duration of key policy domains.
Modern State-Building in the Separation of Powers System
Since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 – and particularly since Roo-
sevelt’s New Deal, which witnessed the creation of dozens of administrative agencies and
numerous pieces of highly significant legislation – the American administrative state has
witnessed a marked growth in size and scope, touching virtually every aspect of social and
economic policy with the passage of such laws as the Federal Trade Commission Act, the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Banking Act, and the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, to name just a few. Such developments led Lowi to observe
(disdainfully) that the“political pressures of social unrest forces Congress and the president
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into premature formulations that make delegation of power inevitable” (2009: 125), though
with the consequence of what he terms “interest group liberalism,” or the clientelism emerg-
ing from that broad expansion of the state. And with such expansions of policy programs
can come constituent expectations about the continued provision of such programs, suggest-
ing a path dependent quality to this state development. Figure 1 plots the total civilian
employment within the federal executive branch from 1940 to 20142, with a clear upward
trend throughout the time series, indicating an expansion in the size of government and the
number of those contributing toward the policies it produces. Such a trend is largely mir-
rored in the Department of Interior, one of the agencies that I evaluate in this dissertation,
though there is a visible decline in its scale from approximately 1990 forward, despite the
sharp growth in the earlier decades.
Needless to say, the nature of domestic policy regulation – both social and economic – has
been far from static, with much policy innovation and reshaping of enforcement contributing
toward a multiplicity of avenues through which rights are asserted by private actors (Farhang
2010), businesses, and states. Novak (2008) calls attention to the importance of considering
American state development outside of the narrow categories such as classical liberalism
versus modern social democracy. Instead, he raises important other sources of state power,
which he defines as a “product of legal processes of extraordinary depth, diversity, and
durability” that includes rulemaking, executive orders, federal statutes, state legislation,
private litigation, among other sources of power (2008: 768). Thus, the complexity of
lawmaking and implementation in the American separation of powers context necessitates
a recognition of the diversity of the regulatory processes at work in shaping contemporary
policy outcomes, in particular given the reality that with the ability to not only promulgate
rules but also to sponsor legislative proposals and launch experimental programs, federal
2These data came from the Historical Workforce Tables provided by the United States Office of Personnel
Management.
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bureaucrats aren’t simply administering policy but rather are playing an important role in
shaping it as well (Carpenter 2005).
While much ink has been spilled addressing questions of state formation in comparative
analyses, we still know far too little about the evolution of contemporary state capacity amid
major legal and policy developments. That is, with a growing scope of policies legislated
by Congress and implemented through agencies, our conception of the state itself should
likewise be dynamic rather than static in nature. Skowronek describes the modern state as
an “internal governmental reconstruction worked out through incremental political reform”
(1982: 285), with the gradual accretion of broader administrative forms and procedures,
though he laments that the modern American state failed to create a vital role for the
judiciary in this new political economy (Id at 287). Derthick & Quirk (1985: 30) note modern
presidential support for deregulatory policy, with President Jimmy Carter claiming that the
nation was suffocating from red tape, and his successor President Ronald Reagan pledging
swift action against what he perceived as overregulation. Among the strategies employed
by presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan were the development of ecoomic impact statement
requirements of agencies, along with centralizing agency review in the Office of Management
and Budget (Id at 30-31). However, despite a common overarching goal of reducing red tape,
a disparity between the Democratic and Republican presidents was whether there was an
effort at extending “regulatory relief” efforts to the new policy regimes of health, safety, and
environmental protection (Id at 33).
Harris & Milkis (1996) likewise address efforts at deregulation, particularly under the Rea-
gan Administration, and though their restriction to qualitative analysis on only two agencies
limits the extent to which we can get leverage from this study in a generalizeable fashion,
they provide valuable information about the mechanisms by which groups have attempted
to undercut state capacity in modern social policy. Both the Federal Trade Commission
and the Environmental Protection Agency fell prey to the Reagan Administration’s efforts
5
to undo the accomplishments of the public lobby regime that had brought them to power
(1996: 358) as well as the growing public concern with “big government” and the large bu-
reaucratic structure that accompanied this expanding administrative state (see also Hacker
& Pierson 2010).3 This example of the Environmental Protection Agency is often cited as
exemplary of the deregulatory efforts of the 1980s – though highly salient to both parties
since its formation in 1970 – and is a prime example on which this dissertation focuses.
While agencies’ expert knowledge has been drawn upon as a prime justification for dele-
gation, this is particularly true in the environmental policy context given agencies’ greater
depth of knowledge than courts with respect to the technical details over which conflicts
arise.
While there is ample interest in understanding the development of the American state,
there is not necessarily consensus as to how best to characterize its continuation over time.
Novak (2008: 759) calls attention to the important shift in American politics scholarship
toward, in analyzing twentieth century American administration and bureaucracy, casting
aside discussion of a weak state tradition in favor of arguments for more centralization. And
despite Skowronek’s (1982) observation about the courts being “swamped” by the expansion
of bureaucratic authority, Novak rightly observes that a number of the most far-reaching
policy initiatives in recent decades have relied heavily on regulation through the courts. In-
deed, one of the most crucial aspects of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was its creation of
a private right of action over violations of Title VII’s provisions prohibiting employment
discrimination. While this implementation strategy of private enforcement was originally a
compromise brokered to permit the Act’s passage, it would ultimately prove highly potent in
ensuring the provision of equal protection in employment, in addition to importantly influ-
encing subsequent civil rights legislation (e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act). Moreover,
the Clean Air Act’s provision of citizen suits empowered individuals and organizations – re-
3However, others draw attention to the limitations of conservative legal movements against liberalism
given this backlash’s roots in the American legal system, a liberal movement (Teles 2010).
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gardless of standing – to sue regulated entities to comply with the statutory provisions and to
compel the implementing agency, the EPA, to enforce the Act. Such provisions would soon
be incorporated into subsequent environmental legislation, thus vastly expanding through
the use of courts the universe of monitors of environmental implementation. It is this use of
private enforcement in combination with, or even in lieu of, administrative implementation
that Farhang (2010) refers to as the “litigation state.”
Novak (2012) argues further that one of the most marked indicators of the transforma-
tion of the American state was the explosion of federal and state legislation in the late 19th
century through the New Deal. After all, legislation has been the dominant form of lawmak-
ing in the 20th century, and Eskridge & Ferejohn (2010) hold that statutes have been the
dominant mode of the development of American democracy, with the Constitution serving
as a vision that is advanced through the development of statutory law. While the United
States Constitution establishes a basic governmental structure, “the biggest change in the
Constitutional structure has been the creation of the modern administrative state, through
congressional delegations of lawmaking authority to independent agencies” in the writing of
statutes (Eskridge & Ferejohn 2010: 10).
While a rich literature to date has evaluated systematically the conditions conducive to
passage of legislation (e.g., Brady & Volden 2006; Krehbiel 1998), as well as the nature of
voting patterns on those laws, the study of statutes to date has neglected their dynamic
dimension. I argue that this dynamic component is a critical dimension of how law, policy,
and the American state develop over time, with this conception of lawmaking capturing
better the realities of the increasingly complex, amendment-based nature of modern statutes,
as well as the ongoing nature of inter-branch interactions in shaping policy outcomes. Indeed,
in a complex and growing state, and with increasing partisan division at the elite level over
policymaking (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal 2006), the project argues that if we want to
understand not simply the predictors of legislative outputs, but the policies we ultimately
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observe, considering these ongoing inter-branch tensions over implementation is essential.
Thus, in the chapters that follow, I seek to build on these conceptions of the state and its
regulatory capacity, and examine the evolution of its reach given the understudied dynamic
inter-branch interactions that reshape legislative police power (Novak 2012: 41), bureaucratic
discretion, the role and powers of courts, and the certainty with which regulated entities can
go about the business of domestic policymaking.
What is Noncompliance?
At the heart of this project’s analysis is the important relationship between represen-
tation and administration. Epstein & O’Halloran (1994, 1996, 1999) and Huber & Shipan
(2002) provide key models of statutory discretion granted agencies by Congress, building on
Hőlmstrom’s model in which the principal delegates a subset of the policy space R, thus
creating a discretionary window in which the agency chooses its preferred policy. Such mod-
els speak to the core bureaucratic policymaking question of how Congress can capitalize
on agency expertise while still achieving policies that are consistent with the legislature’s
preferences. A complication to this delegation can potentially be the difficulty of retracting
discretion once it has been allotted due to the complexity of the American separation of pow-
ers system, thus leaving room for bureaucratic drift (Volden 2002). That is, the executive
will not want to give up administrative power when the agency reflects its preferences, and
given the the executive’s veto power over legislative proposals, there exists an asymmetry
between granting discretion and subsequently restricting that discretion (Id at 115).
The ways in which the democratically-elected Congress chooses to structure administra-
tive procedures impacts both the agency’s political accountability and the technical accuracy
of its decisionmaking, with procedures promoting agencies’ acquisition of technical compe-
tence having the added consequence of raising the potential for bureaucratic drift away from
legislative preferences (Bawn 1995). In a world of perfect bureaucratic accountability, they
would make the same decisions as would the principals if they held the information held by
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the bureaucrats – thus, the agent chooses the “best” result on behalf of its political principal
(Gailmard & Patty 2013: 4). While Congress – the directly elected branch – delegates to
administrative agencies, it maintains a number of tools at its disposal in order to induce
compliance in agencies and thus ensure better representation in implementation. For exam-
ple, it can adjust reauthorization cycles for agencies or programs, potentially going so far as
to require annual reauthorizations and thus further constraining the agency. It maintains
the “power of the purse,” and thus can reduce the aount of funding afforded the agency, in
turn limiting the extent of the agency’s discretion. It can hold oversight hearings to inves-
tigate agency actions, or require audits of the agency activity through inspectors general or
the General Accounting Office (GAO). It can impose administrative procedures that limit
bureaucratic autonomy in implementation, such as the imposition of requirements that the
agency report to Congress or consult with other administrative agencies before taking action
(McNollgast 1987). And perhaps most extremely, it can remove officials from office. These
various powers at Congress’s disposal help to facilitate responsiveness in statebuilding in a
world of bureaucratic governance. Maskin & Tirole (2004) likewise find that elected officials,
rather than unelected agents, engaging in policymaking directly provides to voters the ad-
vantage of ex post removal of officials producing unfavorable policies, as well as providing
incentive for the elected politician to exert effort on behalf of the electorate, though these
advantages are conditioned by the electorate’s ability to effectively provide this monitoring
of the policymaker.
The many veto players at work in the American political process virtually guarantee
that the key actors in the branches will have divergent preferences over policy. After all,
justices of the Supreme Court are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate,
thus requiring some threshold level of compromise in order to ensure confirmation. The
same is true of agency heads, who implement policy within the executive branch but whose
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preferences may not entirely cohere with those of the president.4 Moreover, in order to ensure
passage of legislation, there mut be some degree of overlapping preferences between the
chambers of Congress, and supermajority institutions (e.g., the filibuster) can incite greater
conflict within Congress and require greater degrees of bargaining in order to move policy.
Thus, both within Congress and when looking to the other branches, the separation-of-powers
system in the United States is highly conducive to the persistence of ideological conflict.
In evaluating bureaucratic behavior in policymaking, I adopt Wilson’s (1989) assumption
that bureaucrats hold preferences about their personal condition – such as self-promotion,
power, prestige, and financial reward – and about the policy in which they are engaged.
Thus, noncompliance grows out of these combined incentives over both political and policy
influence.
Given the challenges inherent in passing legislation of significant impact, namely the
passage of legislation fraught with uncertainty over the policy being set, and complexity
arising as legislators seek to buy support from others (see Moe 1989), it is little wonder
that there is ample dissatisfaction over the policy outcomes emerging from the American
bureaucracy. Such difficulties are only amplified amid statutory goals that are “frequently
vague and nonoperational,” making rational decisionmaking on the part of the agency a
difficult endeavor (Gawthrop 1969: 111). The statutes that emerge – for reasons tied either
to the bargaining processes of Congress or a lack of consensus over the proper policy – have a
degree of permissiveness in their delegations to administrative agencies. Moreover, on a more
pragmatic note, there are congressional incentives to provide bureaucrats with the ability to
respond flexibly to unique situations where there is not a clear precedent (Lipsky 1980: 105).
However, given the ample separation-of-powers conflict over ideology, as well as institutional
prerogatives for power, there are conditions under which agencies cross a boundary – that
4See Gailmard & Patty (2007), who argue that the president has incentives to allow bureaucrats to
develop expertise and thus carry out better policy. However, those bureaucrats willing to invest in becoming
experts are those who themselves have stronger policy preferences, thus being considered the “zealots” in
the American bureaucracy.
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is, stepping outside of their discretionary windows – in a way that I refer to as bureaucratic
noncompliance.5
The notion that agencies might not – as the dominant models of bureaucracy suggest
– efficiently and effectively implement their target policies has not gone entirely unnoticed,
with Huber & McCarty (2004) evaluating errors in agency implementation and and arguing
that such errors make it more difficult for principals to detect whether the agent is choosing
a policy that it has not approved (see also McCarty 2011, working paper) and thus falls
within the scope of noncompliance. Carpenter (2003) notes that bureaucratic agencies of-
ten demonstrate reluctance to reach regulatory decisions, with extensive variability among
agencies with respect to the time that they take to grant permits, issue licenses, adopt new
policies, prosecute cases, and approve products, even when faced with the same statutory,
structural, and procedural environments in which they are operating. Carpenter argues
that agency inducement of such regulatory delay allows the agency to obtain valuable in-
formation about the implications of its decisions, as well as potential reputation costs that
would emerge, though there are costs associated with agencies’ failure to take prompt action
(e.g., failure to adequately respond to a crisis or demand). Further, Brehm & Gates (1999)
argue that understanding compliance is necessary in order to understand issues of control
and oversight, with Congress and the President unable to control policy administration if
the implementers (bureaucrats) have discretion to an extent that they cannot be effectively
managed.6. There is, of course, the complication of precisely with what the agency is not
complying, given that “few public policies are immune from political drift, and many are
bombarded by it” (Callander & Krehbiel 2014: 819). While congressional coalitions may
work to stack the deck against a future administration through ex ante constraints such as
5While Lipsky (1980: 49) notes that goal ambiguity is “intrinsic” to street-level bureaucracies, with
“ephemeral” tasks delegated to them, I focus here on clear statutory mandates or bounded windows of
discretion.
6Further, adverse selection problems can arise given that Congress not only is constrained in its inability
to monitor all agency activities once it has delegated authority, but Congress cannot accurately identify the
agency’s true type (Id at 191).
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reporting requirements or sunset provisions, “if this coalition is replaced, then the new prin-
cipals will not be able to force the bureaucrats to obey their wishes” (Tsebelis 2002: 237),
potentially necessitating the passage of new legislation to shift the policy location toward
the preferences of the new legislative principal. To do so, however, becomes increasingly
costly amid higher levels of legislative conflict and polarization, leaving limited room for de-
parture from the status quo. Thus, Tsebelis (2004) argues, bureaucratic independence from
the current arrangement of veto players increases with the number and ideological distance
among those players (Id), a claim that I too put forward and find support for.7
The expectation given some understandings of the judiciary is that courts interpreting
statutes would expect compliance with the enacting Congress, which produces the statutory
text to which regulated entities – as well as agencies regulating them – are held accountable.
Yet given the various models of congressional relationships with bureaucracy, there is reason
to expect that agencies would see value in implementing in accordance with the preferences
of their current principal – the contemporary Congress – rather than upholding outdated
statutory provisions. After all, it is the Congress currently in power that is empowered to
punish an agency for what it perceives as transgressions, and there is a legitimate question
as to whether the 108th Congress would seek to uphold the statutory bargain struck by
the 88th Congress, as opposed to seeking to push policy toward its own preferences. Thus,
agencies can fail to comply with either the text written by the authorizing Congress – which
raises questions of to what extent we observe the rule of law as opposed to the substitution
of bureaucratic preferences – or with the contemporary Congress to which it can be held
accountable, which is consistent with the more common delegation and bureaucratic control
stories of American institutions. To which of these political principals agencies are most
attentive (and under what conditions) is an issue not confronted directly by the delegation
literature, and one that this project seeks to explore. Because no work to date has sought to
7However, there is the potential that fixing these statutes and regulations can compromise the govern-
ment’s performance as well as its ability to act as a representative institution (Callander & Krehbiel 2014).
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measure bureaucratic noncompliance, I create an original measure of agency curbing activity
from Congress, which captures congressional identification of deviations from its preferred
policy implementation, as well as a measure of agency losses in the DC Circuit, which
captures the extent to which agencies are found in court to have deviated from the statutory
texts that they are tasked with implementing. What then emerges is a clearer conceptual
understanding of bureaucratic implementation amid a tug-of-war between congressional and
judicial interpretations of agency authority and responsibility to regulate.
The challenge of adjudicating among different interpretations of the agency’s statutory
obligations can be seen plainly in Congress’s passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, Section 182 of which contained the important error of aiming for too small a target with
respect to achieving progress in reductions. The Environmental Protection Agency, tasked
with carrying into effect the Clean Air Act of 1990, was faced with the dilemma of whether to
apply a textualist reading to Section 182 and thus maintaining the lower occupancy standard
or whether to apply a broader reading of the statute so as to adopt what it viewed as a more
sensible regulatory approach (Herz 1992: 193). Part of the decisionmaking calculus on the
part of the agency is the prediction of whether the court would apply a textualist reading of
the statute should litigation be pursued. By pursuing the facially more reasonable regulatory
strategy, the agency must depart from the statutory language in favor of a more purposive
reading of the Act, albeit at the risk of being deemed noncompliant with the statute should
the agency find itself in court. Yet by pursuing a textualist strategy, the policy outcome
is at odds with the legislative goals underlying the statute as a whole, and the question
that follows in the post-Chevron period is whether the Court will deem the agency’s action
to be based on a reasonable statutory interpretation as opposed to being in conflict with
unambiguous legislative text.
Deviations from statutes and congressional preferences can be found from both the left
and the right, across a number of salient policy domains. Carpenter (2010) calls attention to
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two such episodes within the Food and Drug Administration, from different political parties
and each resulting in ultimate rejection of the agency’s efforts. The first (Democratic) move
by the FDA was made by then-FDA Commissioner David Kessler, who in 1994 sought
unsuccessfully to regulate by rulemaking tobacco amid reports that cigarette manufacturers
were manipulating the nicotine levels of cigarettes. The FDA concluded that under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, nicotine was a drug and that cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco were devices used to deliver that drug to the body, thus falling within the domain
of its authority to regulate under the FDCA. Kessler’s regulatory efforts were challenged in
court and in 2000, the Supreme Court held in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp
that the Food and Drug Administration lacked the statutory authority to regulate tobacco
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (2010: 745). It would not be until 2009 that
Congress formally delgated to the FDA that regulatory capacity.
Lest one believe that extensions beyond statutory authority be specific to the tradition-
ally more pro-regulation Democratic actors, conservative and libertarian forces sought to
extend the FDA’s power over pharmaceuticals on a federalist dimension in 2001 with the
introduction of state tort preemption. However, as with the FDA’s more liberal effort at
tobacco regulation, in Wyeth v. Levine (2009), the Supreme Court struck down the FDA’s
federalist claims by a vote of 6 to 3, rejecting the notion that the FDA’s enabling act pre-
empted state-level failure-to-warn litigation (Carpenter 2010: 747).
One can scarcely search records of the Environmental Protection Agency without finding
numerous accounts of states and interest groups suing the agency to mandate enforcement
of environmental standards. Apart from sheer partisan-related dissatisfaction with agency
actions, the 1980s and the subsequent years have been marked by flurries of lawsuits challeng-
ing the validity of EPA enforcement actions and the slowness of the pace at which the EPA
was acting. Such suits were brought by environmental organizations such as the Coalition for
Clean Air and the Sierra Club, which sought to force the EPA to assume responsibility for
14
local enforcement of the Clean Air Act, and by states objecting to inadequate environmental
protection from the Agency.
To take an example, we find in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train8 (1976) a
challenge brought under Section 108 of the Clean Air Act, which EPA Administrator Rus-
sell Train interpreted as discretionary authority to promulgate national ambient air quality
standards with respect to various pollutants. As a consequence of this interpretation of the
language as discretionary, he failed to establish those standards. Looking to the relevant
precedents, the court found no support for Train’s argument that the EPA was not obligated
to promulgate ambient air quality standards, and that the legislative history of the Clean Air
Act was clearly contrary to the EPA’s interpretation: “The structure of the Clean Air Act as
amended in 1970, its legislative history, and the judicial gloss placed upon the Act leave no
room for an interpretation which makes the issuance of air quality standards for lead under
[Section]108 discretionary.”9 Thus, the EPA had acted contrary to both the statutory text
and the legislative history in failing to regulate according to Section 108. Such cases, though
infrequent relative to the broader swath of regulatory activity that is carried out daily, are
at the heart of the dissertation.
Moreover, in her 2003 testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife,
and Water, Professor Rena Steinzor on behalf of the Center for Progressive Regulation10
noted that routine enforcement by the Environmental Protection Agency was at its lowest
ebb in a decade, with declines in enforcement effectiveness from both litigation and penalties
assessed, with further deregulation on the horizon. Indeed, she cited, the number of EPA
8545 F.2nd 320.
9It is worth noting also that a plain text reading of Section 108 reveals mandatory, not discretionary
language directed at the Administrator: “For the purpose of establishing national primary and secondary
ambient air quality standards, the Administrator shall within 30 days after December 31, 1970, publish, and
shall from time to time thereafter revise, a list which includes each air pollutant (A) which in his judgment
has an adverse effect on public health or welfare...” Such language lends further support to the claim that
such cases are not simply challenges of interpretation of intentionally vague statutes.
10Steinzor, Rena. Testimony before the United States Senate Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and
Water. September 16, 2003.
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inspections and enforcement staff had fallen under the Bush Administration to the lowest
level since the agency’s establishment, and those found in violation of the environmental
statutes were paying 77% less than in previous years. Thus, there was a clear partisan-
driven effort on the part of the agency to regulate below the level set by the statute and in
years previous.
While not specifically aimed at issues of compliance per se, the growth of environmen-
tal regulation in the 1970s led to extensive discussion of disparate impact of environmental
harms, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution as well as Title VI of the Civil Right Act of 1964. Legal challenges over agen-
cies’ permission of industries’ perpetuation of environmental harms that disproportionately
expose minorities to environmental risks and harms have been particularly challenging given
the requirement of demonstrating discriminatory intent as opposed to simply a discrimina-
tory effect. For example, despite the district court acknowledging in Bean v. Southwestern
Waste Management Corp11 that a state agency’s permit to allow a solid waste facility in a
given community would affect the entire community’s land values, tax base, aesthetics, and
the health of its inhabitants, the court rejected the challenge despite the land in question
being in a community with approximately a 60% minority population and noted that it
would be expected that solid waste sites would be placed in locations away from densely
populated regions. Thus, while the impact of these solid waste sites were likely to have
greater impacts on minority communities, there was insufficient proof that it was a product
of purposive racial discrimination (Brougher 2013). The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) allows individuals adversely affected by agency actions to bring legal challenges in
court under the Administrative Procedure Act,12 which provides for a private right of action,
11482 F. Supp. 673, 677.
12The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), passed in 1946, created the basic framework of American ad-
ministrative law governing agency actions and was the product of struggles between regulating and regulated
interests with respect to the New Deal agencies and concerns about the extent of power with which they
were endowed. However, Congress has in more recent decades enacted statutes that mandated rulemaking
procedures to supplement or supercede the APA (Lubbers 2006: 3, 5).
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should it appear that the agency failed to satisfy the statutory requirement of providing de-
tailed environmental impact statements prior to making its decisions (Id at 7).13 However,
the flexible language of NEPA’s requirements of environmental impact statements has led
to potentially excessive discretion in their use of delegated authority, allowing agencies to
incorporate into their decisionmaking and actions discriminatory principles in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI (Id at 9).
In addition to the legal challenges ultimately finding their way into the appellate courts,
one can find even more accounts of noncompliance when turning to earlier stages of opposi-
tion to agency behavior, in the form of notices of intent to sue. Such documents serve as last
resort actions taken by plaintiffs before going to court, addressing the (alleged) malfeasance
on the part of the administrative agency. For example, on February 11, 2015, the Earth-
rise Law Center of Lewis & Clark Law School submitted to the Environmental Protection
Agency Administrator Gina McCarthy a 60-day notice of intent to sue, due to the Agency’s
failure to perform its mandatory duties specified in Section 303(c)(4) of the Clean Water
Act (CWA), with respect to the promulgation of aquatic life toxics criteria for the State of
Oregon. Upon Oregon’s revision of aquatic life toxic criteria in 2013, the EPA had “approved
38 criteria values associated with 14 toxic pollutants while simultaneously disapproving 45
criteria values associated with 16 toxic pollutants,” and in response to the EPA’s formal
disapproval, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality adopted revisions. However,
the revisions made still failed to address seven disapproved criteria values associated with
four toxic pollutants relevant to the Endangered Species Act, which is implemented jointly
by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Interior.
According to the CWA, if a given state fails after 90 days to adopt changes to water quality
standards, the EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to promulgate replacement standards on
13In his Executive Order 12898 in 1994, President Bill Clinton would expand environmental justice goals
beyond the Environmental Protection Agency, requiring that all federal agencies work toward environmental
justice by identifying and addressing, to the extent possible, the environmental impacts of their programs.
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behalf of the state. Apart from the State of Oregon lacking a specific plan to take further
action to regulate those substances, the EPA had failed to promulgate replacement criteria
as required under Section 303(c)(4) of the Clean Water Act. Such failure to take prompt
action was not only with respect to mandatory duties under the Act – thus a clear failure
to comply with statutory obligations – but also was argued by the Earthrise Law Center to
pose considerable concerns for Oregon’s water and wildlife. This instance is merely one of
many in which such groups have provided such 60-day notices of intention to sue the Agency,
including for failure to promulgate rules by deadlines, failure to maintain compliance with
permit requirements, and failure to satisfy other mandatory obligations established in a
number of the statutes under its jurisdiction.14
In addition to these interest group allegations of bureaucratic misbehavior, hundreds of
lawsuits since the EPA’s inception were resolved with judicial holdings that the EPA had is-
sued arbitrary and capricious rules that were in contradiction of the statutes it implements.15
Moreover, in the aftermath of Congress’s passage of the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA) of 1976 – a significant statute that established a regulatory framework for
the handling of hazardous substances and solid wastes – petroleum and mining industries
raised allegations that the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulations were introducing
overbearing safety requirements that subjected the companies to excessively high standards
in the handling of such materials. The Court of Appeals would subsequently find on August
2, 1987 that in imposing the requirements that certain chemicals be considered hazardous –
and thus subject to those higher standards – the EPA had exceeded its statutory authority
14For example, on February 10, 2015, the Conservation Law Foundation worked to sue the EPA for its
failure to notify stormwater dischargers that they must obtain effluent discharge permits under the Clean
Water Act; on September 2, 2014, the WildEarth Guardians worked to sue the EPA for causing unreasonable
and intentional delay in responding to Colorado’s failure to administer its permitting program; and on April
28, 2014, the Sierra Club worked to sue the EPA for its failure to promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan
(FIP) within two years of its partial disapproval of Arkansas’ revised Regional Haze (RH) and Interstate
Transport State Implementation Plans (SIPs).
15While Administrative Procedure Act (APA) cases were noted in the data collection, they were not
counted as noncompliance unless there was a substantive violation declared by the court.
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to regulate under RCRA. Thus, I can confirm that bureaucratic noncompliance – whether in
the form of exceeding regulatory authority or failing to take mandatory actions – is behav-
ior sufficiently prevalent such that much can be gained by understanding better the forces
driving it and the policy consequences that it triggers in the American regulatory state.
Noncompliance in Action
Whether the agency properly construed its obligations under the Clean Air Act was a
matter that came before the DC Circuit in American Trucking Association v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency (175 F.3d 1027), with the per curiam decision rendered
by the court on May 14, 1999.16
At stake was Section 109 of the Clean Air Act, the beginning which provides that the
Administrator of the EPA “publish proposed regulations prescribing a national primary
ambient air quality standard and a national secondary ambient air quality standard for
each air pollutant for which air quality criteria have been issued prior to such date” (42
U.S.C. 7409). Consistent with this requirement, the EPA issued in July 1997 final rules
that revised the primary and secondary national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)
for particulate matter and ozone. However, the DC Circuit held that the “construction of
the Clean Air Act on which EPA relied in promulgating the NAAQS at issue here effects
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power,” and that the EPA “appear[ed] to have
articulated no ‘intelligible principle’ to channel its application” of public health concerns in
setting NAAQS. Thus, they remanded the case for the EPA to develop a construction of the
Clean Air Act that was constitutional. The DC Circuit held further that Section 109 did
not permit the EPA to consider costs in promulgating NAAQS, and that its choice of certain
substances to be designated as particulate matter was arbitrary and capricious.17 The fact
16The decision was rendered by a mixed panel of judges, with Reagan-appointed judges Williams and
Ginsburg,and Clinton-appointed judge Tatel. However, despite the per curiam nature of the opinion filed,
Judge Tatel submitted a separate opinion dissenting from Part 1 of the decision.
17Arbitrary and capricious is a legal ruling in which the court holds that an agency action is invalid because
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that this decision was ultimately overturned in 2001 by the Supreme Court in Whitman v.
American Trucking Association, with the majority opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, calls
attention to the complexity of these cases and the difficulty in determining definitively the
precise bounds on bureaucratic discretion that Congress affords agencies in delegating.
While it is a simpler matter to evaluate the presence (or lack thereof) of noncompliance
with respect to mandatory agency actions, this is a more complex task in the absence of
agency forcing provisions. That is, when can we tell whether agencies are noncompliant in
exercising their discretionary authority?
Such an issue came before the DC Circuit in Ethyl Corporation v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (918 F.2d 225), decided per curium on November 28, 1990.18 Under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, the EPA was granted the authority to
regulate solid and hazardous wastes, the latter of which were defined as a subset of “solid
wastes,” which were defined to include only those products that were actually discarded.
Ethyl Corporation brought a legal challenge against the EPA, which had promulgated rules
regulating TBBPA product slurry and byproduct brine as hazardous waste K131, holding
that the EPA had erroneously characterized these substances as discarded wastes that fell
within its jurisdiction because they were not discarded, but rather recycled products over
which the EPA lacked authority to regulate. The DC Circuit held in favor of Ethyl Corpora-
tion, writing that TBBPA slurry is a “commercially useful product that is neither discarded
nor a waste, and the byproduct brine is immediately recycled in the promine production op-
eration,” thus falling outside the scope of “solid wastes” within as defined in RCRA. Thus,
given the discretionary authority to regulate a certain class of substances, the EPA regulated
those substances that were beyond the scope of its jurisdiction given Congress’s definition
it was made on unreasonable grounds or didn’t adequately consider various circumstances. Court evaluations
of whether agency actions are arbitrary and capricious is part of step two of the Chevron review.
18As with American Trucking, this decision was rendered by a mixed panel, with one Democratic appointee
(Ruth Bader Ginsburg, nominated to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals by President Jimmy Carter) and two
Republican appointees (President George H.W. Bush appointee Judge A. Raymond Randolph and President
Ronald Reagan appointee Judge Laurence Silberman).
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of solid wastes in the delegating legislation. While some might view such a case as mere dis-
agreement over statutory interpretation, the clarity of the RCRA definitions and the nature
of the regulated products suggests that there was little ambiguity with respect to whether
the EPA’s authorization to regulate solid waste under RCRA extended to these entities, and
that the agency had overstepped its discretionary window.
The above discussion acknowledges that a broad swath of activity can fall within the
realm of noncompliance as I evaluate it in this dissertation, and questions can reasonably
arise as to the extent to which they can properly be characterized as being under the same
umbrella of “noncompliance.” On the one hand, one might consider noncompliance to be
an agency failing to achieve a mandatory policy goal – perhaps better characterized as a
point on a line in policy space falling from a left-to-right or more regulatory to deregulatory
continuum – that was compelled by Congress (e.g., “the Administrator shall prohibit the use
of...”). On the other hand, one might consider noncompliance also to be the agency’s moving
beyond the discretionary window that Congress has allotted. That is, rather than mandating
a certain policy choice, the agency might choose a policy that is outside the various options
that Congress has deemed permissible for the agency to enact. This dilemma of measurement
captures the important question of whether agency forcing provisions and agency punishment
for foot-dragging ought indeed to be classified as the same overarching type of behavior.
Because in this project I consider noncompliance to be agency efforts to maximize dis-
cretion in ways that work to pull policy toward their own preferences rather than strictly
following legislative dictates and/or statutory text, I consider both classes of action to fall
within the realm of noncompliance. However, the question remains as to whether they should
properly be pooled in the analysis as opposed to disaggregated. The advantage to disag-
gregating these forms of bureaucratic action is the abiltiy to decipher the conditions under
which agencies will adopt one such path over the other. However, there are important limi-
tations to such an approach, which govern the project largely pooling all such bureaucratic
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behavior under the umbrella of noncompliance, given the small-N problems that arise from
too much disaggregation.
There is the further challenge of litigants’ selection to pursue cases in the DC Circuit
Court of Appeals: while it is a simpler matter to provide evidence of agencies overstepping
their bounds (that is, failure to achieve the point on the line in policy space), defining
discretionary windows and agency actions in relation to them is a harder task to acheive in
court. Thus, there is a more limited about of litigation on those grounds, resulting in small-N
problems with respect to the quantitative analysis. However, in the qualitative evaluations
I do consider cases of both overregulation and underregulation, and as robustness checks
in the analysis of congressional constraints on agencies, I provide model specifications that
disaggregate requirements and prohibitions, which I argue capture concerns with respect to
whether the agency is failing to meet mandatory obligations (policy points) or exceeding
discretionary windows (ranges of discretion).
Dimensions of Noncompliance
Just as we can expect that legal opinions will have greater or less significant consequences,
or that the voting public will be more or less persuaded by negative advertising, so too can
we expect that an agency will be more or less compliant, and that there will be variation
in the extent of noncompliance. Such a metric has value so as to enable us to answer such
questions as, When will it make sense for Congress to exert the effort in intervening in this
noncompliance? Not just whether, but to what extent are individuals are industries affected
(and in particular, harmed) by these bureaucratic actions? Are the legislative and judicial
remedies with respect to the agency reasonable given the extent to which the agency strayed
from its responsibilities or authority under the delegating legislation? Due to the scholarly
inattention to the domain of bureaucratic noncompliance, there is not a clear roadmap for
evaluating this.
There have, however, been attempts at grasping significance in other domains, which
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can help to inform how we evaluate the extent of bureaucratic noncompliance. I argue that
there are three core mechanisms that should indicate to us the gravity of the noncompliant
activity, as opposed to its potential triviality.
1. Noncompliance in Significant Legislation. A number of scholars (Mayhew 1991;
Cameron 2000; Lapinski & Clinton 2006) have taken great efforts toward identifying the
pool of significant laws from the broader set of public laws passed by Congress, and in the
case of Cameron (2000) and Lapinski & Clinton (2006), finding some way of ranking not
just their status as significant laws, but also their degree of significance, as opposed to being
important but not highly significant, or merely ordinary legislation. One can expect that an
agency skirting the edge of its authority in implementing a law that has been deemed to be
of little importance relative to the rest of the body of laws passed by Congress should not
be as consequential as if the agency were to fail to comply with its obligations under the
Clean Air Act, a highly significant law and the most important one under the jurisdiction of
the Environmental Protection Agency. Thus, the significance of the law being implemented
should have a bearing on the significance of the violation (or potential violation) on the part
of the agency.
2. Scope of Those Affected by the Noncompliance. While some bureaucratic actions
affect a wide swath of activity, other decisions have implications for fewer individuals or
organizations. For example, while air regulation (e.g., the Clean Air Act) is an issue of
national, even global significance, policies affecting water tend to be more at the state or
local level, and disputes over land allocations and preservation are most definitely of a more
local character. While it is undeniably the case that noncompliance can greatly affect a
smaller number of individuals or organizations, or only mildly affect a larger population, the
scope of the impact of the agency’s noncompliant behavior does serve as a reasonable proxy
for the significance of the action taken.
3. Visibility of the Noncompliance. The third and final metric by which I argue that
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one can evaluate the significance of noncompliant implementation behavior is the extent to
which the noncompliance is visible. Just as a law’s significance can be evaluated on the basis
of the extent to which it was covered in news outlets or more politics-specific venues such
as Congressional Quarterly (CQ), or the impact of court cases evaluated on the basis of the
volume of their citations, one can consider the extent to which the media addresses a case
of noncompliance as being at least somewhat indicative of the extent and meaningfulness of
the (potential) transgression. That is, we would not expect the New York Times to allocate
extensive coverage with respect to a relatively trivial deadline, but we might expect the New
York Times to extensively cover an agency’s failure to promulgate necessary rules under the
Clean Air Act.
While I do not attempt in this dissertation to measure degrees of noncompliance – though
it is a worthwhile venture for future related work – I do evaluate whether or not the non-
compliance is with respect to the implementation of significant legislation using the set of
significant laws identified by David Mayhew (1991), in addition to discerning the conditions
under which that noncompliance will have heightened impact and visibility.
Understanding Agency Ideology: Noncompliance by whom?
Having discussed bureaucratic noncompliance – both what I mean by it and how we can
evaluate its impact – it is worth considering by whom we are evaluating this noncompli-
ant bureaucratic behavior. While justifications for delegation often emphasize bureaucrats’
greater policy expertise and administrative capacity, there is the additional ideology-related
consideration that “[i]f agents care about the content of policy, they will value the opportu-
nity to influence it,” (Gailmard & Patty 2013: 25), a factor that implicates the driving forces
behind agencies’ policy adoption in the United States and the ultimate extent of democratic
accountability obtained in the process. Such ideology is acknowledged in Wilson’s (1989)
analysis of the American bureaucracy, noting that higher-level federal bureaucrats are more
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liberal than the population at large, and far more so than those in the business climate with
which they interact (1989: 65), though he notes at among senior agency executives there
was ideological variation across agencies (Id at 66).
While the president puts forth nominations for cabinet secretaries (e.g., Secretary of
Interior, Secretary of Labor) and other high-level posts (e.g. Administrator of the EPA),
such nominees must be confirmed by the Senate, thus requiring at least some degree of
political compromise that may result in an agency head having preferences not wholly con-
sistent with the nominating president. The existence of independent agencies provides for
the potential for greater disconnects in preferences given their insulating features such as
bipartisan commissions with fixed terms and insulation against removal. And underneath
the level of political appointees is a larger civil service, with some staff serving under mul-
tiple executive administrations. Thus, there is the additional complicating potential for
ideological heterogeneity within an agency or, in the case of civil servants (careerists), a
lack of policy motivation altogether. However, Howell & Moe (1999) model an executive
who is able to set bureaucratic preferences until those actions are overturned by Congress
or the courts. Moreover, as Gailmard & Patty (2013: 37) note, given the marked wage
imbalance between private labor markets and government employment, one can expect that
even those in careerist positions will pursue such a career not for the monetary gains, but
rather for the potential to influence policy outcomes even from the lower ranks. Such a view
is consistent with Carpenter’s claim that “[b]ureaucrats are politicians, and bureaucracies
are organizations of political actors” (2001: 353). But given the different layers of politi-
cal appointees and staffers, it is important that we make clear the setting in which we are
predicting noncompliance motivated by separation of powers conflict. Such an argument is
further supported by Wilson’s (1989) claim regarding the development of bureaucratic cul-
ture, with the bureaucrats’ political views tending to correspond with the overall political
orientation of the agency: “Bureaucracies will in time acquire a distinctive personality or
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culture that will shape the attitudes of people who join these organization” (Wilson 1989:
68). Thus, not only may bureaucrats inherently have political preferences that align with
the work with which they are engaged, but they may, according to Wilson’s theory, select
into agencies that are consistent with their ideology, while the agency “produc[es] certain
attitudes in its members” (Id).
This is not to say that there is perfect alignment between all bureaucrats and the institu-
tions in which they are situated. There is the alternative possibility that those views made
public are those that reflect the preferences of the more ideological agency heads, while not
necessarily reflecting the preferred positions of those at the lower ranks. Responding to the
marked influence of interest groups and lobbyists, which in many cases led to the suppression
or distortion of EPA scientists’ findings, in 2007 the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)
joined forces with the Center for Survey Statistics at Iowa State University to distribute a
44-question survey to nearly 5,500 EPA scientists on the subject of political interference in
their scientific work for the Agency, the use of science in EPA decisionmaking, communica-
tion barriers in the Agency, employee morale, and their perception of the EPA’s effectiveness
(Union of Concerned Scientists).19 The UCS survey resulted in a 29% response rate, with
1,586 completed surveys returned from scientists in all of the EPA offices and regions. The
respondents reported the following:20
• 60% of respondents had at least one personal experience with political interference in
the past five years.
• 43% of EPA scientists with more than 10 years of experience at the agency said that
political interference was more prevalent in the past five years than in the previous
five-year period.
19The survey sample was identified from EPA websites, consultations with current and former EPA em-
ployees, and internet searches.
20See Union of Concerned Scientists, “Interference at the EPA: Science and Politics at the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency” (2008) for a full report.
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• 7% had frequently or occasionally been told to inappropriately exclude or alter technical
information from scientific reports by the EPA.
• 16% had personally experienced frequent or occasional situations in which scientists
actively objected to, resigned from, or removed themselves from EPA projects due to
political pressures to change reports of scientific findings.
• 18% had personally experienced frequent or occasional situations in which their scien-
tific findings had been changed or edited in substantial ways.
• 22% had personally experienced frequent or occasional isntances of their data only
being revealed selectively or incompletely in ways that justified a specific regulatory
outcome.
• 13% had personally experienced frequent or occasional pressure to ignore regulatory
impacts on sensitive populations.
• 24% had personally experienced unreasonable disappearance or delay in the release of
their reports and scientific materials.
• 31% had personally experienced EPA leadership mischaracterizing scientists’ findings.
• 43% knew of many or some cases in which EPA political appointees had become inap-
propriately involved in scientific decisionmaking in the Agency.
While Gawthrop (1969: 112) characterizes it as “inevitable” that top-level administrative
executives will become wholly dependent on their subordinate administrative officials in order
to effectuate their responsibilities, these survey findings collectively point to a picture of an
administrative agency whose scientists – that is, the careerists within the agency as opposed
to the political appointees – are largely constrained by the preferences of those at the level
of the appointed leadership, which appears from these findings quite willing to suppress
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potentially valuable information so as to support its policy positions. Thus, whether the
truth is closer to Wilson’s characterization of bureaucrats in effect selecting into ideologically-
aligned agencies and thus having preferences consistent with the often quite liberal agency
heads, or closer to the survey findings that suggest the squelching of ideological disagreement
within the agency, what does appear clear is that the policy adoptions ultimately made reflect
the preferences of political appointees at the top of the hierarchy.
Such behavior can also be found in the Department of Interior, which was alleged by its
own Scientific Integrity Officers to have presented distorted summaries of studies and with
critical omissions and repeated inaccuracies all slanted in one direction with respect to a
pending decision to remove dams in the Klamath River.21 Moreover, according to a 2012
survey conducted by the Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, in which the
staff of the Interior Department’s Office of Inspector General (IG) were surveyed and 82%
responded, a growing number of investigators view the Office as actively working to avoid
embarrassing the administration rather than exercising political independence. Indeed, when
asked whether the IG conducted its work “free from improper influence” from the DOI,
nearly one in seven respondents said no and more than a quarter declined to respond, with
less than 60% saying yes.22 These survey findings were consistent with Congress’s and
PEER’s critiques that acting Inspector General Mary Kendall had compromised the IG’s
political independence in order to please political superiors. Given such staff statements as
“There are at least perceptions the acting IG and COS [Chief of Staff] did not do the right
thing, i.e., improperly squashed investigations, and have not been forthright with Congress,”
(Id) there is legitimate evidence that those in multiple capacities in the Department of
Interior are working to support the goals of those at the upper eschelon (potentially in ways
21“Interior Denies Spinning Klamath Science: Complaint Deemed Factual but Inaccuracies Excused as
‘Normal Practice.’” March 25, 2013. Press Release by PEER (Public Employees for Environmental Respon-
sibility).
22PEER noted that these survey responses reflected less political independence in the IG than in the
previous two years (“Rising Doubts on Independence of Interior Inspector General: Staff Survey Shows Only
60% Believe IG Operates ‘Free from Improper Influence.’” October 9, 2012. Press Release by PEER.
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contributing toward noncompliant activity), leaving limited latitude for even an ideologically
heterogeneous coalition in the agency to stray far from those preferences.
Thus, despite Lipsky’s characterization of street-level bureaucrats as “exercis[ing] wide
discretion in decisions about citizens with whom they interact. Then, when taken in concert,
their individual actions add up to agency behavior” (1980: 13),23 at least within domain of
the agencies on which I focus, and taking into consideration the potential policy motivations
of careerists with more lucrative options in the private sector, those bureaucrats operating
at the lower ranks appear to be both policy-motivated and operating with discretionary
windows that are highly constrained by those at the upper eschelons of their respective
agencies.24
The UCS noted in its report further that the White House Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) – in particular its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) –
has played in increasingly prominent role with respect to the creation, review, and approval
of regulatory decisions made by the EPA, using its influence to force the EPA to modify or
withdraw many of its rules and policies since the Reagan Administration. In addition to
merely reviewing EPA policies, the OMB additionally moved to micromanage the science
underlying EPA decisionmaking, such as imposing extensive constraints on how agencies
should conduct scientific analyses and even going so far as to manipulate scientific knowledge
and the basis for EPA rules (UCS Report, “Interference at the EPA”). This provides further
evidence of the close linkage between the policy choices ultimately made by the agency and
the preferences of the White House.25
While Administrators of the EPA do not necessarily squeak through Senate confirmations
23The survey findings are also rather at odds with Gawthrop’s (1969: 113) claim that subordinate bu-
reaucrats may be biased by their motivations for advancement, as well as have an interest in discounting
unfavorable information, though he notes that the latter claim was untested.
24One noteworthy exception to this is the process of “burrowing” – that is the transfer of political ap-
pointees into career positions so as to constrain future administrations’ regulatory capacity.
25The high level of White House influence on EPA decisionmaking also provides greater support for the
validity of using presidential ideology as a proxy for the agency’s preferences, as I discuss in greater depth
in the chapters that follow.
29
by narrow margins,26 they have not been without ample controversy during their tenures as
administrators. Only months after the Reagan Administration’s narrowly avoiding a House
of Representatives citation of contempt of Congress on the part of Secretary of Interior
James G. Watt, who had refused to disclose required papers, EPA Administrator Anne M.
Gorsuch was held in contempt of Congress by a vote of 259-105 for her failure to turn over
required documents on the subject of hazardous waste cleanup under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. Representative James
J. Florio (D-NJ) held that the Reagan EPA had markedly slowed the legal enforcement of the
hazardous waste laws passed by Congress, with dramatic reductions in prosecutions by the
Agency. The congressional vote in favor of holding Gorsuch in contempt followed effective
party line votes against Gorsuch in the House Public Works Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight (9-2 vote) and the House Public Works Committee (27-11 vote) given her
failure to comply with a congressional subpoena. 27 Moreover, Reagan’s 1981 nomination of
James Watt to be Secretary of Interior solidified the Administration’s positions with respect
to environmental deregulation, and though he garnered the support of 83 Senators, all 12
voting against Watt were Democrats, with no Republicans voting against his confirmation.28
Such dynamics collectively suggest high levels of contentiousness as well as partisanship in
the relevant agency leadership.
Central Hypotheses
Here I turn to the main claims of the dissertation, which I test in the chapters that
follow. Cameron’s (2000) treatment of veto bargaining is instructive in highlighting the
potentially marked significance of bureaucratic noncompliance despite its potentially limited
26The July 2013 confirmation of Gina McCarthy as Administrator of the EPA garnered modest bi-partisan
support with an ultimate Senate confirmation vote of 59-40, and the April 2005 appointment of Stephen
Johnson was approved with a Senate vote of 61-37.
27See “Gorsuch Cited for Contempt of Congress.” In CQ Almanac, 1982, 38th ed., 451-55. Washington,
DC: Congressional Quarterly.
28See “Nomination of James Watt to be Secretary of Interior,” http://scorecard.lcv.org/roll-call-vote/1981-
13-nomination-james-watt-be-secretary-interior.
30
appearance in inter-branch interactions over statutory implementation. Cameron lays out
a five-step sequential veto bargaining (SVB) model according to which institutional actors
gauge one another’s preferences and adjust behavior accordingly with respect to whether
to pass or veto legislation (particularly within the context of significant legislation). Thus,
while veto bargaining is in fact a common occurrence that permeates legislative-executive
interactions, we rarely observe actual instances of vetoes, given their effective representation
of the equilibrium breaking down amid uncertainty over the preferences of other actors. This
is, then, a study of the politics of negative power.
Similarly, we cannot infer that bureaucratic noncompliance is insignificant because of
the potentially only infrequent explicit punishments for that bureaucratic behavior, given
that much of the separation-of-powers dynamics shaping agency implementation are in fact
unobserved. If the agency is likely to suffer severe costs of not complying – such as the reduc-
tion of budget or the retraction of enforcement powers – then in equilibrium it will remain
in check with respect to its observable behavior. The interesting inter-branch interactions
come into play under conditions of reduced costs of noncompliance, such that the players’
incentives are reshaped and the opportunities for the agency to shift policy come to expand
greatly. That is, bureaucratic power expands under those conditions that are not conducive
to punishment from the legislative branch given higher levels of partisan conflict and the
multiplicity of sources of oversight. Agencies can thus pull policy toward their preferences
– irrespective of the statute in force – under these conditions, and if agencies have judged
correctly the political conditions in which they are operating, then in equilibrium we should
not expect to observe acts of punishment of agencies. Likewise, instances of punishment for
bureaucratic noncompliance can be thought of as off-equilibrium paths, with agencies poten-
tially misjudging the likelihood with which they will indeed suffer costs for their regulatory
actions. Observations of bureaucratic noncompliance may thus only scratch the surface of
the extent to which this phenomenon plays out, and the extent to which its possibility shapes
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other institutions’ behavior. This presents a number of empirical challenges with which I
grapple in the chapters that follow.
This project puts forward and tests a number of key hypotheses aimed at understanding
better the dynamics at work in policy implementation and lawmaking in the complex and
often divisive American separation of powers system. It goes without saying that an agency
will not defect when it expects to suffer great costs of noncompliance, or when those costs
exceed the potential gains. Administrators are known to be highly attuned to the political
conditions in which they operate, with Melnick (1994: 241) noting the arsenal that Congress
is capable of employing against administrators deviating from their preferences, such that
bureau chiefs are constantly looking over their shoulders at congressional action in their
domains of policy and operation.
In the chapters that follow, I argue that noncompliance rises under conditions of greater
ideological divergence between the legislative and executive branches, and when there is
greater partisan division within Congress, which raises the transaction costs of passing leg-
islation to punish a noncompliant agency. The modal political configuration in the United
States since the late 1960s has been divided government – that is, at least one chamber of
Congress being controlled by a party other than that of the president – and a consequence of
this political environment is congressional delegation to an agency (or agencies) committed
to potentially quite different sets of policies. Under conditions of heightened legislative-
executive conflict, agencies will be less satisfied with the policies preferred by Congress, and
will have the most to gain from working more actively to shift the policy location toward the
ideal point of the executive branch. But given the agency’s desire not to suffer punishment
for its regulatory behavior, its inclination to shift the policy location is conditioned upon
the ease with which Congress is able to pass laws that would have the effect of reducing the
agency’s capacity or discretion.29
29It will also be conditioned upon the existing enforcement apparatus, given the difficulty of defecting when
implementation is already highly fragmented across multiple administrative actors rather than concentrated
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A rich literature on Congress has explored the causes and consequences of gridlock, which
arises given key individual legislators’ preferences relative to the location of the status quo
(see, e.g., Krehbiel 1998; Brady & Volden 2008), as well as the important role of the fili-
buster as a tool to embolden minorities to block legislation that does not have supermajority
support in the Senate (Wawro & Schickler 2006). Thus, amid narrow partisan majorities or
greater partisan differences within or across the chambers of Congress, there is compromised
ability to pass legislation that would shift the policy location (or to punish an agency for its
transgressions). Given the fair assumption of agencies’ awareness of these political condi-
tions in Congress, I expect that these higher levels of gridlock will be associated with lower
levels of compliance.
I expect further that bureaucratic noncompliance will be negatively associated with con-
centrated oversight mechanisms, with fragmented checks on bureaucratic power contributing
toward more freedom to shift the policy location. Oversight challenges can arise from having
multiple principals, among them information leakages and collective action problems that
compromise collective control over agents (Gailmard 2009). Such collective action prob-
lems can lead to the underprovision of congression oversight of agencies, whether it be “fire
alarm” or “police patrol” (see McCubbins & Schwartz 1984). And as congressional over-
sight of administrative agencies breaks down, so too does the extent of representation in
administration.
Given this limitation in effective oversight, one might expect that having more actors
with power or influence over an agency (e.g., congressional committees and subcommittees,
the president, interest groups) should reduce subversion costs and thus increase the range
of non-delegated policy where agencies can implement without a high likelihood of pun-
in a single executive agency. Huber & McCarty’s (2004) characterization of bureaucratic capacity is one aimed
at the agency’s ability to accomplish its intended actions, which can be thought of in terms of resources or
competence. The enforcement structure in which the agency is implementing and the level of autonomy that
it affords the agency should be highly influential here as well (see Farhang & Yaver 2015 for a discussion of
administrative fragmentation).
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ishment. Bawn (1995) raises as a limitation her own analysis that her model treats the
legislature as a single decisionmaker with coherent preferences, whereas more recent work
on legislative-executive has examined multiple legislative principals (e.g., House, Senate,
committees) exercising influence over the executive branch. And as Clinton et al (2012)
demonstrate, fragmentation of legislative oversight of agencies among committees is quite
striking, which we can expect is one of many examples of the limitations on bureaucratic
control that in turn shape agency behavior. I discuss the role of oversight in greater detail
below.
The Role of Third-Party Oversight of Agencies
The conventional wisdom with regard to bureaucratic responsiveness versus drift is that
the agency will comply with the statute for fear of being punished. Examining the factors
that raise or lower the likelihood of Congress exacting a punishment against the agency
is informative in helping to illuminate the conditions under which agencies might have
greater-than-recognized opportunities to shape policy consistent with their preferences. But
Congress does not act alone in lawmaking or in its oversight of those tasked with imple-
menting its laws. In addition to interest groups having clear investment in pressing their
preferred policies – and preventing a “runaway bureaucracy” from shifting policy contrary to
their preferences – the judiciary also provides an important source of independent oversight
of both Congress and the agencies to whom it delegates statutory implementation authority.
Thus, Melnick (1994: 236) calls attention to the critical importance of placing statutory
interpretation within the context of separation of powers and responsibility among all three
branches of the federal government, with both courts and administrators having marked
impacts on the development and implementation of congressional programs.
The structural complexity and numerous veto players that pervade the United States
policymaking process and thus the constraints in moving policy from the status quo have
lead some to characterize the American state as weak, even “stateless.” But while the early
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regulatory state was seen as a mere “patchwork” that only later came to be organized
around national administrative capacities (Skowronek 1981), scholars more recently have
turned toward rethinking the notion of the American state and the more diverse forms of
law and policymaking that fall within its realm, with Novak going so far as to declare the
“weak” American state to be a mere fiction given the “extraordinary aggrandizement of
power within the American regime” (2008: 771).
I argue that both interest groups and the judiciary provide important sources of external
oversight of administrative agencies, thus shaping the extent to which administrative actors
are kept in check with respect to the delegating statutes as opposed to operating with greater
latitude as policymakers within the executive branch.
Interest Group Mobilization
In his famous 1965 treatise on interest group mobilization, Mancur Olson argues that
smaller interest groups can organize collectively if the group’s majority stands to gain more
from a collective good than they lose through the costs of organizing, but that with larger
interest groups come greater incentives to “free ride” on others’ efforts to provide public
goods so as to enjoy the benefits (the provision of the public good, which cannot be denied
if the group is successful) without paying the costs. Collective action problems are produced
when the majority of citizens adhere to this strategy, which in the context of this policy
domain can lead to the underprovision of environmental protection efforts. Such challenges
are particularly prominent in the context of larger scale, more global policy matters in which
individual efforts are less likely to produce recognizeable results. Derthick & Quirk charac-
terize the politics of deregulation as being a study of “how particularlistic, well-organized
interests can be subordinated to diffuse, far more encompassing, but ill-organized interests”
(1985: 13), with its prevalence spreading widely since the mid-1970s amid portrayals of
regulatory agencies as excessively subject to the preferences of regulated interests (Id at 42).
While mobilization around environmental policy would, according to this theory, be
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difficult given the nature of the goods at stake, the domain of environmental policy has
been a locus of partisan conflict and interest group activity from both the left and the
right. Looking within the context of financial regulation but consistent with my argument,
McCarty (2011: 20) argues that the firm possesses strong incentives to influence the agency’s
ideal point so as to achieve policy outcomes more proximate to its preferences. However,
he argues, the way that interest groups go about achieving its preferred policy is not by
working to directly influence the agency’s preferences, but rather to incentivize the agency
to make policy choices that are more favorable to the firm. If the agency is indeed responsive
to industry preferences, there is reason to suggest that agencies’ inclination may be to act
in ways not driven centrally by the delegating statutory text. McCarty’s model indicates
the possibility of important linkages between policy complexity and regulatory capture by
interest groups (Id at 22), a claim that has clear relevance to the notoriously complex realm
of environmental policy.30
A prominent role in which administrative agencies are engaged in rulemaking, the legit-
imacy of which rests in no small part on the linkages to public participation and consensual
processes for the development of rules such that the relevant parties view the rules as rea-
sonable (Kerwin 1994: 161). And indeed, public participation in rulemaking processes can
aid agencies with respect to researching the subjects of regulation, and determining the pub-
lic sentiment among affected communities. However, with these advantages of quality and
consensus-building around rulemaking – which can in turn translate to higher probabilities of
success in ultimate promulgation – comes the added complexity of of with whom the agency
is interacting in forming these decisions (Id at 163). The requirement of public participation
would become codified in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, which provided for the
rather minimalist requirement of “notice and comment” provisions” whereby there would be
30Comparison of compliance in bureaucratic implementation in more versus less complex policy domains
would be a fruitful avenue for further inquiry given the potential variation in regulatory capture and (po-
tentially) in turn, noncompliance.
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some form of consultation between agencies and the public. Such public participation was
particularly relevant in the aftermath of the expansions of government – in particular, social
regulation – marked by the 1960s and 1970s, such that organized interests were motivated
to engage in collective action to shape policy. However, the APA provided that such public
participation would not be necessary amid emergency situations or when the agency viewed
it in the public interest not to conduct such procedures.
A key question to the study of representation is whose voices are amplified through in-
terest groups engaged in the policymaking process. A related concern is that of regulatory
capture, which occurs when an administrative agency acts to advance the specialized con-
cerns of the interest groups most influencing it. That is, interest groups with high stakes
with respect to a given policy outcome are likely to focus their resources on attempting to
shape outcomes consistent with their preferences, while the mass public may not be at all
attuned to this particular issue and thus will ignore it altogether. Administrative agencies
are characterized as “captured” when interest groups’ resources succeed in “capturing” the
agency’s key member(s), resulting in the implementation of the interest group’s preferred
policy. Such dynamics have immense normative implications with respect to the extent to
which policy outcomes are being directed by the rule of law laid out by democratically elected
legislators, as opposed to a small subset of well-resourced organizations with high stakes in
the policy at hand. Thus, there are questions as to the extent to which the statutory provi-
sions for some measure of public participation helped to involve those who were previously
left unrepresented, or whether we still see emerging a picture of agencies engaging in lim-
ited notice and comment proceedings and continuing to be influenced strongly by powerful
interests, many of them the very subjects of their regulation.31
As key figures in policy implementation, administrative agencies come into frequent con-
31Kerwin (1994: 175) notes, for example, that while agencies typically observed the sixty-day period for
notice and comments, its ultimate effect on the public tended to be marginal given the complex and highly
technical nature of many of the rules being promulgated in this broadened regulatory setting.
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tact with the interest groups engaged in the policies within their jurisdictions, whether
through hearings or notice and comment rulemaking proceedings. Since the APA, Congress
has continued to work to statutorily strengthen the role of public participation in agency
decisionmaking and been a major force in promoting such participation in rulemaking (Ker-
win 1994: 173), with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 providing for
full disclosure of government decisionmaking criteria as well as extensive public involvement,
though as I address in the pages below, there was little in the way of litigation were such
requirements inadequately satisfied (and in turn, more limited credibility of the threat to
punish an agency more reluctant to engage the citizenry or interest groups). Addressing the
important relationship between interest groups and administrative agencies, Gordon and
Hafer (2005) hold that corporations use political expenditures as a way to “flex their mus-
cles” to regulators with whom they would be willing to fight over the reach of regulatory
intervention, which in turn yields reductions in enforcement activity with respect to those
corporations. That is, the agency suffers extensive costs – both time and resources – in re-
sponding to appeals of agency actions, and thus will, if given a credible signal of impending
resistance, choose instead to regulate less or regulate elsewhere.
Of course, interest group presence can have any of a number of different effects on agency
behavior. On the one hand, they can follow the expectations of Gordon and Hafer’s (2005)
study32 in that they push the agency to act consistent with their preferences, irrespective of
the statutory dictates given the costliness of encountering legal challenges from key corpo-
rations. On the other hand, that interest group presence can provide an added monitoring
effect, with more actors mobilized to enforce agency compliance in its implementation. While
the conventional wisdom is that the primary interest groups with which agencies are engaged
are business groups, the multiplicity of actors invested in particular outcomes can have the
32Looking within the context of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Gordon & Hafer (2005) construct a
model in which the regulated entity chooses the extent to which it will comply with regulatory requirements
and to what extent it will signal its type through the investment of its money.
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effect of maintaining a watchful eye on the agency’s actions. Which of these interest group
forces will prevail is not immediately clear, and may be driven by the composition of the
interest groups that are active in the policy domain, whether predominantly pro-business,
public interest, or a close division between the two. A well-funded army of corporate special
interests may well have the might to pull policy toward their preferences – leading one to
observe noncompliance – whereas a more diverse group of special interests or else a large
coalescing of public interests may send signals to the agency that its implementation actions
are being monitored closely, with potential (costly) legal ramifications for defection.
While the regulatory responses are somewhat different with respect to private actors, the
logic of seeking to avoid the costs of legal entanglements still holds, serving as an important
check on the ways in which the agency implements the laws under its jurisdiction.
Judicial Oversight
An issue at the heart of this dissertation is the assurance (or lack thereof) of bureau-
cratic accountability to the other political branches and the conditions under which some
interests and preferences are ultimately better represented than others. While in the context
of rulemaking, the judiciary aims for rulemaking to be done in a manner consistent with
constitutional principles and both substantive and procedural law, when thinking about the
oversight role of the judiciary there is is the complicating factor that judges themselves
are “creatures of the political system” and review agency rulemaking “through the prism
of [their] beliefs” (Kerwin 1994: 250). And while the process of judicail appointments is
highly politicized (and becoming even more so – see Binder & Maltzman 2009), upon ap-
pointment to the bench, judges become the least constrained among public officials, though
some (e.g., Cllark 2011) point to evidence of public opinion concerns that do influence their
decisionmaking.
The extent to which the judiciary holds the role of veto player in the American political
process varies depending on the nature of the legal issue at stake, with statutory interpre-
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tations able to be overriden through the (admittedly rare) process of legislative overrides
(Barnes 2004), but constitutional interpretation by the judiciary reining supreme over leg-
islation (Tsebelis 2002: 226). Given the various roles that courts can play in arbitrating
disputes over policymaking and discretion, as well as deeper constitutional challenges, “the
legislatures are always aware that their actions can be overruled by constitutional courts,
and sometimes even ask the courts for instructios in order to immunize their decisions from
judicial abrogation” (Id). Thus, constitutional courts (e.g., the Supreme Court) serve the
role as key veto players in the separation-of-powers lawmaking game, though there are rea-
sonable questions as to the credibility of the threat of override given partisan divisions on
the Court or the location of its median member relative to the preferences of the other veto
players in the political process.33
Contrary to many political science analyses of the politics and ideology virtually inher-
ent in the American judicial system, DC Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards once implied that
courts are aloof from politics because the greatly important issues are not part of the court’s
agenda – rather, courts merely construe statutes, review regulatory actions taken by ad-
ministrators, and superintend district courts (Banks 1999: 51). Edwards held that ideology
does not yield judicial conflict or policymaking because on the DC Circuit on which he sat,
judges agree with respect to a majority of the cases, providing evidence that judges are highly
constrained by the rule of law as opposed to having the flexibility to inject political views
into decisionmaking (Id). However, such a characterization of courts may in fact be deemed
naive, underestimating the impact of politics on circuit courts, with Abner Mikva providing
the challenge, “Pick a controversial subject in our democracy, and you can find at least
two points of view expressed by judges of the DC Circuit” (Id at 51-52).34 Thus, while the
DC Circuit Court of Appeals holds the rank of being the key court superintending national
33There is the additional complexity that courts may strike down legislation for substantive or for proce-
dural matters, thus providing for potentially less predictability in their interpretation of government action.
34There is the further complication that justices’ decisionmaking can potentially also be influenced and
constrained by public opinion given the desire to maintain institutional legitimacy (Clark 2011).
40
regulation, even the judges themselves disagree on the extent to which their ideologies are in
fact reflected in their interpretations and decisions on the cases before them. Nevertheless,
its importance as a monitor of agency actions and the policies that emerge as a consequence
cannot be understated, providing the potential for critical third-party oversight of agency
actions while also providing potential signals to agencies of the extent to which they might
be likely to be aggressive versus lenient in reviewing that regulatory activity.
The impact of congressional provision of private rights of action on public policy outcomes
cannot be overstated. The tool of litigation as a mode of statutory enforcement is available
to those holding that the government is under-regulating relative to the statutes drafted
by Congress, as well as those viewing the government as overregulating – that is, zealous.
Kerwin (1994) 251-52) holds that the very existence of the judiciary and threat of litigation
itself provides an important deterrent effect with respect to rulemaking behavior given that
those affected by rules may have the resources to sue, which imposes costs on the agency.
Thus, there is reason to suspect that the statutory provisions alone, and not the volume of
litigation, may predict bureaucratic behavior with respect to carrying laws into effect.
Apart from seeking to obtain justice in a specific case, the bringing of a lawsuit (as-
suming standing in the American legal system) has important policy implications for the
broader regulatory landscape given that the parties’ request for legal policy change goes
far beyond achieving a favorable result simply for themselves. While focusing on the presi-
dency rather than broader executive branch administrative apparatus, Whittington (2009)
holds that courts provide a potential mechanism for constraining the actions of the executive
branch, lending credence to the notion that the judiciary’s role in a policy and the agency
implementing it should have a meaningful impact on implementation behavior.35 Farhang
(2010) calls attention to the development of the “litigation state,” with Congress working
35Whittington holds that because political regimes of the last century have been characterized by greater
ideological diversity, such conflicts over the law are more likely, and the role carved out for judicial authority
is expanded.
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actively to mobilize private litigants to assert their claims – providing for such provisions as
fee-shifting and changes to damages awarded in ways that made litigation a more profitable
strategy for plaintffs – when they were concerned about bureaucratic drift amid centralized
administrative enforcement. This brings to light both the reasonableness of concern about
the shifting of policy given the preferences of ideologically distant administrators, as well
as the expanding role for private litigants in the implementation setting. And the simple
presence of courts holding this monitoring function has been argued to “foster[] a healthy
respect for the myriad of legal principles and issues that attach to rulemaking” in addi-
tion to pushing agencies to consider more squarely the views of potential plaintiffs should
they find themselves in court (Kerwin 1994: 252). The more careful consideration of such
perspectives can in turn have the effect of influencing the vigor of implementation and the
distance between the policies as set statutorily by Congress and the policies as implemented
by agencies.
The movement toward litigation through a “sue and settle” process36 is one quite familiar
to the environmental policy context, with the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Department of Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Services being the leaders among federal agencies
with respect to the settling rather than defending of cases brought by advocacy groups, and
other agencies such as the United States Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the
National Park Service, the US Department of Agriculture, the US Department of Commerce,
and the Army Corps of Engineers also engaging in this tactic.37 In addition to the EPA and
bureaus of the Department of Interior being the frequent agencies involved in this dynamic,
the most common advocacy group plaintiffs likewise are in the environmental domain, such
36Sue and settle is defined as the condition under which a given agency “intentionally relinquishes its
statutory discretion by accepting lawsuits from outside groups which effectively dictate the priorities and
duties of the agency through legally binding, court-approved settlements negotiated behind closed doors –
with no participation by other affected parties or the public” (“Sue and Settle: Regulating Behind Closed
Doors.” 2013 Report by the United States Chamber of Commerce, p. 11.).
37See “Sue and Settle: Regulating Behind Closed Doors.” 2013 Report by the United States Chamber of
Commerce.
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as the Sierra Club, WildEarth Guardians, Natural Resources Defense Council. Such sue
and settle cases span a range of different issues, with League of Wildnerness Defenders-Blue
Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Kevin Martin (D. Or.) addressing whether the US Forest
Services’s authorization of the Wildcat Fuels Reduction and Vegetation Management Project
in the Umatilla National Forest was in violation of NEPA and the Administrative Procedure
Act,38, Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne (N.D. Cal.) focusing on the December
2008 amendments to the Section 7 consultation rules under the Endangered Species Act
and the decision to exempt greenhouse gas emitters from regulation under the Endangered
Species Act,39 and Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Army Corps of Engineers (US
Supreme Court) addressing Clean Water Act guidance with respect to mountaintop removal
mining permits, which were alleged not to account for the impact on stream function.40
Because the sue and settle process involves negotiations between administrative agencies
and advocacy groups before the public has an opportunity to see the issue at stake, it
has been critiqued as not just increasing special interests’ role in policymaking, but also
undercutting agencies’ compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, whose goal was
largely to promote transparency and public participation in administrative rulemaking.41
Melnick (1994) addresses the monumental significance of statutory interpretation in mod-
ern lawmaking, including but extending well beyond the domain of civil rights policy. He
writes that in the aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971) – a landmark Supreme
Court case that embraced the “disparate impact” framework with respect to Title VII cases
under the Civil Rights Act – “it would be many years before Congress would again go
through the trauma of writing legislation on this controversial topic. In the meantime the
38The case was settled on December 30, 2009, with the US Forest Service agreeing to withdraw its decision
notice for the project and both parties agreeing to dismiss the case.
39The case was settled on May 14, 2009, with the Department of Interior unilaterally revoking the Section
7 rule and reverting back to the prior language, after which the parties to the lawsuit dismissed the case.
40The case was resolved on July 30, 2010, with the EPA issuing guidance while the suit was pending in
the US Supreme Court, effectively settling the case.
41See “Sue and Settle: Regulating Behind Closed Doors.” 2013 Report by the United States Chamber of
Commerce, p. 6.
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courts would define the crucial statutory phrases” (1994: 5). Harris & Milkis (1996) like-
wise call attention to the important role of courts, the decisions of which were reinforced by
congressional mobilization of private rights of action in environmental policy. The litigants
bringing forward these claims were seen as new kinds of public servants – private attorneys
general – in representing the grievances of many, and even losing suits serving the function
of bringing to light the mobilization around issues (Olson 1991: 64).
It was with mobilizing purpose that Congress created citizen suits, first appearing in
the Clean Air Act of 1963, empowering any individual to have standing in court to sue any
individual, including the administrator, for failure to comply with provisions of the law. The
use of this tool can be quite potent. For example, in 1992 the Ohio Environmental Protection
Agency issued an order mandating Hamilton County’s remedying of illegal sewer overflows,
which remain largely unchanged for the next ten years until December 2001, when the
Sierra Club filed a citizen suit and intervened in the consolidated state and federal actions
against the defendants (Metropolitan Sewer District, Hamilton County Board of County
Comissioners, and the City of Cincinnati), ultimately meeting with success in obtaining
and designing an effective resolution to the issue at hand.42 Thus, citizen suits have the
potential to foster concrete results and public benefits amid a government’s failure to respond
adequately to given issue, with these provisions providing “private citizens... [with] a second
level of enforcement and can serve as a check to ensure the state and federal governments
are diligent in prosecuting...” (Sierra Club v. Board of County Commissioners of Hamilton
County, Ohio, 504 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2007).
Whether policy enforcement is sought through litigation is of course far from random,
with Congress working actively to mobilize those litigants, who in turn make rational cal-
culations about whether or not to pursue those rights in court (Farhang 2010). And even
setting aside the institutional incentives crafted by Congress, a number of factors converge
42Altman, David, Amy M. Hartford, & Justin D. Newman. “Citizen Enforcement of Environmental Laws.”
D. David Altman Co., LPA. pp. 1-2.
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to contribute toward a system in which the “haves” disproportionately come out ahead given
their experience as repeat players in the legal setting (Galanter 1974), making policymaking
through litigation potentially unsatisfying.
I argue in the following chapters that courts play a number of key roles in shaping
bureaucratic compliance (or lack thereof) in contemporary implemenation. First, as Whit-
tington and others note, they provide a key source of third-party oversight, which one could
say was reduced in the aftermath of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council (1984) given its declaration of deference toward the decisions of administrative
agencies.43 The expression of Chevron deference has been touted as freeing up agencies to
update the meaning and reach of significant statutes in light of new scientific information,
though it carries the added consequence of subjecting agencies to greater political pressures,
with presidents more single-mindedly seeking to control agencies (Eskridge & Ferejohn 2010:
278). Moreover, in his June 14, 2000 testimony on the constitution’s nondelegation doctrine,
attorney Alan Charles Raul raised concerns that courts might be (at best) inconsistent in
their guarding of congressional prerogatives to make legislative decisions, in turn granting
agencies excessive discretion in their decisionmaking.44
This thus marks an important changepoint in the relationship among agencies, the presi-
dent, courts, and Congress. Second (though relatedly), the congressional provision of citizen
suits empowered ordinary citizens to have standing to challenge administrative agencies in
court – which is of course costly for the agency whether with respect to settlement or resolv-
ing disputes in court – thus shaping agency incentives in policymaking.
In sum, theory suggests that third-party oversight of administrative agencies – whether
through long-standing interest group presence or the mobilization of private litigants and
43However, some scholars, e.g., Merrill (1992), dispute the ultimate impact of Chevron deference on the
subsequent trajectory of administrative law.
44“Does Congress Delegate Too Much Power to Agencies and What Should be Done About It?” Hearing
before the Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regultory Affairs of the
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 2nd session, June 14, 2000.
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judicial review – should have the effect of keeping the agency compliant given the desire to
avoid costly litigation. However, given the costliness of engaging in that legal action and
the variation in effectiveness of that oversight (due to the nature of the policy, extent of the
monetary resources, etc.), there is important variation in to what extent these monitoring
tools ultimately are effective in preventing bureaucratic noncompliance.
Policy Shift through Noncompliance: Temporary or Enduring?
While it is a relatively simple task to identify the factors that lead to relative increases
or decreases in bureaucratic compliance, it is not as straightforward to identify the factors
leading to that policy change being temporary or enduring. In the case of the FDA’s regu-
lation of tobacco, discussed briefly above, the agency’s authority to regulate in this domain
was overruled by the Supreme Court, which held that the FDA was unable to prove that
the impact of tobacco products on the body was “intended” under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act of 1938. Given the Court’s holding that the FDA had transgressed its
regulatory authority, policy reverted back to its prior state rather than being sustained at
that higher level of regulation of this substance.
Yet the Environmental Protection Agency’s underenforcement of environmental statutes
did not result in such a roll-back of policy. While the Supreme Court typically grants cert to
around two environmental cases per year, Farber (1996) observes that the holdings have not
had a substantial impact on the status of US environmental law and regulation, and have
not offered guidance in shaping the scope of environmental statutes. Farber adds that when
the Court has taken up environmental cases of broader significance as opposed to narrower
applications of the law, the Court has made particular efforts to distance itself from the act
of making environmental policy (Id at 555), thus handing down narrower rulings. What’s
more, it was amid the Reagan Administration’s “regulatory relief” efforts and thus the
massive deregulaton of environmental protection efforts that the Court stated expressly in
Chevron that it would exercise deference toward agency decisionmaking (1) where the intent
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of Congress was ambiguous; and (2) where the interpretation was reasonable or permissible.
Thus, the agency’s efforts at underenforcement were sustained, at least in the short term.
So what explains these patterns? It is not immediately clear. A significant component
is the agency’s decision whether to regulate more or less than the policy that is set by
the statute. As discussed above, the conceptualization of noncompliance that this project
adopts centers on the agency’s decision to maximize its discretion by pulling policy toward
its preferences in ways that deviate from the statutory text. Thus, the definition itself
does not distinguish between the exceeding of authority and the failure to enforce a statute.
However, there are reasons to expect that, while both serving as examples of noncompliance,
they might play out somewhat differently in the separation-of-powers framework. Ting
(2001) holds that Congress can make infeasible agency actions with which it disapproves by
exercising its power of the purse. After all, effective agency regulation requires a monetary
investment, with those allocations coming from the legislature. One of the most powerful
tools at Congress’s disposal is known to be the power of the purse, which can shape regulatory
behavior in ways consistent with Congress’s goals. Given the financial reality of regulation
being costly, the tactic of funding retraction can be effective in controlling an agency seeking
to overregulate the statutory policy set by Congress.
However, the reduction of federal funds does not preclude an agency from declining to
enforce the provisions of a delegating statute: the agency remains empowered to sit on its
hands. Thus, there is a fundamentally different challenge of controlling an agent seeking to
do less than its principal’s prescription. If we expect that on balance, Democrats will be
more pro-regulation and Republicans more deregulatory in their approach, then this logic
suggests that there are asymmetric dynamics of bureaucratic control of Democratic and Re-
publican administrators, with the implementation of Republican administrators being more
difficult for Congress to control and Democratic administrators potentially more prone to
punishment. Moreover, given the asymmetry in Congress’s ability to punish these different
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types of implementation behavior, we can expect higher threshold levels of partisan con-
flict and compromised oversight before the agency views noncompliance as an attractive
policymaking option.
While it is thus reasonable to expect that the agency’s preferred policy will be stable
when it is below the policy set by the statute, underregulation should not be considered a
sufficient condition for agency success in shifting policy toward its preferences, nor should
we expect that an agency necessarily will fail in stepping farther beyond the location of the
delegating statute. Understanding the conditions driving agencies into each of the cells in
Table 1 – and understanding the consequences of policy evolution amid these inter-branch
battles over implementation – is at the heart of this dissertation.
Noncompliance and the Evolution of Bureaucratic Autonomy
While some have characterized the American state as being brought to life with the
New Deal, some scholars of American statebuilding (e.g., Skowronek 1982, Skocpol 1992,
Carpenter 2001) have taken issue with such a characterization, instead evaluating significant
developments in statebuilding in earlier decades. With bureaucratic autonomy a central part
of early state development (Carpenter 2000, 2001), we ought to consider the role of bureau-
cratic noncompliance as a consequence of previously established autonomy, and potentially
as a threat to future autonomy. Within the context of the United States Post Office, Car-
penter holds that the “crux of the state-building legacy lay in policy innovation” (2000: 122)
and entrepreneurship, with subsequent reputation building transforming delegation patterns
between politicians and bureaucracy at the turn of the century (Id at 125). This notion of
autonomy is a form of deference that “prevails when a politically differentiated agency takes
self-consistent action that neither politicians nor organized interests prefer but that they
either cannot or will not overturn or constrain in the future” (Carpenter 2001: 17), though
it is important to note that his definition of autonomy is not one of unfettered agency policy-
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making, but rather agencies’ ability to use their recognized capacities to change the public’s
agendas and preferences. Bureaucratic autonomy does not require perfect congruence of pref-
erences, but in order to earn deference from other actors, it does require the development
of a politically-forged organizational reputation for efficicacy, uniqueness of service, moral
protection, and expertise. And it is this very autonomy that facilitated early state-building
in the United States for those agencies successful in this endeavor.
Though Carpenter’s (2000, 2001) analysis provides an excellent treatment of the devel-
opment of autonomy in a new agency – that is, the ways in which the agency builds its
reputation for efficiency and innovation in implementation – it is ultimately unclear how
the dynamics of reputation and autonomy continue to play out in a well-established agency
that has engaged in repeated play with Congress and the courts. Are these reputations path-
dependant, or can they evolve as agencies work to continue to earn that autonomy in carrying
out tasks delegated to them? If bureaucratic autonomy is built out of stable legitimacy and
coalition-building and not occasional administrative fiat (2001: 354), noncompliance appears
to be a challenge to its continuation.
An important question is raised, then, if through shrewdness and organizational efficiency
an agency carves out for itself an autonomous role in policymaking and a future coalition
exploits that freedom to move policy irrespective of the statute, what is the nature of the
agency’s continued autonomy (or lack thereof), and how do lawmaking strategies – and thus
the continuation of state capacity – adapt over time as a consequence? This does not pose
a challenge to Carpenter’s (2001) thesis, but raises important questions as to the ultimate
(and thus far, unexamined) consequences of the bureaucratic behavior under his microscope.
With ample ongoing separation-of-powers conflict and changing preferences over time, we
may be skeptical of claims of path dependence in this role of bureaucratic policymaking.
Given Carpenter’s observation that long-term discretion is based upon reputation or observed
capacity of the agency, there is reason to expect there to be fluidity in the autonomy granted
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over time when there is variation in noncompliance. Absent a more dynamic conception
of the state and the legislation that regulates it, these questions have thus far remained
unanswered. These are the very tasks that this project takes up.
Bringing Congress Back in: Dynamic Conceptions of Lawmaking
In many cases, contemporary lawmaking is fundamentally different from that which can
be observed in earlier decades. Rather than creating new legal and bureaucratic structure
– such as with the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, or the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 – Congress extends and reworks an existing
administrative and legal apparatus in laws such as the FDA Modernization Act of 1997
and the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, both of which built
importantly on the landmark statutes that preceded them. As such, it is imperative that we
consider not just the original legislative bargains struck, but also how they have evolved in
their substance and structure given the inter-branch battles at work in implementing those
laws. That is, how do agency transgressions in implementing shape the form in which those
laws endure, and what are the implications with respect to future administrative capacity
(not to mention, the location of the policy itself)?
While legislators drafting statutes are constrained by the nature of political conditions at
the time of enactment and lack perfect information about how its design will play out, future
coalitions have opportunities to breathe new life into these laws. Indeed, if congressional
delegation to administrative agencies has an effect of leaving it to agencies to fill in the gaps of
statutes through, for example, the promulgation of rules, then statutes will have an inherently
dynamic nature in practice, and empirical evidence confirms that continued congressional
attention to many statutes contributes to evolving de jure policy as well. Moreover, the
very nature of U.S. statutory interpretation facilitates this dynamic process, with private
parties’ interpretations of statutes able to be corrected by implementing administrators,
whose decisions can be reversed by judges, whose statutory interpretations can be overriden
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by Congress (Eskridge & Ferejohn 2010: 272). Thus, both the text and its interpretation
can be in play repeatedly over time.
Patashnik provides one of lone treatments of the after-effects of major acts of U.S. law-
making, though his study emphasizes the durability of policy reform, holding that “[r]reforms
endure not because they are ‘frozen in place’ or because their background conditions do not
change. Rather, they endure because they reconfigure the political dynamic” (2008: 155).
Patashnik offers two compelling reasons to study the evolution of general-interest policy re-
forms: to better understand the consequences of prior efforts at policy reform, and to improve
the direction of future policymaking (2008: 11). Thus, understanding these processes helps
to better illuminate not just why policy programs have succeeded or failed in the past, but
also to better anticipate future sustainability. Of course, the question that this dissertation
explores is not one aimed centrally at policy sustainability, but rather the reconfiguration of
implementation strategy and the resulting policy shifts in the ongoing inter-branch battles
that are waged. However, understanding the broader policy dynamics underlying general
interest reforms (and their disintegration) is highly informative in this lawmaking study.
If we expect Congress to punish bureaucratic noncompliance upon observing it, then there
are a number of important questions about the longer-term ramifications of these inter-
branch interactions. First, how does congressional punishment for noncompliance in one
domain affect the agency’s behavior in another? Does the agency learn from this statutory
curbing of its behavior and adapt its implementation – suggesting somewhat of a ripple
effect – or is the punishment confined to the transgression observed? We know precious little
about the downstream effects of bureaucratic control, and how constraints on some agency
behaviors affect the broader implementation agenda and the resulting policy outcomes. This
cannot be answered fully within the confines of this project, but is a crucial question given
the prevalence of agency actions that extend beyond their discretionary windows, and the
vast opportunities for agencies to be influenced by one another given recent decades’ patterns
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in fragmented legislative designs (Farhang & Yaver 2015).
Additionally, how do punishments for noncompliance affect longer-term administrative
capacity and state-building? Does it simply reshape the tools with which agencies work to
accomplish its policy ends, or does it have the effect of actually reining in the reach of the
regulatory state? By understanding better the ways in which Congress revisits legislation
given variation in agency compliance and transgressions in implementation, we can work to
answer these important questions of law, policy, and American state development.
Importance of Statutory Complexity
If it is true, as Federalist Paper 37 declares, that laws are always “more or less obscure
or equivocal until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular dis-
cussions and adjudications,” then the resolution of those policy issues is crucial. Melnick
characterizes political systems as differing in the ways in which power is statutorily dis-
tributed between judges and administrators in the separation-of-powers setting (1994: 8).
Because policy reforms are rarely self-implementing and require important follow-up from
administrative and other actors, including administrative rulemaking and the monitoring of
regulated actors (Patashnik 2008: 156), it is all the more important to consider the imple-
mentation dynamics and not simply the processes at work in the legislative passage. This is
particularly true of lawmaking in recent decades, which is characterized by increasing levels
of not just detail, but complexity (Schuck 1992), which Herz attributes in part to the growth
in congressional staff over time (1992: 177) as well as to offset the incentives created by
the Supreme Court’s move toward increased judicial deference with the articulation of the
Chevron doctrine (Herz 1992: 179).
Many legal norms have evolved from relatively precise and determinate rules to more
ambiguous standards, with the movement toward administrative rulemaking being closely
connected to increased administrative discretion, the exercise of which creates greater legal
complexity (Schuck 1992: 9). It is this legal complexity that magnifies transaction costs
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in lawmaking because it generates uncertainty: such laws are more costly and cumbersome
to administer, more difficult for lawmakers to formulate and agree upon, and more difficult
to reform once established. Thus, complexity magnifies the costs of compliance (Id at 18).
Legal complexity could in a sense be viewed as inevitable given the increasing complexity
of life and democratic politics (Kagan 2009: 3), with policy domain and social context
having key roles in determining the level of complexity of the law. That is, the American
economy has become more interdependent and the scope of the state more vast.45 Barnes
likewise addresses the growing complexity and interdependence of federal laws, which likely
has increased the extent of conflict among statutes (2004: 35), which can in turn raise the
costs that the agency must undergo in order to comply. Coming back to the quintessential
question of distributive politics, there are important questions as to who benefits (and how)
from the pervasive (and potentially growing) complexity of American law, given the policy
consequences that follow.
The consistently high levels of partisan conflict in the United States not only raises nu-
merous issues to high levels of salience but also leads Kagan (2009) to describe the United
States as a “perfect storm” of constitutional and political conditions contributing toward
statutory complexity and fragmentation of implementation power. Farhang & Yaver (2015)
find that this fragmentation of authority across multiple actors and agencies is powerfully
associated with the growth of divided government since the late 1960s, as well as patterns
of electoral uncertainty, in both cases with congressional coalitions designing legislation in a
manner to guard against drift, whether from the executive branch or from a future congres-
sional coalition. To what extent the law that ultimately is crafted is coherent and cohesive
has potentially quite important effects with respect to how these laws are put into action by
the administrative agents of Congress. After all, even in the case of an agency that seeks to
45Schuck (1992: 25) also attributes the growth in legal complexity to the development of social conditions
that are more difficult to regulate and control, as well as a higher level of education and professionalism,
which raises the tolerance for complexity in social institutions including the American legal system.
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implement a law faithfully, the added degree of uncertainty as to the meaning of the statute
creates more risk of policy outcomes deviating from legislative intent (such as it is). This
becomes all the more problematic when legislative and executive preferences are no longer
congruent, such that administrators have added incentive to shift the policy location toward
their ideal point, and courts are given greater monitoring roles over agencies in working to
ensure compliance. Thus, we observe under such circumstances not only potentially less
compliance from agencies, but also less long-term stability in policymaking, which in turn
has important implications for the scope of state regulatory capacity over time.
These issues of growing statutory specificity are particularly prominent within the domain
of environmental policy, which is the focus of this dissertation. The White House Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) has taken on an active role in overseeing, and often
compromising, regulatory actions taken by the Environmental Protection Agency, a dynamic
that has exacerbated legislative-executive conflict over environmental policymaking due to
the apparent inconsistency between the OMB’s mission and the statutory mandates to which
the EPA is held accountable by Congress and the courts (Herz 1992: 180). The motivation
for Congress to draft more specific – and in turn, constraining – statutes in this realm is made
even more prominent given interest groups’ distrust of the EPA and thus pressure on Congress
to use specific (and favorable) language in the delegating legislation (Id). Such statutory
detail and complexity can be seen quite prominently in the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, a significant piece of legislation that was both extensive in length – nearly four times
the length of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 – and in its micromanagement of EPA
actions.
Given Congress’s institutional prerogatives for power and for its laws to parallel the ob-
served policy outcomes, the uncertainty and other challenges caused by statutory complexity
should create added incentives to revisit its laws, thus better clarifying and updating where
policy should be set. Indeed, Melnick holds that litigation rises “not when administrators act
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lawlessly but when both administrators and judges are compelled to read between the lines
of statutes produced by factious legislators” (1994: 241). While Melnick does not provide an
empirical analysis of noncompliance, he argues that administrators “almost always complied”
with respect to laws that were clear and detailed (Id), suggesting that a meaningful contribu-
tion toward noncompliance is the complexity and vagueness of the statutes that agencies are
tasked with implementing. I argue instead that there are a number of factors contributing
toward intentional efforts to shift policy from the statute’s location toward administrative
preferences, but nevertheless his claim calls attention to the importance of considering the
nature of the laws being written in understanding both agency implementation and the
subsequent lawmaking that takes place.
Plan of the Dissertation
I have outlined above questions that this dissertation raises and their importance to the
broader issues of policymaking and administrative state development in the United States.
I argue that given varied conditions in partisan conflict between the branches and within
the legislature, agencies’ incentives with respect to whether or not to comply with the del-
egating statutes are fundamentally reshaped in ways not recognized in the political science
literature to date. While oversight mechanisms can work to keep these agencies in check,
the multiplicity of oversight actors can create further opportunities for agencies to exploit
coordination problems and set policies closer to their preferences. The complexity of con-
temporary lawmaking can have the effect of contributing toward the noncompliance of even
a well-intentioned agency given the uncertainty of the meaning of the statutes and the au-
thority that they delegate. These deviations from the authorizing statutes can compromise
potentially well-established bureaucratic autonomy as Congress observes that its trusted
agents are no longer using that latitude consistent with its preferences. And relatedly, given
the ample potential for these agency defections, Congress can carve out for itself a more ac-
tive role in the lawmaking game by continuing to revise policy substance and implementation
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to better control its agents.
Chapter 2 provides a more thorough discussion of the theory of the dissertation, articu-
lating the incentives and the preferences of the institutions at work in regulating policy in the
United States. I demonstrate theoretically and empirically that there are a number of legal
and political conditions that have important effects on the benefits and feasibility of moving
policy toward agencies’ preferred policy location. After all, congressional punishment for
agency trangressions requires some threshold level of coalition support and homogeneity of
preferences within and across the chambers of Congress, which theory holds is compromised
under conditions of partisan conflict and dispersion of oversight authority.
The project will proceed with a number of large-N statistical tests of the theory presented
in Chapter 2, applied within two federal agencies: the Environmental Protection Agency and
the Department of Interior.46 This analysis serves as the first rigorous attempt to analyze
empirically the conditions under which agencies deviate from the delegating statutes to adapt
policy consistent with their preferences, and uses a novel, original dataset with which to test
these theories.
Chapter 6 provides the first metric by which to examine long-ranging patterns in policy
movement by through statutory amendments over time, demonstrating the consequences of
this bureaucratic behavior on subsequent policymaking through statute. The data provide
support for the hypotheses discussed above, raising both broader questions of implementation
such as the ripple effects of noncompliance in one domain and punishment (or lack thereof)
for that behavior, as well as normative questions about the scope of the true rule of law in
the United States. Given the complexity of these lawmaking processes and thus the value of
understanding the more nuanced processes at work, to further test the hypotheses I supple-
ment the quantitative analysis with in-depth process tracing in a small number of qualitative
case studies of statutes under the agencies’ jurisdiction, emphasizing statutes implemented
46Future work will extend the analysis to include also the Internal Revenue Service.
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by multiple agencies. Doing so allows me to evaluate the effects of political conflict as well as
bureaucratic design and ideology on the patterns and persistence of noncompliance, holding
constant the policy substance.
By examining bureaucratic noncompliance over a period of approximately forty years
within the agencies – thus spanning a wide variety of legal and institutional conflict conditions
– we can understand the sources and dynamics underlying important adaptations to policy
and administrative capacity in the modern American administrative state. The project
provides important new insights about the rule of law in a world of bureaucratic governance,
as well as the little-recognized conditions under which bureaucratic control breaks down.
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Chapter 2: A Theory of Noncompliance
Despite regulation originating in the laws passed by Congress, a number of presidents in
recent decades have made regulatory reform a core part of their domestic policy agendas, in
part in response to purported excesses of bureaucracy. A fairly common story of delegation
is as follows: Congress delegates to executive branch agencies (or to courts) because amid
a growing administrative state, there are limits to the extent of policymaking that it can
pursue on its own and moreover, it can capitalize on the expertise that agencies hold in
more technical domains of policy. In making such delegations, Congress imposes a set of
administrative procedures – for example, time-limited authority (sunset provisions) and re-
quirements that the agency report to Congress before taking certain regulatory actions – so
as to facilitate its monitoring of the agency and thus to limit the potential for bureaucratic
drift (McNollgast 1987, 1989). Agencies are rational, strategic actors with both preferences
over policy and institutional prerogatives for some degree of autonomy in implementation,
and thus they will seek to avoid punishment at the hands of the other institutional actors.
Thus, while the agencies’ preferences may differ from those of the legislature, it will act so as
to avoid punishment, resulting in compliance – that is, the policy choice set by the agency
will be within its discretionary window (pA ≤ d).
To be sure, this story is a common one amid this era dominated by conditions of divided
government. The United States separation-of-powers system virtually guarantees at least
some level of preference divergence among the various institutional actors. Congress and the
President may not have political preferences that align, a trend that has been all the more
prevalent since the late 1960s. Thus, not only does this raise the potential for new waves of
partisan conflict over confirmations, but there is a diminished likelihood that the appointees
of the president will have preferences that map perfectly on to those he holds. This process
is also true of Supreme Court appointees, who furthermore are given life tenure and remain
on the Court for longer periods of time than was the case previously, such that there is more
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opportunity for judicial divergence from the opinion of those elected into office by the public
more recently.
Likewise, Congress can statutorily create independent agencies, which are much more
insulated from both presidential and congressional influence as compared with executive
bureaus (Lewis 2003). Such agencies have institutional features including having a bipartisan
board that shares power over the agency and whose terms typically are staggered, and
limits on the president’s and Congress’s authority to remove commissioners. This can have
the normatively desirable effect of producing administrative policymaking that is not as
directly driven by partisan preferences (though to say that they are purely insulated would
be a marked exaggeration).47 Yet in the absence of more formalized controls on behavior,
there becomes a heightened potential for ideological drift in those agencies. And when we
compound these facts with lifetime appointments on the judiciary and thus often imperfect
associations between judicial and executive and legislative preferences, one finds a number
of avenues through which partisan conflict can emerge, and even explode.
Even within Congress, the modal argument has been that there has been ever-increasing
polarization within Congress (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal 2006). Wawro and Schickler
(2006) note that given the ideological orientation of the contemporary Congress, it is now a de
facto requirement that significant bills obtain supermajority support in order to achieve final
passage. Lee (2009) observes that in addition to observing the now commonplace polarization
on issues of major policy substance, it has become the case that partisan conflict extends
even to those issues not traditionally associated with party lines,48 leading her to conclude
that the tensions are driven not so much by ideology, but rather by partisan affiliation. And
as Epstein & O’Halloran (1999), Maltzman & Shipan (2008), and others have noted, it is
47Examples of such independent agencies include the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the
National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal Election Com-
mission.
48In fact, she finds that there is even greater polarization along these other, more procedural issues as
opposed to the commonly salient policy matters such as health care or environmental policy.
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under these highly conflictual partisan environments that there are higher transaction costs
in engaging in lawmaking – with more extensive gridlock between key members of Congress
and thus less opportunity to move the status quo policy – as well as ex-post oversight.
These conditions of legislative conflict have been shown to have marked effects upon
statutory design, with Maltzman & Shipan (2008) finding less statutory durability when laws
were crafted out of compromise in conflictual environment as indicated by Common Space
NOMINATE distance between the enacting House and Senate. A considerable limitation to
their analysis, however, is their restriction to considering the time from enactment until the
first statutory amendment, and not the overarching direction of the policy over time. Farhang
& Yaver (2015) find that divided government is strongly and positively associated with
congressional fragmentation of administrative power across numerous actors and agencies,
which should have the effect of reducing the ability of the president – as well as future
legislative coalitions – to reshape policy. Thus, what emerges from these conditions of divided
government is a stickiness of the status quo (see also Moe 1989). Some (e.g., Schuck 1992)
have also observed a growing degree of complexity in American law, looking to the density,
technicality, and uncertainty of laws and rules, along with statutes distributing power across
different decision processes. The interpretation of these complex statutes is highly important
in modern lawmaking, with many administrators left to read “between the lines” (Melnick
1994), which has a rather natural effect of empowering bureaucrats as well as contributing
to greater uncertainty in the legal landscape.
Given this complexity and changing partisan configurations over time, it behooves us to
consider the conditions under which Congress (the principal) is unable to induce compliance
in its administrative agents. I refer to this process as bureaucratic noncompliance, which
is agency efforts to maximize discretion in ways that deviate from 1.) statutory directives,
and/or 2.) the current Congress’s preferences over implementation. While these efforts need
not necessarily be intentional, I focus here on bureaucratic behavior that is aimed at shifting
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policy from the status quo toward the agency’s preferences over policy.
A Tale of Two Congresses
Discussing bureaucratic noncompliance begs the question, noncompliance with what?
Looking within a narrow window of time can make quite plain the principal-agent account-
ability set-up with respect to new legislation, such that the Congress in power is the Congress
that provided for that delegated discretion. However, it often is the case that agencies are
tasked with implementing laws passed several Congresses prior, by Congresses that may
have a markedly different ideological distribution than that currently in power, and without
necessarily further updating the statute.49 That is, while the Congress currently empowered
to punish the agency may have preferences that cohere with the delegating Congress, it is
hardly a given, nor is it a given that a contemporary Congress will be committed to upholding
a legislative bargain from several Congresses previous. This potentially marked disconnect
in legislative preferences can have the effect of yielding an important – and little-discussed
– tension between the ideals of ex ante constraints set forth by the delegating Congress, and
the ex post realities of policymaking in a highly volatile partisan environment character-
ized by changing political conditions over time. Additionally, there is the uncertainty of to
what bargain the judiciary will hold the agency accountable in evaluating its bureaucratic
implementation.
Thus, we have an important – though scarcely studied – wrinkle in American policy
implementation, which is that while the United States Congress as an institution is stable,
it does not serve as a stable principal in the sense of its ideological composition, which
changes every two years (to varying degrees). Such problems of instability in principal-
agent relationships were called attention to by Huber and Lupia (2001), who address cabinet
49A similar argument is made in the context of the judiciary, with evaluations of interpretations of the
enacting Supreme Court decision by a contemporary lower court, with the intermediate actors of subsequent
Supreme Courts and subsequent lower courts also able to interpret and shape precedent (Westerlund et al
2010: 893-94).
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ministeries that are unstable such that the delegating principal does not ultimately perform
the monitoring functions over the agent. Amid these information problems, the resulting
instability has the effect of transferring power to bureaucrats (Id at 26) and furthermore,
even without principal-agent information challenges, the uncertainty about turnover creates
even greater difficulties in bureaucratic control. This is, I argue, not unlike the United
States case given the presence of midterm elections every two years, some of which result
in little ideological change, others of which do not affect partisan control but do affect
supermajoritarian institutions (e.g., the filibuster), and others of which result in radical
swings in preferences. As such, it is important that we turn our attention to “delegation as
it is practiced” as opposed to “delegation as it is portrayed in many formal models” (Id at
18, emphasis in original text), and the challenges of democratic accountability that arise in
this setting.
To take a simple example, the Communications Act was passed by the 73rd Congress
in 1934 under the (Democratic) Roosevelt Administration, and has since been amended
extensively to account for new and changing technologies through which to disseminate
information. Both chambers of the enacting Congress were heavily Democratic, boasting
supermajorities. In the 98th Congress, the Cable Communications Act of 1984 was passed.
Here, the (Republican) president in power is Ronald Reagan, the Senate is controlled also by
the Republican Party, but the House of Representatives is controlled by the Democrats. This
presents a unique and potentially quite challenging partisan configuration given the necessity
that House and Senate versions of bills be reconciled in conference committee, and thus
poses an added burden to compromise in order to achieve final passage. With a Republican
president and a Republican higher chamber of the legislature tasked with implementing –
or revising – New Deal-era legislation, one might expect that Reagan-appointed Federal
Communications Comission (FCC) members might have exercised greater fidelity to the
Reagan Administration and Senate’s communications policy preferences, or at least have
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different interpretations of their authority as opposed to the interpretation circa 1934.50
Moreover, the FCC was faced with the task of continuing to regulate communications policy
under the Clinton Administration but extending beyond the Republican takeover of the 104th
Congress with the “Contract with America.” In 1996, America would see the passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which was considered to be the first significant overhaul of
telecommunications law since the enactment of the Communications Act of 1934. Thus, what
we have observed is marked change in the preferences and broader partisan configurations
across a time horizon of over 60 years, all while tasked with interpreting and continuing
to implement the Communications Act of 1934 and its subsequent amendments. If these
changes in overall partisan preferences are associated with differences in interpretations of
the Act and its proper reach under the administration of the FCC, then this should signal
a need for greater attention to these different interpretations and to which one we should
expect fidelity in implementation.
I argue that these different legislatures – the enacting Congress (and the legislation it
passed) and the one presently in power – creates a multiple principals problem in United
States lawmaking and policy implementation. Such an argument is consistent with Ferejohn
and Shipan (1990), who examine the effects of judicial review in the separation-of-powers
system, holding that statutory judicial review can be a “‘democratic’ device that induces the
agency to be more responsive to congressional preferences than it would be without such a
mechanism,” but that this fidelity is with respect to the preferences of the current Congress
and not the preferences of the enacting legislature (1990: 17). The relationship between
Congress and agencies typically presumes some form of a principal-agent relationship, and
an extensive formal theory literature has worked to understand the various problems that
arise as a consequence of having not one, but multiple principals. Moe (1984, 1987) finds
50It is important to note, however, that the FCC is an independent agency and thus is more removed from
presidential influence than are executive bureaus given, for example, party balancing requirements among
commissioners.
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that in the highly contentious separation of powers system of the United States, administra-
tive agencies inevitably find themselves operating in an environment of warring principals,
with extensive interest group mobilization, congressional oversight committees competing for
influence, as well as ideological divergence between Congress and the President amid divided
government, which has become particularly common since the late 1960s.
Volden (2002) examines grants of bureaucratic discretion that requires both legislative
proposal and presidential approval – thus with two principals not necessarily in concert
with one another – and finds that while there typically is an assumption that bureaucratic
discretion reflects the interests of its principals, that model breaks down when there are
multiple principals who must agree on those grants of authority (Gailmard and Patty 2012:
367). Moreover, Gailmard (2009) notes that the principals’ oversight capacity becomes
compromised and costly under such conditions given the potential for information leakages
when one principal reveals information to all principals, in addition to generating collective
action problems in monitoring. His model does not emphasize ideological distance among
principals, which may well exist and exacerbate the challenges of bureaucratic control, but
rather demonstrates that “multiplicity alone is sufficient to induce control loss” (2009: 182).
This finding, along with the additional challenges discussed above, suggest that there may
be far-reaching effects of these multiple legislative principals in my analysis. And if, as in the
context of judicial review, fidelity is largely to the current legislative principal as opposed to
the statutory text (Ferejohn & Shipan 1990), the stage may be set for a great deal of policy
volatility and uncertainty as agencies become caught in a tug-of-war between legislative and
judicial interpretations of the agency’s statutory authority and obligations. Such dynamics
can importantly contribute to agency actions that are noncompliant, and which are not
explained by existing models of delegation.
Of course, a valid question is whether this noncompliant is strategic or unintentional.
The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) organized a panel of sixteen senior
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government executives at the level of assistant secretary, and issued a report stating, “Over
many years, government has become entwined in elaborate management control systems and
the accretion of progressively more detailed administrative procedures. This development
has not produced superior management. Instead, it has produced managerial overburden”
(Wilson 1989: 369). Such overburden, with “procedures overwhelm[ing] substance” (Id) can
have the potential to lead to noncompliance more incidentally as a consequence of increasing
expectations of agencies given choices of legislative design (potentially with the very goal of
hampering effective administration) and the growth of delegation in policymaking. While
out of step with statutory mandates, the nature of this technically speaking noncompliance
is somewhat different in that it is not addressing strategic behavior aimed at securing a
different policy outcome than that which Congress set forth.
A challenge in the dissertation is the disentangling of compliance that is with the aim
of shifting the policy toward the agency’s preference when dissatisfied with its location, and
that which evolves out of bureaucratic administration challenges such as overburdening or
underfunding. The focus of this study is intentional efforts on the part of the agency to
capitalize on what it perceives as greater ranges of implementation latitude to pull policy
toward its ideal point, potentially in noncompliant manners.51 One way that I work to
address the fact that “noncompliance” may simply be insufficient resources is the inclusion
of variables tracking the agency’s annual budget and workforce, with the assumption that
those effects should be powerful and significant if they are in fact driving the bureaucratic
behavior that is out of step with that set by Congress, or with the current Congress’s
51For example, on October 22, 2002, the organization Safe Food and Fertilizer challenged the EPA’s rule
issued on July 24, 2002, which held that zinc-containing hazardous wastes would be excluded from the
definition of solid waste used as fertilizer so long as they met certain metal concentration standards. The
organization challenged the rule in the DC Circuit Court of Appeals with the assistance of the Western
Environmental Law Center, challenging both the content of the rule and the EPA’s authority to promulgate
such a rule under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, which was passed with
the aim of ending reliance on land disposal, requiring that hazardous wastes be disposed in a manner that
protected human health and the environment, and be accounted for from start to finish” (Anonymous.
“Challenging the EPA fertilizer rule.” Earth Island Journal 18(3): 16).
67
preferences over that implementation.52 While imperfect, I argue that the inclusion of this
information helps to reflect the extent to which the agency is equipped (in terms of resources)
to be compliant. What this fails to capture is more complex dynamics of bargaining over
statute-writing, which may result in statutory designs that are difficult, if not impossible,
to implement effectively or reliably, and which is consistent with Wilson’s claim that the
American separation-of-powers system is evidence that the United States government was
not designed to be efficient or powerful, contributing to “clumsy and adversarial regulation”
(1989: 377). For such detail in the process of crafting legislation so as to be effective or
ineffective with respect to the agency’s implementation latitude, I turn to legislative histories.
However, as a preliminary evaluation of the effect of laws being written in ways that
promote noncompliant bureaucratic behavior by the agency, I present in Figure 1 lowess
smoothers of the volume of agency curbing activity (normalized so that the values would
fall between 0 and 1 and thus be on a comparable scale) and the rate of lawsuit losses
by the EPA, both with respect to the Clean Air Act. The dotted vertical lines indicate
the Congresses in which the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (95th Congress) and 1990
(101st Congress) were passed. Thus, here we have a long-standing policy – the Clean Air Act
– being revisiited in significant ways with the potential to instigate challenges in effective
enforcement.53 If congressional coalitions were colliding in ways so as to render the law
difficult if not impossible to implement faithfully given the new tasks and responsibilities
being laid out in the amendments, we might expect to see an upward trend in agency curbing
activity and lawsuit losses following the passage of these amending laws.54 However, Figure
1 provides mixed support, with an upward trend in congressional efforts to curb the agency’s
52Because these data were provided at the year level, I averaged years to convert the data to be at the
Congress level.
53The particulars of these data are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
54Evaluating legislative activity within the immediate vicinity of these “shocks” of passed delegating
legislation is a potentially fruitful avenue for further inquiry so as to better gauge the extent to which the
agency curbing legislation reflects congressional statutory designs that are designed to be inefficient, or a
reflection of the agency’s actual regulatory behavior and the compliance thereof.
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capacity before declining considerably, and a downward trend in EPA losses in the aftermath
of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments. And while agency curbing peaks in the late 1990s
and 2000s – thus in the aftermath of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, this effect does
not take place until years after the Act’s passage,55 and the lawsuit losses reflect a plateau
and decline in loss rate in the aftermath of the 1990 Amendments. Overall, then, it is
not entirely clear that the bureaucratic behavior that looks like noncompliance is merely a
product of congressional bargaining processes that (potentially strategically) tie the hands
of implementers, and may in fact be a reflection of the agency’s strategic efforts to influence
the policy location relative to where the other institutions have set it.
The Calculus of Noncompliance
Looking to policy implementation amid the complexities of the American separation-of-
powers process, we can think of an administrative agency’s compliance calculus as being a
function of 1.) the potential benefits that the agency would reap from shifting the policy
location from the status quo to its ideal point (b), 2.) the probability of success in shifting
the policy location (p),56, 3.) the likelihood of the principals’ ability to impose those costs
(l), and 4.) the potential costs that would be incurred for subverting (c). Thus, the expected
value of noncompliance can be construed simplistically as EV = b(p) − l(c), though there
remains some level of uncertainty with respect to the policy or the willingness of other
institutional actors to intervene. The agency exercises noncompliance when that expected
value is positive – that is, when the benefits outweigh the costs. The factor here that the
previous models have failed adequately to explore is the likelihood of suffering the costs of
noncompliance, as there is an assumption that the potential to impose costs should in itself
55One potential explanation is that some of the rules that the EPA was tasked with implementing had
deadlines that were not for a couple of years after the law’s enactment, and that other goals needed to be
achieved with longer time horizons.
56For example, if an agency is not well-resourced, then its capacity to reshape the policy agenda will be
diminished.
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shape the agency’s implementation behavior. This dissertation seeks to correct that deficit,
and to probe the consequences of little-discussed opportunities for agencies to expand their
policymaking latitude.
The first task is to decompose each of these factors driving agency incentives, which I do
in greater detail below. To take simplified examples of these interactions, however, we can
think of the following scenarios:
1. High benefit of noncompliance, high costs of noncompliance, but low likelihood of actu-
ally suffering those costs. In this case, the agency would stand to gain much by pulling the
policy location toward its preferences given such factors as salience or preference divergence
(e.g., its ideal point is far from the location of the statute), and while the agency’s principal
would like to impose high costs upon observing noncompliance, such costs are difficult if
not impossible to impose (e.g., due to extensive legislative division). Thus, the agency may
accept the risk of acting in accordance with its own policy preferences, even if that means
deviating from the statutory text.
2. High benefit of noncompliance, high likelihood of punishment, and high costs. This is
a case in which both the agency and its principal(s) are heavily invested in the policy and in
disagreement over its policy location, but the agency is in a weak position to set the policy
agenda given Congress’s credible ability to take action to punish noncompliance. Thus, the
agency should comply.
3. High benefit of noncompliance, high likelihood of punishment, low costs. It is not
immediately clear what would happen in this case, given that the agency has a strong
preference for moving policy toward its own preferences, and it faces a lower cost with great
certainty of actually facing those costs. In this case, we might expect that – consistent
with Gailmard’s (2002) model of subversion – the agent would step below the discretionary
window, but not so far as to reach its preferred policy given the higher costs associated with
making greater deviations from the statutory text.
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4. Low benefit of noncompliance, low likelihood of punishment, and low costs. This
represents a case in which while there may well be preference divergence over policy (or the
policy is not of high significance relative to other policy matters on the agenda), it is not so
great that the agency reaps large benefits from moving away from the status quo location,
or that the principal is willing to investigate the agency’s actions and impose punishment
for its actions. Thus, we would not expect that this would be a set of conditions in which
there would be extensive partisan conflict over compliance or lack thereof.
In each of these cases, we can see quite plainly that as the likelihood of punishment
converges to 0 – such as under conditions of utmost gridlock in Congress – the agency’s
willingness to step outside of its discretionary bounds increases markedly, but it becomes
highly risk averse when those overseeing its behavior are well-positioned to punish it.
Figure 2 presents simple (and admittedly, highly stylized) spatial models of the potential
composition of preferences among an administrative agency (A), the delegating legislation
(L) passed by the enacting Congress, the contemporary House median (Hm), and the con-
temporary Senate median (Sm). In Case 1, we have a centrist statute, an agency whose
ideal point is slightly to the left of the statute, and the House and Senate medians both to
the right of the statute. Thus, the Congress currently empowered to punish the agency is
relatively unified in its preferences, which are in the opposite direction from the status quo as
is the agency’s preference over policy. Moreover, the agency’s preferred location is relatively
close to the location of the delegating statute, leaving it relatively satisfied with the enacted
policy and with little room to shift policy. That is, the agency does not suffer great policy
losses by being faithful in its implementation of the statutory text, and by moving policy
away from the status quo, Congress will be both motivated and capable of punishing the
agency for its actions. This results in not only a low benefit reaped from moving policy at all,
but a high likelihood of punishment, which the agency prefers to avoid. As a consequence,
with this political configuration we should observe bureaucratic compliance.
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In Case 2, we have a centrist delegating statute, an agency and House median to the
right of the statute, and a Senate median that is to the left of the statute. The agency’s
ideal point in this case is much farther from the location of the law and as a consequence, it
has little to gain from engaging in rote implementation of the statutory text, instead gaining
much greater policy rewards from pulling policy toward its preferences in ways that I refer
to as noncompliance. Moreover, the House and Senate medians are divided in this case,
with the Senate dissatisfied with any policy change that the agency would attempt, and the
House far more satisfied should the agency pull policy toward its preferences (even achieving
its ideal point). Because the American bicameral system requires some threshold degree of
preference overlap between the chambers in order to pass legislation, in this configuration
it would be highly difficult for the Senate to credibly commit to punishing the agency for
its regulatory behavior through the passage of legislation. With Congress’s hands effectively
tied, the agency is in a relatively unconstrained state and thus has the latitude to shift policy
to its preferred location, resulting in noncompliance.57
Finally, in Case 3 we have an agency to the left of the statute as well as both the House
and Senate medians. Unlike in Case 1, where we also see the agency opposite the House and
Senate from the statute, in Case 3 we have the agency’s preference far from the statute, giving
it incentive to shift policy away from the status quo rather than implementing it faithfully.
However, with Congress still in a position of relative strength to punish the agency, the
likelihood of suffering costs is escalated, thus inducing compliance in the agency. Thus, we
have here a case in which the agency will be dissatisfied but constrained by the partisan
configuration in which it is operating.
Understanding Credible Threats of Agency Punishment
If the common delegation story is one that relies heavily upon fideilty to text as well
57In such a case, however, the agency’s willingness to subvert the delegating statute should also be affected
by the preferences of the judiciary and in turn to what extent it will expect adherence to a bargain struck
by an earlier legislature (see, e.g., Landes & Posner 1975).
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as the potential for congressional punishment of an agency that begins to drift from the
policy set by the legislature, then it is incumbent upon us to consider the likelihood that
such punishment would – or even could – occur. After all, congressional punishment of an
agency requires a threshold level of preference cohesion sufficient to pass a bill that would
constrain funds or implementation capacity (or both). In order to achieve legislative passage,
a bill must proceed through the following hurdles: legislation must be introduced, it must
be referred to a congressional committee and potentially a subcommittee (contingent on the
merits of the bill), in the case of the House of Representatives it must go through the Rules
Committee as well, it must receive a majority committee vote, it must receive a majority
floor vote, and in the case of the Senate it must not be filibustered. Differences between
the House and Senate versions must be resolved, which can be a particular challenge amid
a divided Congress, and the president must sign the bill into law. Each of these steps serves
as a veto point in the legislative process, which can compromise the successful passage of
policy even under conditions of relatively cohesive preferences.
A large and growing political science literature suggests that elite polarization between
the parties is strikingly high (see, e.g., McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal 2006; Layman, Carsey &
Horowitz 2006; Lee 2005), though there are debates as to the extent to which this polarization
trickles down to the electorate as opposed to being confined to political elites. Layman and
Carsey (2002) observe that the Democratic and Republican parties have grown increasingly
polarized on all of the major policy dimensions in American politics, a division to which
they refer as “conflict extension.” Gelman et al (2008) find that voters are polarized in
different ways in different states, with some regions displaying more class divisions and others
displaying more striking party lines. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) use NOMINATE
scores to show that while polarization had been high in early periods as well, it rose in the
1970s onward, a pattern that Jacobson (2000) finds as well in his analysis, though as for
determining the causes of this growth in polarization at elite versus mass levels, Jacobson
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holds that the processes of polarization are “inherently interactive.”
This increased partisan conflict in the US has important consequences for the produc-
tion of new laws by Congress, with respect to both their number and their design. Wawro
& Schickler (2010) note that compared with the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
when the threat posed by the minority party was far more limited, not only has minor-
ity obstruction been a more formidable problem in recent decades, with the filibuster now
being viewed as a much more legitimate tactic and the costs of engaging in them quite re-
duced, supermajority support is now a de facto requirement in order to pass legislation of
significance. Sinclair (2002) likewise highlights how obstruction itself has become virtually
costless, as the minority no longer has to hold the floor for an extended period in order to
block action. While Mayhew (1991) holds famously that divided government does not in
fact yield significantly lower production of significant laws per Congress,58 Brady & Volden
(2006) note that the preferences of key members of Congress and supermajority institutions
(the Senate filibuster and the presidential veto) provide meaningful contributions to gridlock
in Congress. They argue that what it takes to effectively change policy hangs on knowing
the policy preferences of those members of both chambers of Congress near the median and
determining how close the status quo is to these crucial member’ preferences. Much like
Krehbiel’s (1998) argument, gridlock can be overcome only when the status quo is further
from crucial members’ preferences than are the alternative policies proposed by the President
or other key players.
These potentially profound disruptions on the legislative process inevitably trickle over to
the legislature’s ability to effectively control its agents – that is, the administrative apparatus.
A restriction of bureaucratic capacity to implement a policy – such as dramatically reducing
its budget or shifting its authority to another agency – would undoubtedly have the level
58There is, however, the limitation that his study assesses relative rather than absolute levels of legislative
significance, which has the effect of biasing his study toward a null effect on the study of meaningful legislative
productivity.
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of controversy sufficient to provoke a response from the opposing political party given its
impact on the policy that would emerge. After all, in the absence of funds, governmental
functioning becomes difficult if not impossible, making this congressional tool of the power of
the purse all the more potent with respect to bureaucratic control. Given the highly public
nature of complaints of gridlock in Congress, with the mass media making it widely-known
when partisan conflict is precluding the passage of important laws, it is not a difficult stretch
to assume that actors within the bureaucracy will be well aware of Congress’s overall unity or
disunity with respect to voting.59 Moreover, Clinton, Lewis, and Selin (2013) note through
the use of expert surveys that Congress is less influential vis-a-vis the executive branch when
more committees are engaged in oversight of the agency, and that having greater numbers
of overseeing committees may compromise congressional ability to respond to bureaucratic
behavior. They find marked variation in the number of committees exercising active oversight
of certain agencies, and while their study is confined to the 110th Congress, I expect that
this trend has been increasing over time, making recent years more ripe for disruptions in
bureaicratic control and in turn, the relationship between representation and administration.
I make the assumption that actors within agencies – at least at the upper echelons, such
as cabinet secretaries and assistant secretaries – have ideological preferences, an assump-
tion that follows from the ideal point estimation literature that seeks to measure agency
preferences. Classic models of inter-branch conflict (e.g., Epstein and O’Halloran 1999) rely
upon assumptions about congruence versus divergence in preferences among the branches of
government, and Clinton and Lewis (2008) use expert surveys on agency ideology and char-
acteristics to use a multirater item-response model that generates ideal point estimates for
82 administrative agencies, ranking them from most liberal to most conservative.60 Indeed,
59Clark (2011) notes in his analysis of congressional Court-curbing activity that the Court is in fact aware of
congressional efforts, however unsuccessful, at curbing the Court’s capacity. I expect that agency awareness
of these potential legislative constraints will be even higher given the greater potential for passage, or at
least the less symbolic nature of such proposals.
60An important limitation to their analysis is the time-invariant nature of their agency ideology estimates,
with the implication being that the Environmental Protection Agency under the leadership of Anne Gorsuch
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as the legislature incentivizes the development of expertise, those bureaucrats who will exert
the effort in becoming experts in their field should be those who have strong preferences
(Gailmard & Patty 2007), in addition to which those bureaucrats should be constrained by
the preferences of those at the higher ranks within the agency. Given agencies’ political
preferences, their awareness of legislative conflict should shape their implementation actions
with respect to the statutes under their jurisdictions so as to avoid suffering the costs of
punishment from political principals.
Additional Sources of Oversight
Threats of punishment can, of course, come from a number of other avenues, namely
from interest groups and through court action. Gordon & Hafer (2005) find that agencies
exercise a lower propensity to investigate the actions of corporations that “flex their muscles”
through financial contributions intended to signal a willingness to challenge agency actions
with which they are displeased. Given agencies’ purported desire to avoid suffering those
costs of litigation, they thus reshape their vigor of enforcement for reasons unrelated to the
statutory text by which they legally are bound. This suggests a meaningful level of variation
in the agency’s fidelity to the text’s mandates that it investigate compliance and potential
noncompliance from regulated entities (and punish those in violation), particularly when it
is being heavily influenced by interest group activity. And given that interest groups are
likely to be highly mobilized around issues of great policy importance and salience – those
issues on which I focus my analysis – I expect their effects on agency activity to likewise be
large in magnitude.
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided the landmark administrative law case Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, in which the Court articulated a position of deference
(1981-83) and that under the leadership of Lisa Jackson (2009-13) are given the same ideological preferences,
and likewise with the preferences of Secretaries of Interior James Watt (1981-83) and Bruce Babbitt (1993-
2000), despite the substantive policy importance of the President’s choice of political appointees to cabinet
posts.
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to administrative agency decisions given agencies’ purportedly greater levels of expertise.
Such a contention is not without merit, particularly in the complex policy domains of en-
vironmental and financial regulation, on which this study focuses. The Chevron doctrine
proceeds in two steps: first, the Court determines the congressional intent and to what ex-
tent Congress clearly indicated the agencies’ interpretation of its authority, and second, once
the Court has found no clear congressional intent in the statute, it determines whether the
agency’s interpretation is reasonable or permissible. Considering the effect of this decision,
a simple difference-in-means test indicates that the rate of bureaucratic noncompliance (the
measurement of which will be discussed in greater detail below) more than doubles in the
post-Chevron period, significant at the p < .001 level, a preliminary finding consistent with
my claim that an agency will experience weaker control amid this period of reduced judicial
scrutiny of its decisions. Consistent with this, Yackee & Yackee (2010: 266) characterize
the post-Chevron period as reducing opportunities for judicial interference in the regulatory
process and providing agencies with advantage of favorable standards of review should they
find themselves in court. Moreover, the legal counsels of administrative agencies appear to
be cognizant of this advantage that they came to enjoy in the aftermath of the Chevron and
United States v. Mead61 (2001) Court holdings, with a general counsel advising his agency
to regulate through the formal notice and comment procedure rather than less formal mech-
anisms so as to ensure that the agency would be given a deferential standard of review in the
event of litigation (Id). This provides further evidence of the self-consciousness with with
agencies can be found to act in effort to maximize their latitude vis-a-vis the judiciary in
carrying out statutory implementation, and in turn the reduced level of constraint in which
61In United States v. Mead (2001), the Supreme Court took up the question of where the Chevron doctrine
should be applied, and concluded that the Chevron test should be applied only in the case where Congress
delegated interpretive authority to the agency with respect to the given statutory provision, and the agency
has made an appropriate formal ruling with a “lawmaking pretense” (Brady 2011) The Court subsequently
determined in National Cable and Telecommunications Association v. Brand X (2005) that while there are
conditions under which judicial deference to agency decisionmaking is clearly appropriate, such deference is
not required with respect to agency interpretations of whether or not it is owed said judicial deference.
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they may know that they are operating in the post-Chevron period of this study.
Kurzweil (2007) notes that at the Supreme Court level, justices’ appeals to the Chevron
doctrine appear motivated more by separation of powers concerns about judicial interference
in delegated powers as opposed to being driven by agency expertise. However, he notes
that the Court of Appeals relies heavily on agency expertise in determining the degree of
deference that agency interpretations should be afforded. Thus, while legal and political
science scholars have debated the ultimate effects of the adoption of the Chevron doctrine
on the Supreme Court, the potentially marked impact of Chevron at the Court of Appeals
level is highly important given its status as being the last venue of appeal for most claims.
The most relevant court for the purposes of this project is the DC Circuit Court of Appeals,
which is responsible for directly reviewing administrative decisions and rules promulgated by
any federal agency, often without a prior review by the district court. Thus, irrespective of
a direct change in Supreme Court invoking of the Chevron doctrine and thus reshaping the
scope of deference afforded to agency actions, agencies should be responsive to the Court of
Appeals’, and in particular the DC Circuit’s adoption of this lower standard of review. Such
a claim is consistent with Ferejohn and Shipan’s (1990) results which suggest that judicial
review can have the effect of moving the equilibrium policy outcome toward the median
member of Congress (and conversely, that the reduction of judicial review post-Chevron
should weaken the ties between the median legislator and the policy location).
Moreover, a strategy that Congress historically has employed to effect policy change
through circumvention of the executive branch is the mobilization of private litigants (Farhang
2008, 2010). By incentivizing private suits, Congress can help to facilitate the assertion of
rights under the statutes irrespective of potential bureaucratic drift, and Farhang shows
that the presence of divided government powerfully contributes toward congressional use of
this enforcement strategy that circumvents agency implementation. Thus, amid a weakly
enforcing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, discrimination need not necessarily
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go unchecked provided that individuals prosecute in court those violations, a process that
can be incentivized through congressional manipulation of the plaintiff’s potential benefits
(e.g., damages that can be won if prevailing), their probability of success (e.g., the burden
of proof) and the costs associated with litigation (e.g., attorney’s fees). Further, historical
patterns of divided government and legislative-executive conflict, which have become all the
more common since the late 1960s, are linked strongly with the “coincident growth of the role
of litigation and courts in the implementation and elaboration of federal statutory policy”
(Farhang 2008: 821).
A particular form of private lawsuits are those known as citizen suits, whereby private
parties are empowered to sue an administrative agency for failure to act, irrespective of
whether they themselves were harmed by the infraction. This form of litigation is a marked
departure from other cases of lawsuits, which require that the litigant have standing, or a
personal stake in the outcome of a case, in order to sue. Thus, these citizen suits are a
significant tool at the disposal of private parties against administrative agencies who are
viewed as being out of accordance with the statutes that they are tasked with implementing.
If it is in fact the case that in certain domains of law (e.g., environmental policy), this
adjustment to standing leads to greater litigation against the regulating entities, then these
provisions should operate as a significant constraint on the agency’s sense of autonomy in
implementing so as to avoid the burdens of litigation and settlement.62 That is, it plays
the important role of third-party monitoring of agency action (and more specifically, statu-
tory compliance in policymaking). This claim is consistent with McCubbins and Schwartz
(1984), who argue that Congress holds a rational preference in favor of “fire alarm” oversight,
whereby other parties (e.g., individuals and interest groups) raise fire alarms over agency
62The vast majority of cases brought before the agency are resolved through settlement, though a number
do reach the Court of Appeals, in particular the DC Circuit. However, it is crucial to note that those cases
settled are largely those focusing on the meeting (or missing) of statutorily-provided deadlines for taking
regulatory actions. Such agency actions (or rather, failures to act) are difficult to classify as noncompliance
as I characterize it, given their potential association mainly with agency resources and workload as opposed
to efforts to shift the policy location.
79
enforcement (or potentially lack thereof) rather than Congress itself combing through all
administrative behavior in search of violations given the high costs and limited payoffs as-
sociated with such “police patrol” monitoring. And once successful appeals have been made
by individuals and organizations invested in the regulatory outcomes, Congress can be made
aware of the violations that are occurring and bring itself back into play in the lawmaking
game, such as through the process of statutory amendments, which I evaluate in Chapter 5.
I have identified above one critical source of constraint on agency action, litigation (or
the threat thereof), as a key locus of opportunity to prevent agencies from directing policy
toward their preferred outcomes when contrary to the statutes or the preferences of the key
players in power. With higher levels of external oversight through the judiciary, the agency
should exercise greater caution in its enforcement of the statutes within its jurisdiction,
relative those areas less prone to lawsuits against agencies (for example, lower salience issues
or those policies in which courts traditionally have not been involved).63 Transaction costs
in lawmaking are reshaped given variation in partisan conflict and the margin of control of
congressional seats. Thus, on which end of the spectrum these key variables fall ought to
have profound effects on the extent to which agencies feel compelled to comply as opposed to
having leverage in reshaping the policy landscape in accordance with their own preferences.
This is precisely the subject of my inquiry in the chapters that follow.
Asymmetries in Bureaucratic Control
Critical to the study of delegation in lawmaking is understanding the reach – and in
turn, the limitations – of democratic accountability as the directly elected branch houses
authority in expert bureaucrats. Such an evaluation demands examining what we mean by
noncompliance. That is, in addition to adjudicating between compliance with statutory text
and responsiveness to current congressional preferences over that statute’s implementation,
63This is not to say that courts are unable to insert themselves into policy domains traditionally dominated
by administrative agencies.
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there is the additional need to consider how we conceive of delegations, whether as policy
choices – points on a line that ranges from left to right or from more pro-regulation to more
deregulatory and that the agency must achieve in order to be compliant – or as windows
of discretion within which the agency should operate but may in some cases step beyond.
Callander & Krehbiel (2014) allow for the legislature to select a particular policy that the
agency must implement (a case that they characterize as constrained delegation, or a decree),
or may delegate to the agency some authority over that policy choice (a case that they
characterize as unconstrained delegation), with the agency selecting a policy that is compliant
with the statute. Thus, they recognize that there is not a single type of delegation d, and I
take both types of delegation into account in my evaluation of compliance.
Examples of specific statutory language may help to clarify what compliance in each
case looks like. In the case of congressional prohibition with respect to the agency, non-
compliance is quite straightforward. Section 101 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
(P.L. 101-549) provides that “The Administrator shall not promulgate any redesignation of
any area (or portion thereof) from nonattainment to unclassifiable.” Thus, should the EPA
Administrator’s rule include such a redesignation, that would constitute an act of statutory
noncompliance. In some cases, Congress compels action of the Administrator, often within
a specified time frame, such that failure to satisfy the obligation – which could be charac-
terized as a policy point – could likewise be construed as noncompliant. The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 also provide that “Within 3 years after the enactment of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, the Administrator shall issue technical documents which identify
alternative controls for all categories of stationary sources of volatile organic compounds and
oxides of nitrogen which emit, or have the potential to emit 25 tons per year or more of such
air pollutant. The Administrator shall revise and update such documents as the Adminis-
trator determines necessary.” With the exception of the Administrator’s ability to exercise
discretion with respect to the later updating of the technical documents, Congress is in this
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case specifying a particular policy that the Administrator must fulfill within three years, an
example that falls within Callander & Krehbiel’s conception of constrained deligation, and
deviation from this policy point is outside of the Administrator’s authority.
A somewhat less stringent command of the Administrator can be found in Section 108 of
the Amendments, in which it was provided that “[t]he Administrator shall promulgate regu-
lations within 18 months after the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, specifying those provisions of this Act for which it is appropriate to treat Indian
tribes as States.” Such a provision imposes clear constraints on the Administrator, such that
failure to promulgate the regulations on this matter within 18 months would constitute a
violation, but the Administrator’s rules are promulgated for the conditions under which it is
“appropriate,” thus provinding somewhat less constraint on the agency’s authority as in the
previous case, with any litigation likely to focus on whether the agency reasonably construed
when Indian tribes could be treated as States. Thus, noncompliance here can come in the
form of failure to satisfy the mandatory requirement that it promulgate the rule within the
specified time frame, or in the failure to interpret the statute reasonably, such as consistent
with the legislative history and intent.
The most complex case is that in which Congress is delegating discretionary authority
to the agency, as in the 1990 Amendments provision that “[t]he Administrator may, in the
Administrator’s discretion, promulgate regulations requiring manufacturers to install such
onboard diagnostic systems on heavy-duty vehicles and engines.” Here, statutory noncom-
pliance would be the promulgation of those rules to a broader class of vehicles than those
that Congress permitted in this provision.
While above I defined noncompliance as actions that deviate from the statutory text or
the current legislative principal’s preferences over the statutory implementation, given these
important distinctions between mandates setting particular policies and the allocation of
discretionary authority, there is a further need to decompose noncompliance into actions
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that seek higher (that is, over-regulating) or lower (under-regulating) policies than those
that would be deemed compliant. Bureaucratic policymaking may be relatively unrespon-
sive to the rewards offered by principals, given the number of tasks and principals that these
agencies face (Dixit 1995). This points to a significant problem of bureaucratic control by
democratically elected officials. If a prime way in which Congress can punish a noncompli-
ant agency is to retract federal funding with which to operate, and if we expect that the
Democratic Party will on balance be more pro-regulatory and the Republican Party more
deregulatory, there is a significant possibility of asymmetric processes – and potential – for
bureaucratic control depending on the party controlling the executive branch.
After all, conducting vigorous investigations into private actors’ statutory compliance
and promulgating numerous rules according to the Administrative Procedures Act requires
costly effort as well as monetary resources, which come from Congress. This suggests that in
order to preclude regulatory actions with which it disagrees, a feasible mode of congressional
control of the agency is to exercise the power of the purse. However, such a method would
seem to be appropriate only for agencies seeking to regulate beyond the bounds of the statute,
behavior which would be more characteristic of Democratic administrations, which tend on
balance to be more in favor of an expansive regulatory state.
Returning to the question of whether congressional delegations are set policy points or dis-
cretionary windows, one potential way to conceptualize this is in terms of whether Congress
mandated that the agency take a particular action (e.g., “The Secretary shall promulgate by
January 1, 2015 rules reducing the emissions permissible in new vehicles...”), in which case
the failure to take a mandatory action could be thought of as a failure to achieve the policy
ideal point that Congress established statutorily, or whether the agency was authorized to
regulate one subset of behavior but the agency promulgated rules that were broader and
touched on more subjects than the statute technically provided for. Agencies commonly are
given broad discretionary authority to promulgate rules that they deem necessary to exer-
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cise the functions statutorily set by Congress, such as to protect human health and welfare.
In this case, we can think of Congress allotting the agency some range of discretion, per-
haps quite limited to a certain class of activities, with extensions beyond that discretionary
window constituting noncompliant behavior on the part of the administrative agency.
Inherent in the literature of bureaucratic control by Congress is a tension between con-
gressional ability to influence the agency through the appropriation of funding, and their
means of controlling those agencies in their policymaking once they are empowered. Ting
(2001) provides a useful formal analysis of this process of congressional cutting of agencies
budgets with the aim of making an agency’s desired policy infeasible. However, he finds
ultimately that while Congress does have this power to restrict agency budgets, doing so
can also compromise Congress’s own policy goals. But consistent with expectations, the
dynamics of bureaucratic control and resulting policy do, in his model, vary depending on
whether the principal’s policy agenda is more or less ambitious vis-a-vis the agent.
This leads us to the notion that Democratic and Republican-controlled agencies can func-
tion differently with respect to oversight mechanisms from Congress and the judiciary, given
the relative consistency of Democratic agencies being more pro-regulation and Republican
agencies being more deregulatory. While the termination of funds can make infeasible agency
actions that seek to extend beyond the bounds of a statute, such a punishment is unlikely
to be effective with respect to an agency seeking to drag its feet rather than regulate ac-
tively. Moreover, environmental law experts and employees of the Environmental Protection
Agency have confirmed that challenges to agency inaction are almost always resolved behind
closed doors through settlement, with courts coming into play almost exclusively with re-
spect to agency actions that have already been taken, with Democratic-controlled agencies
more prone to regulate, particularly in this domain. If we return to the original framework
of the expected benefit of noncompliance, the implication here is that the likelihood (and
thus in turn the cost function) of punishment for noncompliance is higher with respect to
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Democratic than with respect to Republican agencies, which may shape the strategies of
bureaucratic control that are employed.
Legislative Design and Bureaucratic Behavior
Above I have examined the institutional factors that constrain or expand administrative
capacity to shift the policy location toward their preferences. Here I examine the impact
of statutory design on agency actions. This marks an important departure from the extant
literature, which emphasizes the causes rather than the consequences of these legislative
choices in statute writing.
Either as a consequence of agency behaviors or in anticipation of bureaucratic drift amid
conditions of heightened political conflict, Congress has been shown to strategically design
statutes in ways that impose boundaries on agencies’ delegated windows of discretion (see,
e.g., Huber and Shipan 2002; Farhang 2013), and which I argue affects the agency’s calculus
by shaping the parameter p, or its probability of achieving its intended outcome. McNollgast
(1987, 1989) provide seminal analyses of congressional use of administrative procedures in
statutes to facilitate bureaucratic oversight and to guard against drift. Huber and Shipan
(2002) conduct a comparative analysis of statutes and find that under conditions of greater
ideological conflict, legislatures provide greater detail statutorily, with the theory being that
laying out greater detail leaves less room for bureaucrats to exercise discretion given the
more limited extent to which the agency can fill in the gaps of the statute.64
Farhang (2013) examines the specificity with which Congress lays out policy substance
when delegating implementation authority to courts as opposed to administrative agencies.
Congressional provision of greater specificity is interpreted as Congress playing a greater
role in policymaking – that is, it is specifying more of the details itself with respect to the
content of rules and their proper application – and in turn leaving more limited latitude for
64A limitation to their analysis, however, is their inclusion of all statutory text, as opposed to constraining
the analysis to that text which specifically addresses policy substance.
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the implementer(s). He finds that the choice of venue – courts versus agencies – is a powerful
predictor of the degree of specificity of the legislation, with Congress leaving greater room
for agency discretion but providing markedly greater detail when implementation was being
carried out through courts by way of private litigation. Such a finding is consistent with the
notion that delegation to administrative agencies stems at least in part from their specialized
knowledge, whereas courts do not possess such expertise and thus may not be as trustworthy
implementers of a less specific statute.
Moreover, Farhang and Yaver (2015) provide novel data on congressional fragmentation
of administrative authority across different actors and agencies, and the structuring of turf
wars by way of overlapping jurisdiction over policy, and use the data to test hypotheses
linking fragmentation to divided government and electoral uncertainty. Laws on the low
end of the fragmentation spectrum have centralized implementation in one or two agencies,
while laws on the high end of the fragmentation spectrum have numerous actors within and
across agencies, as well as instances in which multiple administrative actors share policy
tasks over the same policy space (for example, joint rulemaking). They find robust evi-
dence in support of their claims that the presence of divided government powerfully predicts
congressional motivation to divide power across numerous venues in order to insulate pol-
icy against bureaucratic drift and require greater coordination on the part of the executive
branch in order to move policy. Moreover, they find that congressional coalitions that are
electorally vulnerable are more likely to divide power in order to create a “sticky” status
quo rather than enabling a future coalition to change the course of policy. Thus, if Congress
is successful in achieving its goals with respect to insulating policy against drift and tying
the hands of future implementers, higher levels of fragmentation should be associated with
greater constraint in moving policy in subsequent periods.
I argue that these choices of design both emerge as a consequence of these divisive polit-
ical conditions and shape future legislative-executive interactions in policy implementation.
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Thus, while an excellent body of literature has worked to explain the predictors of features
of legislative design, this dissertation instead provides the first systematic analysis of the
consequences of those decisions with respect to agencies’ subsequent behavior. After all,
while little empirical work has provided evidence of this, it is within statutorily-specified pa-
rameters that agencies, courts, and interest groups operate in the policymaking landscape.
If, as Farhang (2010, 2013) demonstrates, Congress strategically chooses whether to delegate
to courts or agencies (or both) and to what extent, we can expect that policymaking carried
out through one venue versus the other might well produce different observable outcomes,
particularly given the purportedly strategic behavior on the part of prospective litigants.
Moreover, if we accept the premise that agencies might operate differently were it given
more expansive ranges of authority as opposed to narrower windows of discretion and au-
tonomy, then these choices of statutory design – whether in the form of discretion or the
fragmentation of authority – likewise will have important ramifications with respect to the
ultimate implementation, despite the political science literature’s virtual inattention to these
questions of policy outcomes.
Thus, assuming that Congress is successfully fragmenting power given its policy motiva-
tions – that is, successfully producing a meaningful decrease in bureaucratic autonomy in
implementation – I expect that higher levels of administrative fragmentation will not only
raise the costs that are associated with moving the policy location (that is, it will have
to expend more effort to do so), but will importantly reduce the likelihood of the agency
achieving its intended outcome, given that an agency would be forced to act in concert with
other administrative actors who may not share their preferences over policy.65 After all, if a
liberal agency is placed in a joint rulemaking capacity with a right-leaning agency, it will be
65A limitation to the fragmentation measure employed by Farhang and Yaver (2015) is their restriction to
actors carrying out implementation functions, and not those actors with whom implementers must consult
and/or receive approval. Thus, there is a systematic underestimation of the degree of fragmentation of
administrative authority, making the use of this measure in fact a harder test of the theories of its causes
and consequences.
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unlikely to obtain its ideal point, and will rather aim for a policy closer to the center. More-
over, even in the absence of tremendous heterogeneity of preferences among implementing
actors, coordination challenges alone can reduce the control that any one actor will have in
setting policy. Agencies are themselves aware of these limitations that they face in these
implementation frameworks, and should adapt their implementation behavior accordingly.
Bringing Congress Back In
This manuscript’s attention to the dynamic inter-play among the branches is hardly
restricted to examining agencies’ implementation of the statutes under their jurisdiction.
After all, if Congress is dissatisfied with administrative behavior, it may – and indeed,
should – work to bring itself back into additional iterations of the lawmaking game so as to
relocate the policy positions. This reinforces the project’s attention to the dynamic nature
of policymaking, with many analyses restricted to at most two periods – the congressional
delegation and the agency action – while this project evaluates a minimum of three periods
(the congressional delegation, the agency action, and the congressional response(s)).
That Congress amends its laws has not gone entirely unnoticed by political scientists.
Maltzman and Shipan (2008) do not consider ongoing inter-branch interactions, but they do
assess the predictors of policy durability as indicated by the time between initial passage
and the next amendment that was passed. A severe limitation to such an analysis is that
there is not attention paid to the extent of that amendment activity, let alone the extent to
which this interplay continues beyond the time to the first amendment. For example, one
might imagine a circumstance in which a law is quite durable but required some statutory
clarification by Congress as to the meaning of particular provisions that previously were found
to be vague, after which little if any ongoing congressional attention was made necessary.
Such a circumstance would imply relatively low inter-branch conflict with respect to the
statutory implementation, but might according to their study be seen as a legislative bargain
that was not durable if the clarification was made shortly after the statute’s initial passage.
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One can also imagine a quite different set of circumstances, in which Congress continually
revises the legislation from year to year, such as the many revisions to the Clean Water Act.
This would, in contrast with the first example, suggest changing and conflicting preferences
and/or outright noncompliance on the part of the implementing agency or agencies. Their
analysis, while providing some insight into the predictors of statutory changes, does not
allow for the disentangling of these quite different separation-of-powers regimes.
As an aberration to the inattention to lawmaking dynamics, Clinton (2012) provides an
excellent treatment of amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, originally passed in
1938 as part of Roosevelt’s New Deal program, by applying the Bayesian approach employed
by Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) and finding that major policy change is observed
less commonly than the formal predictions suggest. There is, however, a challenge that
the method was applied to a particular domain of law in which quantifying change is more
easily done, with raises of the minimum wage and maximum hours both constituting clear
increases in the expansiveness of the labor regulation. Moreover, the policy heterogeneity
and omnibus nature of laws of recent decades raises important complications to the study of
statutory amendments, which cannot be resolved by focusing exclusively on roll call votes
on a particular issue. To address this challenge, I present in chapter 4 a novel metric of
statutory change through amendment using the entire universe of cases in which Congress
returned to a given statute.
Upon observing implementation, there are a number of ways in which Congress can con-
ceivably work to better control agencies and in doing so, better ensure that policy outputs
reflect its preferences. As discussed above, congressional fragmentation is designed with the
aim of limiting bureaucratic autonomy in implementation given the added need to coordinate
with other actors and agencies, or having jurisdiction over only a piece of a law’s enforce-
ment. Thus, as Congress observes a law’s implementation after its initial passage, among
its options in future legislative action is the further fragmentation of authority such as by
89
allowing another agency to make rules in the statute. Likewise, the imposition of additional
administrative procedures – for example, requirements that the agency report to Congress
or consult with other agencies before taking major actions – serves the similar purpose of
increasing the degree of statutorily designed constraint and oversight that should insulate
the policy location from further bureaucratic drift.
Moreover, as Huber and Shipan (2002) demonstrate in a comparative perspective, leg-
islatures can work to constrain the executive branch amid heightened conflict by providing
greater statutory detail, thus affording less discretion for bureaucrats in their implemen-
tation. By estimating the amount of statutory specificity, the theory holds that we can
ascertain approximately to what extent Congress is writing down policy itself versus allow-
ing the executive branch to fill in the policy details as it sees fit. Though I argue that the
provision of greater detail in subsequent statutory activity should reduce agency discretion
over the statute, I adopt Farhang’s (2013) narrower definition of policy detail, looking ex-
clusively at the statutory language that was policy-related, as opposed to all of the text of
the laws.
The use of specificity as a tool with which to constrain implementers appears to prevail
across post-war significant legislation (Farhang 2013), lending credence to my claim that by
revising statutes so as to make the body of the texts more specific and detailed, Congress
can reduce the windows in which agencies are interpreting the reach of their authority. I
thus expect there to be a positive association between heightened inter-branch conflict and
greater degrees of statutory specificity added when Congress chooses to amend the delegating
statute.
Implications
The implications of bureaucratic noncompliance in implementation are vast and unex-
plored. A rich literature has established that Congress makes concerted efforts to keep agency
actions in check and thus not too far from their own preferences (see, e.g., McNollGast 1987,
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1989; Epstein & O’Halloran 1989; Huber & Shipan 2002), though there is a suggestion that
once that initial power is delegated to the agency, it is very difficult to retract that authority
given the complexities of the US separation-of-powers system (Volden 2002). That is, there
is an implicit path-dependence with respect to congressional delegation of authority, such
that bureaucratic power can only remain stable or increase, but not be meaningfully reduced
once it has been allocated to a given implementer or set of implementers.
This implies that within the range of conditions that motivate agencies to pull policy
toward their preferences without facing high risks of punishment, agency behavior may well
warrant congressional response but those responses may in fact be ineffective in the long term.
This leads us to important questions of what, ultimately, is determining the longer-term
course of US public policy, if it is not (at least under a certain set of increasingly-prevalent
conditions) the US Congress and the voters to whom it is held accountable. And relatedly,
if we care about policy outcomes an not just statutory mandates, then these moments of
heightened bureaucratic autonomy and noncompliance call attention to the need for more
careful attention to the quality of the policy produced and who wins or loses as a consequence
of these dynamics. The winners and losers of politics is a fundamental issue at the heart of
the study of distributive politics, and while it is far from easy to determine these outcomes
given bureaucratic behavior, there is much to be gained by estimating systematically the
resulting policy locations relative to those groups with vested interests in the outcomes.
I argue that while to be sure there are numerous difficulties in passing legislation to
curb agency capacity – particularly under the partisan conditions in which we would expect
bureaucrats to be most inclined to maximize their discretion and potentially overstep their
bounds – Congress does in fact have a number of tools that enable it to better control agencies
once it observes its prior efforts at bureaucratic control breaking down. Were Congress a
stable principal with consistent preferences over time, this would seem to suggest a four
period legislative-executive game. That is, in the first period, Congress delegates to the
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agency and in the second period, the agency defects so that policy will be more consistent
with its own preferences. In the third period, Congress observes this and learns about the
agency’s willingness and ability to deviate from the statute, and it revises the law in a way
that curbs bureaucratic discretion. Finally, the agency observes Congress’s ability to punish,
and thus complies moving forward.
Yet a core assumption I make throughout this manuscript is that while the American
institutional structure and rules by which it is governed are stable, the preferences and
incentives can change quite markedly over time. This reshapes the way that this game is
played because there is considerably less opportunity for learning about the preferences and
capacity of the other actors when making legal and policy decisions from one iteration of the
game to the next.
Conclusion
Here I have laid out the strategic framework that I expect administrative agencies –
in particular, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Interior – to
follow in deciding whether or not to comply with the statutes that they are tasked with
implementing over time. Examining policymaking in a dynamic rather than a static setting,
I argue that the changing partisan configurations in which administrative agencies come to
operate over time can importantly reshape their incentives in implementation (in particular
with respect to the EPA, rulemaking). In contrast with the modal theories of delegation and
their predictions of compliance, I expect that when agencies disagree with the current policy
agenda, they will be motivated to reshape policy consistent with their ideology in ways that I
refer to as noncompliance – whether by failing to satisfy mandatory obligations or by steping
beyond the edges of the discretionary windows afforded them – though that motivation is
conditioned by the likelihood that they will be punished for that regulatory behavior giventhe
distance that the agency is moving policy, the unity with which the contemporary Congress
can act in response to the agency’s actions, and the extent to which the judiciary and those
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utilizing the judicial system (e.g., interest groups and other potential litigants) are likely to
provide a potent threat against the agency by engaging in costly litigation that might result in
holdings adverse to the agency. The likelihood of the judiciary providing such a constraining
rule is moderated by the congressional provision of citizen suits and the extent to which it is
likely to exercise deference toward agency decisionmaking. I hold further that agencies will
be less accountable and more risk-accepting with respect to noncompliance under conditions
of heightened polarization and gridlock within Congress, such that Congress can no longer
credibly threaten to punish the agency for what it deems to be noncompliant behavior.
I expect that there will be particularly great opportunities for these dynamics to play out
under conditions in which there is disagreement between the enacting Congress, which drafts
the statutory text interpreted by courts, and the contemporary Congress that is capable of
assessing punishment for deviations from preferred implementation. This dynamic places the
agency in the unfortunate position of adjudicating between multiple competing principles
overseeing their policy implementation over long time horizon, a challenge that has been
given limited empirical attention in the American Politics literature to date but which im-
portantly shapes the post-delegation outcomes observed. Such conditions can place agencies
in effectively a rock and a hard place, with fidelity to one legislative principal effectively
requiring non-responsiveness to the other, with the currently-empowered Congress and DC
Circuit judging the regulatory outcomes that emerge in this setting. And as Congress views
agency implementation of its statutes, it has a number of tools at its disposal (conditional
on the political environment) to reenter the lawmaking game and re-set the agenda, better
controlling the implementing agency (agencies), which in turn shapes future administrative























































Figure 1: Clean Air Act Noncompliance Over Time
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Case 1: Low benefit, high likelihood of punishment ⇒ compliance
A L Sm Hm
Case 2: High benefit, low likelihood of punishment ⇒ noncompliance
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Case 3: High benefit, high likelihood of punishment ⇒ compliance
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Chapter 3: Bureaucratic Policymaking and the Environment
In the preceding chapters, I laid out the core theory of the dissertation, which evaluates
the effects of legislative-executive conflict, intra-branch conflict within Congress, judicial
oversight, and multiple principals problems in reshaping administrative agencies’ incentives
to comply with the delegating legislation. I turn now to the particular domain in which I
am evaluating these dynamics, which is environmental policy.
In the dissertation, I carry out extensive quantitative, as well as qualitative, within-
case analysis of two agencies – the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department
of Interior – in addition to making cross-case comparisons given the differences between
agencies on key variables of interest. The selection of a small number of cases presents a
number of challenges in that they are used to highlight the features of a broader population,
thus standing for a population of cases much larger than the cases (in this case, agencies)
themselves (see, e.g., Seawright & Gerring 2008). Case study selection must thus meet the
twin objectives of achiving both a representative sample as well as obtaining useful variation
on the dimensions that are of theoretical interest, with the ultimate goal of understanding
a larger class of similar units (in this case, agencies) (Id at 296). Combining quantitative
analysis and process tracing through qualitative research allows for a more comprehensive
picture of the many moving parts at work, and helps to offset the limitations of each research
method when used in isolation.66 To provide generalizability of the findings, there is value in
obtaining variation in the agencies on which I base the large-N and qualitative case analyses,
an approach that Searight and Gerring refer to as diverse cases representing the full range
of values characterzing a given X/Y relationship (2008: 300).
While emphasizing environmental policy in this dissertation, inter-branch conflict and
66For example, Gerring notes that while large-N, cross-case studies allow for the estimation of causal effects
– that is, the magnitude of the effect of X on Y and the relative precision with which it is estimated – such
analysis is less illuminating in drawing out causal mechanisms (2007: 44).
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subsequent noncompliance can be found across a number of policy domains and time frames,
though it is not typically framed in the language of compliance. Johnson (2011) examines
the role of race in the agricultural welfare state, holding that the Jim Crow South and even
in policymaking in the 21st century, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
partook in highly racialized policies in the provision of agricultural subsidies, with African
American farmers receiving substantially less federal support despite the Civil Rights Act’s
(1964) prohibition against discrimination on the base of race or color. Such acts of racial
discrimination were highlighted in the class action suit Pigford, Brewington v. Glickman and
the USDA (1999), which was brought on behalf of black farmers who claimed that since the
1960s, they had been denied loans and other financial assistance that had been extended to
white farmers. Amid these discriminatory subsidy practices, the number of black farmers
declined from 184,000 in 1964 to less than 19,000 in 1997 (Johnson 2011: 143), though
some of these discriminatory effects are attributable to the delegation of federal authority to
state and local authorities, some of whom exhibited persistent racial prejudices (Id at 160).
Carpenter (2010) observes then Food and Drug Administrator David Kessler’s regulation
of tobacco under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act during the Clinton Administration,
and the subsequent case of F.D.A. v. Brown & Williamson (2000), in which the Supreme
Court held that the FDA lacked explicit statutory authority to regulate tobacco. Thus, this
interplay of agencies’ skirting the edges of their statutory and constitutional authority can
be seen in diverse domestic policy settings, with a number of administrative agencies falling
within the scope conditions of the theory.
In his well-cited (1972) article, Lowi provides a typology of policy processes, dividing pol-
icy into the categories of regulatory, distributive, redistributive, and constituent, with these
different dimensions of policy affecting administrative patterns in policymaking and forming
nearly the full range of possibilities of policy types that one might observe in tracking the
development and evolution of policy over time. Regulatory policy works to govern business
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conduct, markets, or to protect the public welfare and interest, working toward the passage
and enforcement of legal regulations and often reflecting the politics of interest group plural-
ism. Distributive policies are aimed at the proper distribution of goods and services among
different segments of the population, and are meant for particular sections of society. They
often reinforce political logrolling that helps to ensure congressional members’ reelection.
Thus, in the politics of distributive policy, a government has an asset in its possession that
it distributes in a manner that it sees fit with its conception of justice, and among Lowi’s
policy types it tends to be the least contentious. Lowi’s conception of constituent policy
involves a top-down policymaking process that is dominated by elected officials and agen-
cies. Redistributive policy involves the transfer and redistribution of resources or wealth or
property among groups, and is characterized by class politics, with the key question being
who wins and who loses and at whose expense. Redistributive programs often come from
distinct groups and lead to higher levels of contentiousness than do other categories of pol-
icy that Lowi identifies, given the levels of discontent that can potentially emerge around
them (Chalekian 2014). Lowi (1972) demonstrates how these different policy types influence
party politics and can be influenced by interest group organizations, and there is reason to
expect that the forces influencing these different dimensions of policymaking might have key
differences that allow for useful variation in analyzing agency cases.
To evaluate these questions of noncompliance in implementation and congressional revi-
sion of statutes in response to that bureaucratic behavior, I select administrative agencies
from different policy categories, with the Environmental Protection Agency being regulatory
and the Department of Interior being distributive in nature.67 Below I discuss the particular
cases in which I analyze these dynamics.
Noncompliance and Environmental Policy
The regulatory agency that I select is the Environmental Protection Agency, which is in a
67In future work I will extend analysis to the redistributive agency of the Internal Revenue Service.
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sense the natural setting in which to evaluate such questions of noncompliance in bureaucratic
policymaking, and which serves as a typical case with respect to the study of noncompliance
given the richness of information inherent in this case, also characterized as a positive case
that is “constituted by the phenomenon that the reacher seeks to explain” (Goertz 2006:
159).68 Seawright and Gerring note that typical cases can also be considered representative
cases, exemplifying a stable, cross-case relationship, and in which the puzzle that is of
theoretical interest lies within the case (2008: 299). Of course, selection effects can arise
in qualitative research when choosing a case based on the value of the dependent variable.
King, Keohane & Verba (1994) address a particular form of selection bias in case selection
when the researcher truncates the full range of the dependent variable in the case selection,
a concern that can be avoided here given the extensive variation in both partisan control
and vigor of enforcement (or lack thereof) by the agency over the course of the 1973 to 2010
time series.
The EPA is an instrumental case in that while it is the centerpiece of the dissertation
project, I argue that the findings with respect to this agency can be used to extrapolate to a
broader policy context in separation-of-powers interactions, and while the EPA exemplifies
the dynamics of bureaucratic noncompliance that motivate the study, it provides insights
into the reach of the broader theory. Moe calls attention to the inefficiencies built into the
structure of the EPA, which he holds was “never designed as a coherent organization. Its
presidential creators pulled together disparate programmatic units under one roof, viewing
this as a first step toward a coherent organizational structure... Throughout its life, the EPA
has been hobbled by its programmatic inheritance” (1989, 317; see also Wood 1992).
The distributive politics agency that I select is the Department of Interior, which presents
a useful case comparison with the EPA and falls within the most similar case type according
to Gerring’s (2007) typology of case selection given its similarity with the EPA on a number
68Gerring defines typical cases as one or more typical examples of a given cross-case relationship and
which, by definition, are representative (2007: 89).
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of core variables other than bureaucratic structure69 and ideological orientation, and the
significant amount of both overlapping and non-overlapping policy space with respect to
statutory delegations. Here,while not representing the full range of values characterizing
the X/Y relationship as with the diverse cases approach (Seawright & Gerring 2008: 300),
the cases are different on factors of interest (e.g., bureaucratic structure and ideology) and
similar on other possible causal factors (Gerring 2007: 131). These agencies form the basis
of my environmental policy analysis.
Environmental policy, implemented in large part by the Environmental Protection Agency,
is one of high salience at the local, national, and global levels, and one that demands both
extensive public attention as well as government resources, with an estimation of over $80
billion in public expenditures spent toward air and water regulation between 2000 and 2012
alone, not including the additional expenditures of private industries (Rosenbaum 2014: 197).
Moreover, in the environmental policy context we find numerous historical episodes of inter-
branch conflict over the proper vigor of enforcement levels. For example, the Environmental
Protection Agency came under heavy scrutiny from environmental organizations under the
Reagan Administration, alleging failure to enforce the Clean Air Act, which is arguably the
most significant law that falls under its jurisdiction.70 The Clean Air Act provides a par-
ticularly interesting case for evaluating inter-branch conflict over implementation given the
large role that it has taken on with respect to regulating climate change, an issue beyond the
Act’s original scope. Moreover, a challenge rather unique to environmental policy in that air
and water quality (among other environmental issues) affect all citizens is that there is not
a natural constituency as might be the case with, for example, the National Labor Relations
69Berry and Gersen (2010: 19) find that agency design affects both legislative and presidential influence of
the agency’s spending decisions, with the extent of high-level personnel politicization impacting in important
ways the extent of the agency’s political responsiveness, which is importantly linked to this dissertation’s
conceptualization of compliance, or lack thereof.
70In 1986, the EPA was also faced with a number of charges of knowingly failing to comply with the
Endangered Species Act, ignoring the Fish and Wildlife Service’s alerts about the harms of various pesticides
placing protected plants and animals in jeopardy.
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Board.
The Environmental Protection Agency is the main agency tasked with coordinating,
promoting, and managing the federal government’s efforts to control pollution and prevent
environmental degradation. It works to preserve the purity and quality of air, land, and
water, to improve public health, and to stimulate further environmental research (Hill and
Hill 2004: 364). It is the leading governmental agency with respect to environmental pro-
tection, and with a federal office in Washington DC and 10 regional offices, it coordinates
with state and local governments, industries, and other agencies to maximize compliance
with EPA rules. It is headed by a president-appointed and Senate-confirmed administrator,
who is supported by a deputy administrator and several assistant administrators. Despite
the sweeping effects of the issues under the EPA’s jurisdiction, the EPA has become highly
politicized, wish sharp swings in policy direction and vigor with changes in the party of the
president. Hill and Hill (2004: 364) attribute this in part to the fact that the EPA’s offices
contain a number of president-approved and Senate-confirmed appointees in its offices, such
that most of the agency’s direction is being shaped by political appointees, with careerists
simply tasked with addresssing the more technical aspects of the policies.
The distributive politics agency, the Department of Interior (DOI), contains eight bureaus
which act as the United States’ main conservation energy to protect and provide access to
natural and cultural resources and heritage, in addition to conducting scientific research,
managing natural resources, and working on fish and wildlife protection (Hill and Hill 2004:
230). The DOI, created in 1849, has its secretary appointed by the president and approved
by the Senate, and assistant secretaries responsible for wildlife and parks, land and mineral
management, Indian Affairs, science, with the cabinet divided into a number of distinct
bureaus under the overarching jurisdiction of the Secretary of Interior (Id).
While environmental policy is an issue typically considered to be “owned” by the Demo-
cratic Party and the groups with which it is aligned, there is ideological variation both across
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these agencies as well as within the agencies over time. Clinton and Lewis (2008) use expert
surveys of administrative agency preferences and utilize a multirater item response model
to rank from most liberal to most conservative 82 executive agencies that existed between
1988 and 2005. According to their methodology, The Department of Interior ranked as the
21st most conservative among the these 82 agencies, which is consistent with conventional
perceptions of the DOI as being quite a conservative bureau. Moreover, Berry and Ger-
son’s (2010) analysis of Democratic tilt among distributive agencies places the Department
of Interior as one of the only agencies leaning in favor of Republicans with respect to the
agency’s allocations going toward Democrat-represented districts. In contrast, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency ranked as the 13th most liberal among these 82 agencies, and
ranks higher on Berry and Gerson’s (2010) scale of politicization, which they define as the
“average number of political appointees divided by the sum of the average number of political
appointees plus the average number of SES personnel in the agency” (2010: 32). Thus, here
we have two environmental agencies falling on opposite ends of Clinton and Lewis’s (2008)
ideological ranking, and while there are a number of substantively different environmental
issues taken on by these two respective agencies, they are broadly within the same policy
domain and thus are likely to have oversight by the same or similar congressional committees
and interest groups.
These agencies provide valuable variation in agency ideology and structure – with the
EPA being a relatively new (founded in 1970), structurally unified, and traditionally left-
wing independent agency, and the Department of Interior being a much older (founded
in 1849), hierarchically structured, and traditionally right-wing executive bureau – while
holding constant the policy domain (environment) and in some cases thanks to congressional
structuring of overlapping jurisdiction, holding constant the particular laws themselves.
However, apart from being focused on policy domains in which there is high salience and
thus greater potential for ideological clashes over policy (whether or not that conflict actually
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occurs), this theory is hardly specific to environmental policy. Providing a third case study
that is markedly different – and yet with the same potential for these inter-branch dynamics
to play out – allows me to have better confidence in the study’s external validity, and to un-
derstand better how institutional conflict varies (or doesn’t) across different policy domains.
It is with this goal in mind that I turn in future work to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
which is the redistributive agency that I evaluate. Financial regulation, notoriously complex
and fragmented (and thus presenting a number of opportunities for the breakdown of bu-
reaucratic control that motivates this study), is a policy domain more commonly considered
to be aligned with the Republican Party and conservative interests, thus providing valuable
variation relative to the environmental cases discussed above.
This case selection strategy allows me to evaluate noncompliance across agencies in each
of the different categories of policy discussed by Lowi (1972), with additional variation in
policy substance and ideology, while also allowing for some degree of overlapping policy ju-
risdiction, the implementation of which I evaluate qualitatively in evaluating and comparing
bureaucratic behavior.
Noncompliance and the EPA
Command and control regulation follows a clear legislative pathway in environmental
regulation: (1) regulation toward goals that Congress has identified; (2) identify criteria to
set pollution standards; (3) set quality standards for all of those pollutants being regulated;
(4) set emission standards for regulated pollutants; and (5) ensure that those quality and
emission standards are carried into effect (Rosenbaum 2014: 198). However, the technical
nature of environmental policy makes more complex these regulatory dynamics and the
ways in which political forces and institutions operate, with particular terms or objectives
sometimes left unclear. Moreover, there is a mix of discretionary and non-discretionary
provisions, which impacts the propensity of the administrative agency to fight to achieve
environmental compliance on the part of states and private entities. Among the mandates
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of the Clean Air Act, as well as the 1977 amendments, are the compulsion that the EPA
establish the maximum permissible ambient air concentrations for pollutants that are harmful
to human and/or environmental health (including carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, lead,
nitrogen oxide, particulates, ozone, and sulfur oxides) and the mandate that the EPA set
maximimum emission standards for new stationary sources, in addition to other requirements
that that states establish implementation plans for the achievement of federal standards and
the creation of a timetable for achieving auto and truck emission controls. The Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990 contained a number of new provisions and deadlines, primarily
adding to the original Clean Air Act’s titles on acid precipitation and ozone protection as
well as substantially amending other portions of the Act. Among those amendments were the
establishment of new classifications of areas failing to meet national air quality standards,
the establishment of more than 90 new truck and auto emission standards, the requirement
that the EPA create national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants for all major
sources of hazardous or toxic air pollutants and 189 listed chemicals, the creation of a new
emissions trading program for sulfur oxides, and a schedule for phasing out the use of ozone-
depleting chemicals (Rosenbaum 2014: 207-2010). It is worth noting that for the purpose of
this dissertation, I focus on mandatory requirements of the agency and the extent to which
the agency itself complies with those regulatory duties.
One can scarcely search records of the EPA without finding numerous accounts of states
and interest groups suing the agency to mandate enforcement of environmental standards
over recent decades. Such conflicts reached a notable peak amid President Ronald Reagan’s
“regulatory relief” efforts, which sought to markedly scale back federal regulatory efforts
in this domain. Reagan sought to withdraw the administrative enforcement machinery,
dramatically reducing the EPA’s budget and staffing as well as seeking to cut back on private
environmental lawsuits that could threaten the administration’s efforts to more vigorously
regulate environmental policy (Farhang 2011, 676). Landy et al observe that administrative
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turbulence between 1980 and 1982 led to sharp curtailment of environmental enforcement
efforts, with a 50% decline in the number of cases that the EPA referred to the Justice
Department and approximately a 33% decline in the number of enforcement orders that the
EPA issued (1990, 249). It was during this same period that the EPA actively sought to shift
environmental enforcement from the federal government to the states (Id at 272). In August
1986, the Environmental Protection Agency was charged with violating the Endangered
Species Act by knowingly failing to protected endangered animals and plants from harmful
pesticides, despite the US Department of Interior’s Fish and Wild Life Service’s provision
to the EPA of a formal opinion as to the harm caused by specific insecticides (Houston
Chronicle). What’s more, the Agency openly confessed to its noncompliance with the ESA,
with EPA Assistant Administrator for Oesticides and Toxic Substances John A. Moore saying
plainly, “There is no question about it, we didn’t comply with the requirements of the law...
I do not dispute the findings” (Id).
Wood & Waterman (1993) call attention to the importance of understanding bureau-
cratic adaptation in the EPA, arguing that bureaucratic behavior can be shaped by discrete
events, progressive events, and other sweeping shifts in the policy environment in which
the agencies operate. While they are correct to comment that “[p]ast models of politics
and the bureaucracy ignored the complex stimulus environment of the bureaucracy” (1993,
499), their restriction of analysis to referrals for litigation71 leaves many important questions
unanswered, such as other institutions’ responses to the agency outputs that they identify.
The EPA’s implementation, as with much environmental policy, provides for a division of
responsibility among federal, state, and local regulators. This dynamics promotes a strong
federalist quality to the nature of the political battles fought in this terrain, with regulated
interests more likely to push for a major state or local role in carrying out enforcement
given the expectation that it works to their advantage more so than having implementation
71They acknowledge directly that it captures only a single dimension of enforcement, and not the important
roles of the legislature and courts in monitoring compliance or lack thereof.
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concentrated in the EPA’s national and regional offices, and local regulatory agencies pre-
disposed toward accommodating those regulated interests (Rosenbaum 2014: 224). Such a
disjointed structure has additionally led to conflicting federal, state, and local views on the
proper scope of the regulation.
While the EPA’s implementation in the 1980s typifies the regulatory behavior under my
microscope, its enforcement has not perpetually waned, with Democratic administrations
typically seeking to make the agency less anemic in its regulatory capacity. In his October
21, 2008 letter to then EPA Administrator Stephen L. Johnson, House Oversight Committee
Chair Henry Waxman noted hat the EPA had lost two thirds of its Clean Air Act cases,
whether in whole or in part, in the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, which in many of those
cases “severely rebuked EPA for an apparently willful disregard for the plain language of
the governing law,” and Waxman went on to find that the Agency’s frequently majing such
decisions not withstanding judicial scrutiny was a marked waste of taxpayer dollars and
government resources under the Bush Administration. Apart from the resource constraints
imposed by the noncompliant rules adopted, those rules were, reported by the Los Angeles
Times to be developed by attorneys representing the industries being regulated, and adopted
by political appointees over the objections of EPA career attorneys and despite the fact that
its language would ultimately be found to be contrary to the statute’s plain language (Wax-
man letter to Johnson, October 21, 2008). Thus, in addition to being highly salient, there
is substantial variation in partisan composition and regulatory support for the agency over
time, allowing me to assess the effects of inter-branch conflict on implementation behavior
and to test the core hypotheses.
In the chapters that follow, I turn to the empirical estimations of noncompliance in the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Interior, and the conditions under
which and the manner in which Congress responds to this implementation behavior by these
agencies.
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Chapter 4: When Do Agencies Have Agency?
The Limits of Compliance in the EPA
“I think that 1970 will be known as the year of the beginning, in which we really began
to move on the problems of clean air and clean water and open spaces for the future
generations of America.” – President Richard M. Nixon on the 1970 Clean Air Act
On May 4, 1979, Joseph Dowd, the Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Amer-
ican Electric Power Service Corporation, appeared on behalf of the Utility Air Regulatory
Group to provide comments at a public hearing at the Environmental Protection Agency.
Among other complaints, he argued that the Environmental Protection Agency’s rules under
Section 120 of the Clean Air Act were far too sweeping relative to the statutory delegation
which required that the EPA’s regulations be as discriminating as the statute, and failed
adequately to define the compliance to which the Agency would be holding industries ac-
countable. He noted also that the Agency’s 13-month delay in promulgating those rules had
the implications of limiting the opportunity for public comment as provided for under the
Administrative Procedure Act, and limiting opportunities for judicial review of the Agency’s
actions (EPA Public Hearing on Section 120 Proposed Regulations, May 4, 1979). Such a
concern about the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulatory behavior is but one of
many raised over recent decades as to the reach of the statutory delegations to the Agency,
and the manner in which the Agency utilized its delegated powers.
With the development of the modern regulatory state came great expectations about
the role of government in providing services to its citizens, leading to a marked increase in
regulation and congressional delegation to better facilitate that policymaking. Indeed, bu-
reaucratic policymaking is the hallmark of modern American government, with bureaucracy
touching on virtually every facet of contemporary law and policy. Much attention has been
paid to inter-branch conflict and delegation in lawmaking, addressing congressional strategy
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in allocating discretion to agencies as well as to courts given concerns about bureaucratic
drift (e.g., Epstein & O’Halloran 1999; Huber & Shipan 2002; Farhang 2010). Yet for all
this discussion of conditions underlying congressional delegation to other institutional actors,
there has been little scholarly attention to statutory implementation and the consequences
of these delegation decisions and the potential disconnects between the ex ante oversight
in place and the ex post realities of policymaking amid extensive partisan conflict given
coalition drift. To correct this deficit, this chapter addresses the following core question:
Under what institutional conditions is Congress unable to induce compliance with legisla-
tive dictates in contemporary statutory implementation carried out by the Environmental
Protection Agency?
The growth of the administrative state and complex policy agendas has made delegation
virtually inevitable, given both the limitations of what Congress itself can achieve and the
administrative expertise on which Congress can capitalize post-enactment. While Congress
reaps a number of advantages in making such delegations, such strategies raise important
democratic theory questions about policymaking in the modern administrative state. In
structuring these choices of legislative design, Congress can acquire that expertise itself
through committees, it can delegate to an administrative agency (Epstein & O’Halloran
1999) or to multiple administrative agencies (Farhang & Yaver 2015), or it can delegate to
courts, such as through the provision of private enforcement (Farhang 2010). Each such
choice provides a set of advantages in obtaining efficient policymaking, but there is the
tension that there is the additional normative desirability of maintaining accountability
and a set of policies that reflect majoritarian will, as reflected by Congress. Accountability
problems can arise if there are conflicts between the goals of Congress and the administrative
entity, which can potentially motivate bureaucratic drift. Thus, these regulatory actions
result in Congress creating for itself a problem of agency (McCubbins 1995: 724), which can
be mitigated through structural arrangements and procedural requirements whose policy
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consequences remain virtually unknown. The question then arises, If Congress passes a
law and the bureaucracy is not bound by it, in what sense is law supreme and bind the
executive, and in what sense does popular will determine the general course of public policy?
This brings to light the central linkage between representation and administration, and the
extent to which disconnects may arise amid certain political configurations in ways that I
refer to as bureaucratic noncompliance.
This chapter thus focuses on the agency’s choice of how much to comply with its discre-
tionary limits in this partisan setting. While I do not claim that noncompliance is necessarily
pervasive, given concerns about compliance and the ways that Congress can work to attain it
(e.g., Miller 1977; McCubbins & Schwartz 1984; McCubbins 1985; McNollgast 1987), there
is ample reason to explore the conditions under which inducements of compliance may be
less effective, making agencies more than mere rote implementers of the policies delegated to
them. For example, the predominant political conditions of polarization (McCarty, Poole,
& Rosenthal 2006) and gridlock in recent decades elevates the transaction costs associated
with lawmaking. Such inter-branch dynamics, as well as coalition drift, can open new doors
for agencies to be more active policymakers than previously acknowledged and result in less
effective constraints on the range of possible administrative actions.
The extant literature’s failure to link delegation choices to the ultimate implementation
outcomes is a severe shortcoming if we want to understand the effects of partisan configu-
rations on observed policy choices. The chapter sheds important new light on the rule of
law in this world of bureaucratic governance and the mechanisms underlying policy changes
in the American political process. Because studies of bureaucratic compliance largely em-
phasize only formally the institutions’ strategies, to evaluate this empirically I developed a
large-scale dataset with which to provide new insights into these implementation choices.
Applying these questions of compliance to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
from 1973 to 2010, the chapter argues that given varied conditions in legislative-executive
109
conflict, divisions within the legislature, competing political principals, and reduced external
oversight of agency actions, agencies’ incentives to comply with the delegating statutes are
fundamentally reshaped, allowing them to take more active policymaking roles should they
so desire.
I begin by discussing the limitations of prior delegation analyses, and relatedly my con-
ceptualization of bureaucratic noncompliance and the implementation strategies involved.
I proceed with a brief discussion of my selection of the case of the EPA, and move on to
discuss my core separation-of-powers hypotheses of when noncompliance should be more ver-
sus less pervasive. I test these hypotheses with original data drawn from several thousand
bill introductions and several hundred DC Circuit court cases, with both datasets capturing
institutional interventions into bureaucratic implementation. I find strong support for the
claim that inter-branch partisan conflict and partisan division within Congress powerfully
compromise Congress’s ability to induce compliance in its administrative agents, unless the
party opposing the president is well-equipped to pass punitive legislation. While the pres-
ence of competing legislative principals powerfully predicts noncompliance, there is less clear
support for the hypotheses concerning the role of courts in monitoring bureaucratic behavior.
The Potential Limits of Compliance
To ensure efficient policymaking that also reflects the will of those legislators directly ac-
countable to the voters, scholars have sought to understand the relationship between demo-
cratic theory and administrative policymaking, and the factors that shape the nature of
the policies carried into effect. Congress has a number of tools at its disposal to help it
to induce compliance in administrative recipients of delegation – for example, it can man-
date annual reauthorization cycles for its programs, excercise the power of the purse, hold
oversight hearings with respect to agency implementation, and can impose administrative
procedures (e.g. reporting and consultation requirements) that limit bureaucratic discretion
(McNollgast 1987; Epstein & O’Halloran 1999). Yet while these models shed light on why
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and under what conditions Congress would seek to impose such constraints on the recipients
of delegation, they do not tell us necessarily to what extent, or under what conditions these
tools are more or less effective. Should these constraints be rendered ineffective, we may
expect a rise in the process to which I refer as bureaucratic noncompliance, or those agency
actions that seek to maximize discretion in ways that deviate from legislative dictates. Thus,
acts of bureaucratic noncompliance work to pull policy toward the agency’s preferences.
While much scholarship on separation of powers in lawmaking emphasizes laws’ insti-
tutional design, there remains a problematic assumption that agencies are effectively con-
strained by the delegating statutes, even though they may in truth be capable of skirting the
edges of their discretionary windows, even surpassing those bounds on authority. Indeed,
Congressman Henry A. Waxman noted to then-EPA Admininistrator Stephen Johnson that
the EPA’s “[r]epeated losses on plain language grounds suggest a reckless determination to
pursue the Administration’s policy objectives regardless of legal limits” (Letter from Henry
Waxman to Stephen Johnson, October 21, 2008). A typical delegation model might claim
that Congress will (1) delegate regulatory authority to an agency but in doing so it will (2)
impose procedural controls to constrain the agency’s actions, and (3) the agency, rational
and with institutional prerogatives for power, will comply in order to avoid punishment.
However, a number of important conditions reshape the likelihood of the agency suffering
consequences for defections, and as the chapter discusses below, there is merit in considering
when there is not a credible threat of punishment, reducing the likelihood of suffering costs
for shifting policy toward the agency’s preferences in ways that I refer to as noncompliance.
Moreover, many significant laws being implemented today were passed several Congresses
ago, and the policy preferences of these Congresses may be highly divergent, leading to po-
tentially substantial coalition drift. This calls into question the appropriate administrative
implementation given the preferences of the legislative principal(s). So while extant delega-
tion analyses (e.g., Epstein & O’Halloran 1999; Huber & Shipan 2002) take great strides in
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explicating the strategies resulting in the nature of the delegating statutes, to understand
better the policy outcomes we observe, this chapter argues that we must consider not just
delegation, but implementation in a dynamic political environment.
The many veto players at work in the American political process virtually guarantee
that key political actors will have divergent preferences over policy. The chapter’s emphasis
on noncompliance seeks to explain agencies’ incentives and their responses to the partisan
arrangements in which they operate. I assume that bureaucrats hold preferences about their
personal condition – such as self-promotion, power, prestige, and financial reward – and about
the policy in which they are engaged (e.g., Wilson 1989; Gailmard & Patty 2007).72 In turn,
noncompliance by these politicized agency heads grows out of their combined incentives over
both political and policy influence, resulting in agencies carving out greater opportunities to
be active policymakers relative to the status quo policy location.
This chapter departs from a number of conventional delegation models that assume faith-
ful agency execution of legislative dictates, and rather is in concert with the few models that
allow for bureaucratic noncompliance, or subversion. Gailmard (2002) examines a legis-
lature’s delegation of implementation power to an imperfectly-controlled bureaucrat who
can subvert the legislature by stepping beyond the bounds of explicitly delegated author-
ity. Agencies can choose policies beyond what the legislature authorized, but the farther
beyond the bounds of delegated authority, the greater the likelihood of being exposed, and
the higher the potential costs. Similarly, Huber & McCarty (2004) allow that the policy that
the bureaucrat sets may or may not comply with the statute, though they do not require
that such noncompliance be intentional on the part of the bureaucrat (see also Miller 1977).
While overt acts of punishment for noncompliance may at first blush appear rare, because of
72This claim is further substantiated by Congressman Waxman’s correspondence with EPA Administrator
Stephen Johnson on October 21, 2008, holding that the EPA Administrator, in conjunction with the White
House OMB, had ignored legal counsel in its deregulatory activities with respect to the Clean Air Act.
Thus, while there may be heterogeneous preferences among civil servants, their choices appear to be heavily
constrained by the preferences of the top political appointees and the White House that appointed them.
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punishment’s off-equilibrium nature,73 there is likely to be a plethora of unobserved agency
noncompliance in which agencies successfully shift policy consistent with their preferences.
Discussing bureaucratic noncompliance begs the question, noncompliance with what? A
little-discussed principal agent problem in statutory implementation is that while Congress
writes the laws and provides for ex ante constraints on agency latitude, the authorizing
Congress does not engage in much of the ex post monitoring of the agents to whom it
delegates because coalitions change (to varying degrees) every two years.74 This legislative
turnover and thus coalition drift creates in fact two legislative principals, one of which lays
out provisions for ex ante bureaucratic control in drafting the authorizing legislation (e.g.,
reporting and consultation requirements), while the subsequent legislative principal engages
in ex post control consistent with their policy preferences, but potentially at the cost of
enforcing the precise letter of the law, a tension that this chapter addresses.
It is for this reason that I conceptualize and measure two distinct types of bureaucratic
noncompliance. First, it can constitute acts that maximize agency discretion in ways that
deviate from the delegating statutory text. Second, it can constitute acts that maximize
agency discretion in ways that deviate from the current Congress’s preferences over that
statute’s implementation. The conventional expectation is that courts interpreting statutes
would expect compliance with the enacting Congress – that is, the statutory text.75 Yet
agencies might see value in implementing in accordance with the preferences of their current
principals – the contemporary Congress – rather than upholding outdated statutory provi-
sions. After all, the current Congress is capable of punishing an agency for what it perceives
as transgressions, and there is a legitimate question as to whether a legislature would exer-
73That is, anticipation effects preclude us from observing much of the noncompliance that does – or could
– occur (see, e.g., Cameron 2000).
74This phenomenon is analogous to delegation by cabinet ministers in parliamentary systems, in which the
principal delegating to the bureaucrat is, unlike a common assumption in delegation models of the United
States, not a stable principal (Huber & Lupia 2001: 19).
75Landes & Posner (1975) hold that courts “do not enforce the moral law or ideals of neutrality, justice,
or fairness; they enforce the ‘deals’ made by effective interest groups with earlier legislatures.”
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cise a commitment to upholding a past bargain as opposed to pushing policy toward its own
preferences. Thus, agencies can fail to comply with either the text written by the authoriz-
ing Congress – which raises questions of to what extent we observe the rule of law versus
the substitution of bureaucratic preferences, and to which they will be held accountable in
court – or with the contemporary Congress to which it can be held accountable, which is
consistent with the more common bureaucratic control stories of American institutions. To
address this tug-of-war between judicial and congressional interpretations of agency latitude
in policymaking, I provide in this chapter one measure that captures congressional inter-
ventions into agency policymaking that is out of concert with its preferences over statutory
implementation, and the other that captures judicial interventions into agency policymak-
ing for purported noncompliance with the statutory text. For the sake of clarity, I refer to
noncompliance with the statutory text – that is, with congressional mandates of the agency
or windows of discretion – as statutory noncompliance.
The concept of statutory noncompliance can be made clearer with the provision of a con-
crete example. In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act to amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) of 1980 in effort to regulate the transportation and storage of substances
that were potentially harmful to public health and welfare. Enforcement authority in the
Act was housed largely in the EPA, which among other things was tasked with promulgat-
ing by 1988 a rule regarding the provision of notice when substances being transported were
harmful. Consistent with the statutory directive, the EPA proposed in January 1988 a rule
regarding this notice provision. However, it was not until 1990 – two years after the deadline
– that the agency promulgated a final rule, which instead revisited the statutory language
and determined that it would only apply the notice requirement to a narrower range of con-
ditions. Thus, the scope of its regulation was vastly narrowed relative to what the statute
had initially provided for. As a consequence of this agency action, in Hercules, Inc. v.
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Environmental Protection Agency (1991), the DC Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
the agency had read into the statute a drastic limitation that not only did not appear in the
words that Congress chose, but that also flew in the face of the legislative history. Thus,
this case provides a clear example of noncompliance: a congressional mandate of regulatory
action by the agency, the agency’s proper interpretation of its authority and determining
that it would regulate only a subset of that which Congress compelled, and the judiciary’s
determination that the agency was out of compliance with the delegating statute. This is
precisely the phenomenon that I explore here.
The Strategy of Noncompliance
Theory suggests that agencies will comply with the statute rather than defect and suffer
adverse consequences such as the retraction of enforcement powers or funds with which
to operate. Yet a number of factors fundamentally alter agencies’ incentives, affecting both
compliance and the likelihood of being punished for that subversion. In the absence of a high
likelihood of punishment, the congressional majority and the administrative agency may be
playing a fundamentally different game with different choice sets available in policymaking.
Moreover, as Gailmard & Patty (2007) hold, those developing expertise and building careers
in civil service are those who have unusually strong policy preferences, which I argue can
contribute to divergence between the authority delegated and the policy outcomes observed.
The value of noncompliance in policymaking is a function of the agency’s expected benefit
if prevailing in moving policy toward its preferences, as well as the costs of not complying
given a variable likelihood of suffering those consequences. I expect that the likelihood of
exercising statutory noncompliance will be increasing in the distance between the agency’s
preferences and the location of the delegating statute. If the agency and the statute are
aligned – for example, both liberal – the agency has little to gain from stepping outside its
discretionary window because it can approximate its own ideal point. However, as these
preferences diverge, the agency has less to gain by being a rote implementer of the statute
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because to do so would result in a vastly different policy outcome than that preferred by the
agency. Thus, the benefit of statutory noncompliance in this case would be high.
I argue that the likelihood of noncompliance – both statutory noncompliance and with
respect to the current Congress – is decreasing in congressional incentives for private en-
forcement, in particular in the form of citizen suit litigation, which provide private citizens
standing to sue actors in violation of the acts as well as administrative entities for their reg-
ulatory actions or inactions, and have broadly-construed attorney’s fees and injunctive relief
for the prevailing party.76 Such provisions typically contain language such as, “Except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section and section 309(g)(6), any citizen may commence
a civil action on his own behalf – (1) against any person (including (i) the United States,
and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent
standard or limitation under this Act or (b) an order issued by the Administrator or a State
with respect to such a standard or limitation, or (2) against the Administrator where there
is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act of duty under this Act which is
not discretionary with the Administrator” (Clean Water Act, Sec. 505, emphasis added). By
mobilizing additional coalitions to monitor agency actions, the agency should be in a more
constrained condition, more vulnerable to costly litigation should it step outside the bounds
of its regulatory authority.
The likelihood of noncompliance with the current Congress should be increasing in leg-
islative conflict given the greater transaction costs associated with passing legislation under
those conditions. That is, when Congress is a more constrained actor, the likelihood of
punishment declines in ways that render the suffering of costs potentially negligible.
The likelihood of noncompliance with the current Congress should be increasing in
76The 1990s and 2000s exhibited a marked rise in citizen suit litigation in environmental regulation,
with Congress providing in the Clean Air Act for “private attorneys general” and citizen suits from both
environmental groups and other citizens accelerating markedly in response to this delegation (May 2003).
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legislative-executive conflict. If the agency and the current Congress are ideologically aligned
– for example, both liberal – the agency has little to gain from exercising noncompliance be-
cause by being a faithful agent to this legislative principal, it will approximate its own ideal
point. However, as the preferences of the agency and the current Congress grow farther and
farther apart – for example, a liberal agency and a conservative Congress – the agency has
little to gain from being a faithful agent to this legislature, and has a much greater benefit
of stepping outside of its discretionary window in order to achieve a policy it deems better.
However, and quite crucially, this is conditional upon the strength of the opposing political
party. In the case of a liberal agency and a conservative Congress where the conservatives
maintain a thin majority or a large minority, Congress is not in a strong position of power
to punish the agency for taking actions not in concert with its preferred implementation,
and thus not only is the benefit of noncompliance high, but the likelihood of suffering costs
is low. However, in the case of this ideological divergence but a conservative congressional
coalition that holds large and powerful majorities, the legislature will be both motivated and
capable of exercising punishment toward the agency, rendering the agency constrained (and
compliant) in its actions.
The Challenges of Measuring Noncompliance
While a number of scholars have addressed theoretically the importance of compliance and
the strategies at Congress’s disposal to ensure compliance with the administrative entities
to which it delegates, there do not exist measures that capture over long periods of the
dynamic of noncompliance as I have conceptualized it above. An inherent challenge in the
measurement of noncompliance – and indeed, much separation-of-powers behavior – is that
there are a number of highly salient unobserved strategic calculations on the part of the
institutional actors. For example, while veto bargaining dynamics are highly important in
shaping the laws that emerge through the veto gates, we do not often observe actual instances
of vetoes given congressional anticipation of the president’s actions, and the president’s
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anticipation of veto overrides (Cameron 2000). Likewise, the institution of the filibuster
importantly shapes the nature of the laws that are put forward in the United States Senate
given the frequent need for supermajority support (Wawro & Schickler 2006), even in the
absence of the actual use of this tool.
The same is true of bureaucratic noncompliance, with the agency’s strategic calculation
of where its preferred policy location is, but also the preferences of Congress and the extent
to which the chambers are united or hampered by partisan division, as well as the likelihood
of being sanctioned in court. Observed punishment for noncompliance can thus be construed
as off-equilibrium action. Such limitations present challenges to in what Goertz (2006: 95)
refers to as “concept-measure consistency,” or the extent to which the measure faithfully
characterizes the underlying concept that we seek to explain (see also Adcock & Collier
2001). Evaluating such consistency requires that one consider whether key aspects of the
concept are omitted from the measure, and whether the measure also includes inappropriate
elements (Id at 96). By such metrics, an accurate and consistent metric of noncompliance
would be difficult, if not impossible to achieve given the extent of anticipation effects among
the branches and the cost-benefit analyses in which instititutional actors engage in deciding
whether to punish noncompliant behavior.
However, if we observe perfect statutory compliance, we should not expect to observe
numerous judicial determinations that the agency was not compliant. Likewise, if we observe
perfect compliance with the current Congress’s preferences over implementation, we should
not expect to observe numerous instances of congressional coalitions working to strip the
agency of its capacity. Yet as in Hercules, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency and
as I discuss in greater depth below, in approximately one fourth of the cases in which the
EPA was sued in the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, the agency loses on substantive grounds
based on assertions of violations of clear statutory text. This then presents a puzzle as
to what explains these instances of agency punishment. Because of the challenges inher-
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ent in measuring bureaucratic noncompliance directly in this context of ample unobserved
strategic behavior, I instead address this phenomenon indirectly by evaluating judicial and
congressional interventions into bureaucratic policymaking. I argue that by evaluating these
off-equilibrium actions in the separation-of-powers system, we can better grasp the limits to
Congress’s ability to effectively induce compliance in the agency to which it delegates.
Hypotheses about Bureaucratic Noncompliance
A rich literature has called attention to congressional efforts to reduce administrative
discretion amid divided government and electoral uncertainty so as to guard against bu-
reaucratic drift (e.g., Moe 1989; Epstein & O’Halloran 1999; Huber & Shipan 2002; Farhang
2010). Beyond ideological differences between Congress and the executive branch, legislators
are influenced more by particularistic than national interests and are more subject to interest
group pressure, potentially leading to divergent preferences over regulatory implementation
even within the same party (Moe 1989). Thus, legislators and the interest groups that influ-
ence them strive to create agency structures calculated to implement their policy preferences
while tightly constraining discretion so as to better insulate against executive subversion.
Given concerns about subversion amid inter-branch disagreement, I expect that agencies will
be most inclined to seek to shift policy from the statute toward their preferred implemen-
tation under conditions of heightened legislative-executive ideological distance, conditional
upon the strength of the opposing legislative coalition. Thus:
H1: There will be more noncompliance with the current Congress when there is higher
ideological divergence between the legislative and executive branches, except when the opposing
political party holds a large majority of seats in Congress.
A number of factors affect the likelihood of identifying and punishing acts of noncompli-
ance. While Gailmard (2002) identifies subversion costs as lawsuits or the loss of budgets or
status, this project considers also the statutory adjustment of discretionary windows, which
relies upon a congressional coalition eager and able to pass new legislation. A rich literature
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on Congress has explored the causes and consequences of legislative conflict, which arises
given key individual legislators’ preferences relative to the location of the status quo (e.g.,
Brady & Volden 2006; Krehbiel 1998), as well as the use of the filibuster to embolden mi-
norities to block legislation lacking supermajority support in the Senate (Wawro & Schickler
2006). Given the numerous veto points in the legislative process, lawmaking becomes in-
creasingly costly when there are diverse preferences over policy. Thus, amid narrow partisan
majorities or greater partisan differences within or across the chambers of Congress, there is
compromised ability to pass legislation to shift policy from the status quo. In these cases,
agencies may perceive a reduced threat of statutory punishment given the elevated transac-
tion costs of lawmaking and Congress’s inability to credibly threaten to introduce punitive
legislation (see also Ferejohn & Shipan 1990). Thus:
H2: There will be more noncompliance with the current Congress when the transaction
costs of lawmaking are raised by ideological disagreement within Congress.
Challenges in oversight can arise from having multiple principals, with information leak-
ages and collective action problems compromising collective control over agents, and leading
to the potential underprovision of congressional oversight (Gailmard 2009). Given this limi-
tation in effective oversight, one might expect that having more actors with power or influence
over an agency (e.g., congressional committees, the president, interest groups) should reduce
subversion costs and thus increase the latitude with which agencies can set policy without
a high likelihood of punishment.77 Such challenges of multiple principals can arise not only
within, but also across Congresses when there is extensive coalition drift over time.
H3: There will be more bureaucratic and statutory noncompliance when there are multiple
competing political principals seeking to influence the agency.
77The presence of multiple political principals can potentially reduce incentive to deviate, given the in-
creased number of monitors capable of detecting noncompliance. Yet when the principals are in ideological
tension with one another, the conflicting goals and pressures on the agency should sway the agency’s imple-
mentation strategy in ways more likely to induce noncompliance.
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Just as fragmented congressional oversight of agencies can lead to inefficiency and at
times conflicting policy goals, the extent of vigorous judicial oversight should likewise shape
the agency’s incentive to comply. I expect that noncompliance will increase in the aftermath
of the Supreme Court’s landmark administrative law decision of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. vs.
National Resources Defense Council (1984), which broadened the extent of judicial deference
to agency decisions (1) where the intent of Congress was ambiguous; and (2) where the in-
terpretation was reasonable or permissible. This limited the legislature’s ability to rely upon
a third party (the judiciary) to control bureaucracy, which can in turn create new oppor-
tunities for agencies to move policy toward their preferences. The deference jurisprudence
developed under the Chevron doctrine can reshape the ways in which statutes are elaborated
and enforced, impacting both delegation and administrative implementation.
While Chevron arguably compromised stringent external oversight by the judiciary, the
frequent delegation to private litigants within the domain of environmental policy – and in
particular in the form of citizien suits – may act as meaningful check not just on the targets
of regulation, but also on administrative agencies seeking to avoid the burdens of legal suits
(see, e.g., Farhang 2011):
H4: There will be less bureaucratic and statutory noncompliance in the presence of greater
third-party oversight provided through the judicial branch.
In addition to considering the political configuration in which the agency is operating, the
extent to which the agency will be a faithful implementer of the delegating statutes should
be shaped by the extent to which it agrees with the policy location that it sets. An agency
should be more inclined toward compliance when its ideological location is more proximate
to its own, such that it believes in the policy that it is tasked with implementing. Thus:
H5: There will be more statutory noncompliance when there is greater ideological distance
between the statute’s location and the agency’s ideology.
In sum, the chapter argues that the extent of ideological disagreement, the ability of
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Congress to punish the agency, and the extent of effective oversight by other institutional
actors fundamentally reshape agencies’ incentives to pull policy toward their preferences
rather than engaging in “rote implementation.”
Other Predictors of Noncompliance
The above hypotheses capture the dominant institutional dynamics that I expect to
shape agency compliance (or lack thereof), but they are by no means exclusive. An aspect
of the agency’s noncompliance calculus is its probability of successfully pulling policy to-
ward its preferences. I treat administrative capacity as the agency’s ability to effectuate
policy consistent with its policy preferences in the separation-of-powers system, and it can
vary given – among other things – the manner in which Congress structures policy imple-
mentation. Congressional dispersing of power across multiple actors should operate as a
meaningful constraint on agency behavior, forcing compromise among administrators with
different preferences and interests (Farhang & Yaver 2015), as well as creating competition
among them. Amid this more fragmented political environment, agencies enjoy less autoomy
and is in a “much less happy state of affairs” given its preference for “its tasks [to be] simple,
its rivals nonexistent, and the constraints minimal,” without other agencies engaged in its
same policy goals (Wilson 1989: 181). If this legislative strategy of fragmentation is effective,
administrative actors will be better constrained rather than leaving marked room for drift
in policymaking. I thus expect there to be a negative association between fragmentation of
implementation power and agency deviations from legislative dictates.
Furthermore, with greater policy salience and significance, the stakes in policy implemen-
tation are raised relative to ordinary legislation over which we may be less likely to observe
institutional conflict. And while this will have the likely effect of increasing monitoring of
agencies’ implementation, I argue that it will nevertheless be within this policy domain that
we are most likely to observe agencies having strong preferences over implementation, and
where ideological disagreements are most likely to play out.
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Below I provide empirical tests of these hypotheses within the context of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency.
Empirical Model
The Dependent Variable: Bureaucratic Noncompliance. Measuring noncompli-
ance as I have conceptualized it is no easy task, and no empirical work to date has sought to
capture systematically over time the behavior that I address here. To test the core hypothe-
ses discussed above, I provide two novel and distinct measures of this phenomenon – one
to measure congressional intervention in agency actions given its preferred statutory imple-
mentation, and one to measure judicial interventions over implementation of the statutory
text (with the assumption that it is indicative of statutory noncompliance) – with the hope
that understanding the patterns and extent of these off-equilibrium outcomes will give us
valuable new insights about the limits of Congress’s effectiveness in inducing compliance in
the agency to which it delegates.
The first measure, agency curbing, captures congressional dissatisfaction with the EPA’s
implementation. Following Clark’s (2011) court curbing measure, I conducted THOMAS
searches for each of the 26 statutes implemented by the EPA from 1973 to 2010, which
returned a total of 11,272 bill introductions. Table 1 summarizes these 26 statutes, which
were identified from the EPA’s website.
I restrict analysis to the 5,169 bills introduced by members of the president’s party, with
the expectation that constraints by the president’s core supporters will provide the least
noisy signal of agency defection from the current Congress’s preferences. Such an argument
is consistent with claims of “counter-preference signals,” with Chiang & Knight (2011) finding
greater influence of liberal endorsements of conservatives and vice versa, and Beim, Hirsch &
Kastellec’s finding in the context of the United States Court of Appeals that “whistleblowers
who are closer to the panel majority who nevertheless choose to dissent will be much more
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Table 1: Environmental Protection Agency-Implemented Statutes
Law Name Policy Domain Citizen Suits
Atomic Energy Act Energy No
CERCLA Toxic Substances No
Clean Air Act Air Yes
Clean Water Act Water No
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act Toxic Substances No
Endangered Species Act Public Land/Animals Yes
Energy Independence and Security Act Energy Yes
Energy Policy Act Energy No
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Public Health/Safety No
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Public Health/Safety No
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Water Yes
Food Quality Protection Act Public Health/Safety No
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act Water Yes
National Environmental Policy Act Public Land/Animals No
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act Energy No
Noise Control Act Public Land/Animals Yes
Nuclear Waste Policy Act Toxic Substances No
Ocean Dumping Act Water No
Oil Pollution Act Toxic Substances No
Occupational Safety and Health Act Public Health/Safety Yes
Pesticide Registration Improvement Act Toxic Substances No
Pollution Prevention Act Toxic Substances No
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Toxic Substances No
Safe Drinking Water Act Water Yes
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act Toxic Substances Yes
Toxic Substances Control Act Toxic Substances Yes
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credible messengers of severe non-compliance” (2014: 10) than are whistleblowers who are
the farthest ideologically from the panel median.
I then hand-coded these 5,169 Congressional Research Service (CRS) summaries to iden-
tify the bills that sought to control the EPA’s behavior by (1) requiring that the EPA take
new mandatory regulatory actions (e.g., issuing new rules or sanctions for violations), (2)
prohibiting the EPA from taking certain regulatory actions or otherwise withdrawing EPA
authority (e.g., rescinding EPA funds or transferring its authority to another agency), and/or
(3) imposing new oversight procedures (e.g., reporting or consultation requirements).
Those bills designated as containing requirements included those bills requiring the EPA
to promulgate rules, set standards, enforce violations, or approve permits, and they con-
tained language such as, “Requires EPA to implement strategies for chemical testing and
risk assessment,” “Instructs the EPA Administrator to issue guidance annually identifying
the makes and model numbers of low greenhouse gas emitting vehicles,” or “Amends the
Clean Air Act to direct the EPA Administrator to revise regulations.” Those bills designated
as containing prohibitions included the formal congressional disapproval of EPA rules, the
prohibition against imposing sanctions or enforcing provisions, the transferring of enforce-
ment authority from the EPA to another administrative agency, the delay of EPA rules, the
mobilization of litigants against the agency, or the rescinding of funds with which to im-
plement its programs, and these bills contained language such as, “Amends the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 to repeal provisions authorizing the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to modify the frequency of
submitting toxic chemical release forms,” or “Disapproves the rule submitted by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) on December 15, 2009, relating to the endangerment
finding and the cause or contribute findings for greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.”
Those bills designated as containing oversight provisions included reporting requirements,
consultation requirements, spending limits, time limits, public hearings, and direct oversight,
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and contained language such as, “Requires the Administrator to report on or before January
1, of each year to the President and to Congress regarding the receipts and expenditures and
works of all State and regional environmental centers,” or “Requires the EPA Administrator
to arrange with the Secretaries of Education and of Energy to study how sustainable build-
ing features such as energy efficiency affect multiple perceived indoor environmental quality
stressors on students in K-12 schools.” If a bill made any one, or any combination of these
efforts, it was considered an agency curbing bill. 1,361 such bills were introduced by the
president’s co-partisans over the course of the 1973 to 2010 time series. A random sample
of 100 bills were double coded for reliability, and there was virtually no inconsistency in the
codes assigned.78
Importantly, a number of bills were introduced over the course of the time series that
addressed the powers and responsibilities of the Environmental Protection Agency that were
not counted as agency curbing bills. Among those bills relevant to the EPA that were not
considered relevant were appropriations bills not specifically involving a reduction of funds
to the EPA or the programs within it, the authorization but not requirement that the EPA
take regulatory action (that is, discretionary provisions), the establishment of offices within
the EPA but not requiring that the EPA itself take regulatory action, requirements of actors
other than the EPA (e.g., an environmental protection requirement in an EPA statute that
was directed instead at a state agency), the requirement that other administrative entities
consult with the EPA and not that the EPA initiate the consultation, or the mentioning
of the EPA in passing but not actually regulating it. Many such bills were introduced, in
particular those granting only discretionary authority, which was not counted because it was
construed as adding to, rather than reducing bureaucratic capacity to regulate.
While there is reason to suspect that requiring an agency to take on new regulatory
7897 of the 100 bills were assigned the same codes in both rounds of coding, suggesting both high reliability
and a randomness in any errors in the data.
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tasks might not necessarily operate as punishment of the administrative agency,79 Figure 1,
which is a lowess plot of the average agency curbing level by Congress (both the composite
measure and the individual indicators of curbing activity), confirms that the three agency
curbing variables exhibit similar patterns over the sample time series albeit with somewhat
different frequencies of occurrance. The performance of principal components factor analysis
revealed that the variables loaded on a single factor with an eigenvalue of 2.05 for the first
factor, with individual factor loadings of 0.87, 0.79, and 0.80, showing that the three items
are highly associated with the underlying factor and at similar levels.
This lends credence to my claim that the three variables are tapping into a single core
dimension, which I argue is congressional punishment over perceived transgressions of its
preferences over implementation. The pooling of the variables is supported further by aver-
aging the standardized requirements, prohibitions, and oversight variables, which produced
a Cronbach’s alpha of .80. The Cronbach’s alpha measures the internal consistency of a
scale, or the extent to which the items comprising the scale capture the same underlying
concept, and .8 is considered sufficient for the use of a composite measure (DeVillis 2012).
Thus, in both approaches to evaluating the internal consistency among the variables, the
data prove to be reliably tapping into a single dimension. The claim is supported further by
the fact that the requirements included in this variable are all mandatory rather than discre-
tionary, and thus contribute toward the micromanagement of the agency’s regulatory actions
(which is clearer in the case of prohibitions and oversight) as opposed to contributing to the
agency’s latitude.80 I thus created an agency curbing factor score81, which I then weighted
by the average cosponsorship support so as to afford greater weight to those bills garnering
79That is, Congress may be signalling intentional foot-dragging by the agency, but it may also simply
desire that the agency take on greater regulatory responsibility, albeit mandatory rather than discretionary.
80Fewer than 20% of the agency curbing bills also contained discretion-granting provisions, which bolsters
the claim that these bills are overwhelmingly comprised of efforts aimed specifically to limit administrative
latitude.
81Creating a composite measure by averaging the standardized variables produced comparable results.
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widespread support than to bills in which a lone legislator expressed dissatisfaction with
the agency’s implementation. The average number of cosponsors for curbing bills was 5.8,
though I normalized the cosponsorship measure to fall between the values of 0 and 1. While
I also conducted a separate analysis of those bills that only sought to prohibit or further
oversee agency actions – that is, those curbing bills that did not contain any requirements
at all – the infrequency of those occurrences (269 bills over the entire time series) rendered
the variable with very limited variation (and sometimes none) within the panels, making
very difficult the interpretation of the results (however, see Appendix Table A1 and the
accompanying discussion).
While I argue that those bills introduced by the president’s co-partisans should be the
least noisy signal of congressional dissatisfaction with bureaucratic implementation, there
is the additional possibility that one might want to evaluate agency curbing efforts made
by members of the majority party of Congress. Here, one can plausibly argue that while
members of the minority party might be less expected to be successful and thus might be more
willing to engage in cheap talk behavior less reflective of a broader congressional coalition,
majority party members may be more invested in the legislative agenda and inclined toward
legislative sincerity. In Figure 2, I present a time series plot of agency curbing actions against
the EPA with respect to the Clean Air Act (left) as well as the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (right), comparing the curbing patterns of the president’s co-partisans and
members of the majority party. Both the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act had fairly high rates of both same sponsor curbing and majority sponsor curbing,
with a total of 406 same sponsor and 528 majority sponsor curbing bills with respect to the
Clean Air Act (out of a total of 1434 bill introductions, 880 of which were curbing bills),
and a total of 206 same sponsor and 319 majority sponsor curbing bills with respect to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (out of a total of 1,454 bill introductions, 437 of which
were curbing bills). While there are notable increases in majority sponsor curbing (relative
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to same sponsor curbing) in the 100-101st and the 104th Congresses, the overall patterns
between the two time series are relatively consistent with one another in the Clean Air Act.
Likewise, apart from more marked deviations in the 103rd, 106th, and 110th Congresses,
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act time series also follow each other fairly closely,
providing greater support that the patterns are not vastly dissimilar with respect to their
overall volume and persistence, and the results do not hinge on the analysis’s restriction to
same sponsor curbing bills.
Agency Curbing in Action
The varied reasons for congressional bill introductions makes useful the more in-depth
discussion of the legislative constraints made against those within the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency in response to its implementation decisions. Looking within the context of
the 104th Congress – that immediately following the Contract with America and thus the
marked turnover of partisan control of Congress in the 1994 congressional midterm elections
– one finds John Warner, the Republican Senator from Virginia, introducing on February
16, 1995 S. 440, The National Highway System Designation Act of 1995, which originated
in the Senate Environment and Public Works and its Subcommittee on Transportation and
Infrastructure and garnered the support of 33 congressional cosponsors.
Among other provisions, the bill prohibited the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency from requiring a state’s adoption or implementation of enhanced vehicle
inspection and maintenance programs in order to comply with the Clean Air Act. More-
over, the bill prohibited the EPA Administrator from disapproving or applying automatic
discounts to state implementation plans based on policies, regulations, or guidelines that
provided for discounts of emissions credits that were based on certain inspection and main-
tenance programs. The bill further prohibited the federal government at large from taking
actions to prepare or implement regulations concerning rights-of-way in public lands until
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September 1996. The bill ultimately became Public Law 104-59, thus enacting into law these
ultimate constraints on the EPA’s range of implementation options, with specific targets at
EPA behavior suggesting clear sources of dissatisfaction with the agency’s choices in carrying
the delegating legislation into effect.
Of course. this example does not derive from the behavior of the president’s co-partisans,
but rather from a member of the Republican Party under a Democratic executive branch.
However, one finds in looking to the 103rd Congress – controlled by the Democratic Party
and under the Democratic Clinton Administration – that Democratic Congressman William
Huston Natcher (KY-2) introduced on February 1, 1994 H.R. 3759, the Emergency Supple-
mental Appropriations Act of 1994, which among other things delayed the availability of
amounts for state revolving funds administered by the Environmental Protection Agency
and rescinded funds made available to the Environmental Protection Agency and a small
number of additional administrative agencies. On Februrary 12, 1994, the bill was enacted
into law as Public Law 103-211 after being agreed to in the House conference report’s roll
call number 27 by a vote of 245 to 65.82
Collectively, these two cases of bill introductions on the part of Democratic and Repub-
lican legislators suggest not simply a blanket attack on the administrative agency given its
opposition to broad-based policy, but rather a careful attention to the policy choices adopted
by the agency and the legislators’ efforts to curb the agency’s capacity to continue to carry
them into effect. Such decisions on the part of legislators form the basis of the agency curbing
data on which I base the analysis in this dissertation.
Evaluating Statutory Noncompliance
The estimation of statutory noncompliance requires the evaluation of the meaning of the
82While prohibiting the allocation of funds toward the EPA, a traditionally more liberally-aligned agency,
the bill granted authority to other administrative agencies including the Department of Defense, suggesting
that what was at work was not a blanket attack on the executive branch but rather a more targeted effort
at the agency itself.
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delegating statutes and to what extent they extend obligations and authority to agencies, an
interpretive role often left to judges. After all, amid the expansion of federal bureaucracies
and the potential for inter-branch and intra-branch policy collisions, “private parties usually
find ways to bring such disputes to court. Federal judges must then try to sort out the
conflicting legislative mandates,” with judges left to assume the role of “traffic cop” (Melnick
1994: 34).83 To measure judicial interventions in agency implementation, I identified through
Lexis searches of each of the 26 statutes implemented in whole or in part by the EPA the
567 DC Circuit cases from 1973 through 2010 in which the EPA was the defendant.84 Banks
(1999) notes that despite their considerable importance as Article III constitutional courts,
the United State Court of Appeals are “described, paradoxically, as the courts that ‘nobody
knows’” (1999: 1), though it is often the court of last resort in American cases being litigated.
Banks notes in the context of the DC Circuit that amid the rampant growth of regulation
that characterized the 1970s, the court had focused its efforts toward constraining with
the hard-look doctrine85 administrative agencies’ legal and policy initiatives given agencies’
increasingly sweeping power to act legislatively (Id at 2). Banks characterizes the DC Circuit
as becoming a “de facto, quasi-specialized administrative law court of last resort” (Id at 3),
not to mention a court that developed a conservative reputation with the addition of Reagan
appointees.
Going beyond the discussion of pure ideological features of judges, Canon and Johnson
note that while “judges try to mute the influence of their attitudes,” they are unable to
83While Melnick (1994) notes that courts are the venue in which these disputes are settled, he also claims
that like the rest of the American political system, the judiciary is highly divided both with respect to
ideology and with respect to the judicial philosophies of activism versus restraint (1994: 35-36) and calls
attention to their activism within the context of AFDC cases (Id at 97).
84A limitation of this analysis is the exclusion of settlements, though they are largely due to failure to
meet deadlines as a consequence of insufficient resources with which to comply with statutes, as opposed to
active efforts to expand discretionary windows. Thus, such settlements are not of theoretical interest.
85The hard look doctrine is a principle of administrative law declaring that a court should review agency
decisions with great care so as to ensure that those decisions were based on reasoned decisionmaking, with
courts interfering should it become apparent that the agency had not taken a “hard look” at the salient
problems at hand, and with “arbitrary or capricious” actions made invalid.
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escape their implicit views on justice and social order, as well their views on the what the
proper role of judges should be in the separation of powers system, which in turn affects the
decisions rendered (1999: 46). Moreover, they are attuned to the political environment in
which they operate, in that while judges technically are meant to make decisions based on
legal facts and precedent as opposed to the political environment, judges carry the incentive
to maintain respect and avoid being criticized for their decisions, such that judges may be
“sensitive to social and political considerations in their environment as they interpret higher
court policies” (Id at 52). Thus, there are institutional and societal pressures that may be
conducive to judges producing decisions based on factors other than the text itself (see also
Binder & Maltzman 2009).
Herz (1992) writes on the subject of judicial exercising of textualism that new textu-
alists’ message is very simple: “[F]ocus on the text, nothing but the text, and no,”thing
but the text of a legal document,” without any consideration of extra-textual evidence that
favors a contrary legislative intent (1992: 184). Of course, legal and political science schol-
ars acknowledge the limits of textualism, or the extent to which it can reliably yield the
same interpretation among different judges, with Eskridge & Ferejohn (2010) noting that
the remains, especially with respect to the larger policy areas, a lack of interpretive closure
despite the fact that “the statutory text, its purpose and legislative history, and its context
within particularly statutory schemes remain the critical tools for figuring out how to apply
statutes” (2010: 465). It is this persistent statutory ambiguity – combined with political sci-
entists’ widely documented accounts of judicial ideology at the appellate and Supreme Court
levels of the judiciary – that leads to concerns about treating the judiciary as the appropriate
institution to which to turn with respect to resolving matters of legal interpretation of cases
over which Congress and the agency have failed to resolve the proper policy interpretation
and implementation choice. And while judges claim to be deferential to agencies’ statu-
tory interpretations, a pattern that was defended in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
132
Council (1984), Eskridge & Ferejohn find that “judges are not as deferential as they claim to
be,” thus leaving a greater role for ideology (2010: 24). However, despite this concern about
judicial biases in their exercise of deference toward agency actions, Westerlund et al (2010)
find that the ideological makeup of a Court of Appeals panel does not affect its treatment of
Supreme Court precedent, even controlling for ideological distance between the levels of the
judicial hierarchy, suggesting a smaller role of judicial ideology at the appellate level than
some might suspect. Thus, while there are certainly inconsistent political and legal accounts
of the extent of ideological decisionmaking on the US Court of Appeals, there appears to be
evidence sufficient to suspect that at least some of what drives DC Circuit judges’ rendering
of decisions is based on the content of the text and good-faith efforts to interpret it properly.
It is for this reason that I rely on DC Circuit opinions with which to evaluate bureaucratic
compliance with the delegating statutes.
To be sure, it is not always the case that those statutes delegating to the Environmental
Protection Agency contain agency-forcing provisions. That is, there are a number of case
in which the agency is permitted, but not required, to carry out various regulatory tasks.
It is in such cases that one would observe litigation that centers not on the failure to take
on mandatory regulatory tasks, but rather the slowness with which the agency is carrying
out regulatory tasks that are seen as being within its jurisdiction – even obligation – despite
the potential absence of a particular time frame within which to act. Such is the case when
interest groups accuse the EPA of dragging its feet with respect to tasks that technically
are discretionary in nature but that nevertheless are construed as within the agency’s core
mission, to protect the environment such as through the preservation of air and water quality.
Another dimension in which litigation can arise in such a context absent agency forcing
provisions is those cases in which the agency is authorized (though again, not required)
to take regulatory actions in defense of environmental protection (for example, protection
of public lands or water), and in which industries take aim at the agency in court given
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allegations that the EPA is being overly vigorous in its protection of these resources, thus
being unfair to the companies with vested interests in these environmental and energy issues.
I hand-coded each majority opinion to determine whether the agency lost on substantive
grounds. While the district courts are typically the first venue of litigation, suits against
administrative agencies often go straight to the appellate courts, with the DC Circuit being
the main circuit addressing Administrative Procedure Act cases, making this the appropri-
ate level of analysis. The predominant reasons for the EPA’s loss was the issuing of rules
or enforcement that were inconsistent with the delegating statutes, or intentionally caus-
ing unreasonable delay in taking mandatory actions.86 I excluded from the noncompliance
measure those cases that were decided on procedural grounds (e.g., standing or notice and
comment procedures) so as to focus on matters of substantive policy. The vast majority of
these cases were unanimous, as is typically the case at the appellate level, and there were
very few cases that contained dissenting opinions.87
A clear limitation to this the measure is that it effectively treats DC Circuit judges as
neutral arbiters of agency actions as opposed to treating them as ideological and able to read
multiple views into text. Eskridge & Ferejohn note that Americans commonly view judicial
review as important because it preserves constitutional rights and governance, and thus “the
most accessible theory is that judges should apply the text and principles of the sacred text
of our civic religion” (2010: 437). Given this, many of the most noteworthy justices of
American history (e.g., John Marshall, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Louis Brandeis, Hugo
Black) advocated such a text-based or structural approach to constitutional interpretation.
Moreover, they add, legal academics typically advocate in favor of theories of constitutional
interpretation that are rooted in the document’s text, structure, and principles (Id at 438).
86Among the language determined to count as noncompliance were “regulation violated Clean Air Act”
(American Corn Growers Association v. EPA, 2002), “EPA abused its discretion in promulgating Tribe’s
redesignation” (Administrator, State of Ariz. v. EPA, 1998), and “[EPA’s rule] was unreasonable and
arbitrary” (Kennecott Corp. v. EPA, 1979).
87Exclusion of those cases involving dissents did not substantively affect the results.
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Of course, this does not address the challenges of determining how long a text should be
read, how to address ambiguities, and how we should resolve conflicts when two judges see
“plain meaning” of a law but would produce opposite outcomes. I am unable to resolve
such issues of textualism here. However, by relying on strict textual analyses of the agency’s
authority and the extent of (non)compliance that it exercised and by relying on the judge
to explicate the clear statutory obligation that was not met or the clear statutory provision
that was breached by an action taken, I placed a heavy burden on the court to demonstrate
noncompliance and thus sought to strip away, to the greatest degree possible, the effect of
ideology. Using these criteria, I found that the EPA lost 129 (or approximately 23%) of these
cases. This measure EPA suits lost is the percentage of EPA losses per law per Congress
(see Table 2A in the Appendix for summary statistics).88
Measures of Institutional Conflict. Legislative-executive distance is a continuous
variable measuring the NOMINATE distance between the President and the median floor
member (Poole & Rosenthal 1997).89 Lower values are associated with greater ideological
proximity between the branches, indicating unified government, whereas larger values are
associated with divided government with heightened disagreement between the President
and Congress.Margin of control is absolute value of the margin by which the majority party
controls the seats in Congress, such that larger values indicate a wider majority while val-
ues closer to zero indicate an evenly divided Congress. With a large margin of control in
Congress, a party has lower transaction costs in passing curbing legislation. The value does
not alone distinguish between whether that majority is that of the president or his oppo-
sition.90 I interact margin of control with legislative-executive distance because I expect
88Using a count rather than percentage of suits lost produces comparable results.
89Using the president’s NOMINATE score to approximate agency ideology is imperfect, but the time-
invariant nature of the Clinton & Lewis (2008) scores and the limited range of the Chen et al (2014) scores
makes the president’s ideal point the closest available approximation of the agency’s ideal point, particularly
given that the EPA is not an independent agency but rather is headed by a political appointee.
90Thus, a large margin of control value could indicate one of two conditions: divided government with the
opposing party in a very strong position of control in Congress, or unified government in which the President
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that the effects of extensive inter-branch ideological disagreement will be conditioned by the
extent to which the majority coalition is in power and positioned (as well as motivated)
to pass punitive legislation with respect to the agency. I expect the independent effect of
Legislative-Executive Distance to be positive conditional upon the level of margin of control,
but given the higher likelihood of punishment with a large margin of control in the majority
party of Congress, I expect the interaction effect to be negative.
To estimate legislative division, I use the measure chamber distance, which is the first-
dimension Common Space NOMINATE distance between the House and Senate medians.
Because successful policy adoption requires some overlap in preferences among key political
actors in both of the chambers of Congress, greater distance between the chambers will yield
higher transaction costs in passing legislation, creating greater opportunities for the EPA to
shift policy toward its preferences. Thus, I expect the effect to be significant and positive.
To estimate the statute-agency ideological distance, I computed the absolute value of the
NOMINATE distance between the median member voting in favor of the delegating statute
and the median floor member of the contemporary Congress.
Other Political Environment Variables. Because of the potentially meaningful ef-
fects of interest group lobbying in shaping bureaucratic implementation, I include from the
Policy Agendas project the annual number of environmental interest groups.91 Gordon &
Hafer (2005) call attention to interest group pressures and their “flexing of muscles,” holding
that companies’ communication of intentions to fight agency decisions may lead agencies to
regulate less or regulate elsewhere, despite statutory directives. Thus, multiple competing
principals – Congress and interest groups – may drive agencies toward noncompliance.
To estimate further the potential problems arising from multiple principals, I include the
variable distance between congresses, which is the absolute value of the distance between
commands strength in both the executive and legislative branches. The variable serves as a constraint on
agency policymaking in the former case of divided government, while it enhances bureaucratic latitude when
the branches are united in their preferences over policy.
91I divided the value by 100 to allow for easier interpretation.
136
the authorizing Congress’s first-dimension NOMINATE median legislator and that of the
contemporary Congress. This allows me to estimate to what extent coalition drift drives
the agency to exercise noncompliance with the statutory text in effort to be responsive
to the current Congress, or alternatively defecting from the current Congress in effort to
exercise fidelity to the delegating statute. To control for DC Circuit ideology, I identified the
median judge’s ideal point utilizing the Giles, Hettinger, and Pepper (2001) ideology scores
of judges, which are based on the judge’s appointing president and/or home state senators,
thus exploiting the norm of senatorial courtesy. Epstein et al (2007) find that the Giles et
al measure ‘exhibits face, convergent, and construct validity and outperforms other common
neasyresm such as the party of the appointing President or the ideology of the state from
which the judge is selected” (Epstein et al 2007: 4-5). 92
Because partisan ideology should predict well the direction in which the agency would
opt to push policy (whether higher or lower than the statute), I include the dummy variable
Democratic President. I expect that the party of the president can be treated as a proxy for
these preferences over implementation, particularly given the Democratic Party’s historically
strong ties to environmental policy as well as a more broadly pro-regulatory agenda. Given
the greater ease of punishing an agent seeking to over-enforce rather than seeking to under-
enforce, I expect the coefficient to be significant and positive.
To account for the possibility that agency enforcement is driven not by ideological pref-
erences over policy but rather resource constraints on effective implementation, I control
for the EPA budget for the fiscal year, using data made public by the agency.93 Given the
92Evaluating instead the NOMINATE distance between the median judge and the median floor member,
and the NOMINATE distance between the median judge and the president, did not substantively affect the
results. Using the cruder measure of a dummy variable for Democratic or Republican control of the DC
Circuit likewise produced comparable results.
93I divided this variable by $100,000,000 to ease interpretation. Replacing this budget variable with a
trend of the size of the EPA workforce over time produces slightly weaker, though largely consistent results,
and the effect of Workforce is insignificant. The inclusion of both variables simultaneously produces results
highly comparable to those presented in the main models below, though simultaneously controlling for them
induces the problem of multicollinearity due their correlation of .94.
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natural ebbs and flows in the extent of environmental regulation over time in ways that are
not relevant to my theory (e.g., an oil spill), I control for the total EPA legislating, which is
the number of bills introduced that addressed the Environmental Protection Agency in some
way, and the total EPA litigation, which is the total number of DC Circuit suits pertaining
to these laws. To evaluate whether the period following Chevron v. NRDC (1984) was
associated with greater agency maximizing of discretion, I include the dummy variable Post-
Chevron, which takes the value of 1 after the 1984 case and 0 otherwise.94 The evaluation
of the pre- and post-Chevron provides, I argue, an important (potential) structural break in
the data such that consistent with studies employing regression discontinuity design (RDD),
we should be able to see a “treatment effect” of being in the aftermath of the deferential
review advocated by Chevron.95
Finally, to model the nonlinear pattern of bureaucratic noncompliance over time, I include
smooth cubic splines. The procedure, which produces one less variable than there are knots,
produces a continuous smooth function that is linear before the first knot, is a piecewise
cubic polynomial between successive knots, and is linear after the last knot. Performing
sensitivity analysis to vary the number of knots did not meaningfully affect the main results.
Law-Level Measures. For each of the 26 statutes implemented in whole or in part
by the EPA, I determined the level of administrative fragmentation, which is a factor score
comprising the numbers of implementing administrative actors and agencies, and the number
of instances of overlapping jurisdiction over policy space in each of the laws. These actors
and entities were identified based on the text of the law and whether they were involved in
implementing core regulatory functions (rulemaking, sanctions, hearings, and/or lawsuits).96
94Also relevant is I.N.S. v. Chadha (1983), pertaining to the legislative veto, though it fell within the
same Congress as Chevron and thus the effects cannot be disentangled using this cutpoint.
95However, a simple difference-in-means test reveals that there is a small and statistically insignificant
difference in agency curbing between the two periods, and plotting the data with a vertical marker on the
x-axis for the time at which Chevron took place (the 98th Congress) produces mixed findings and in some
cases none at all. Thus, evaluating this effect at the bivariate level does not produce results, and the data
are not sufficient in size to carry out a proper RDD design within the vicinity of this assignment variable.
96Averaging the standardized scores performed equivalently.
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Farhang & Yaver (2015) argue that congressional fragmentation of the state constrains the
executive branch given the need to coordinate across numerous actors and agencies, in ad-
dition to facilitating the legislature’s goal of maintaining a “sticky” status quo. Thus, I
expect higher levels of fragmentation to be associated with more constraints on the EPA’s
implementation, and in turn less noncompliance.
I identified from the text of the delegating statutes whether the law provided for citizen
suits, which I expect to constrain bureaucratic behavior. There is potential endogeneity
involved in evaluating the impact of citizen suit litigation provisions when those provisions
may have been inserted into legislation with the precise concern that agencies might be
less inclined toward compliance with those particular statutes. To evaluate this further,
I evaluated the various differences between laws passed with versus without citizen suit
litigation. Laws providing for citizen suits are distributed widely across time of passage,
policy topics, and levels of statutory significance, in ways not systematically distinct from
non-citizen suit laws (though citizen suit laws do appear somewhat more frequently in the
later decades of the data).97 Thus, it does not appear to be the case from this cursory analysis
that the differences in the details of the statutes themselves (which could potentially shape
its vulnerability with respect to precluding bureaucratic drift) were the driving forces behind
Congress’s inclusion of these provisions.
A question remains, of course, to what extent the statutory provision of citizen suits
alone is enough to shape bureaucratic behavior, or whether the frequent use of this legal
strategy would be necessary in order to ensure better compliance.98 If it is indeed the case
97A limitation here is that many citizen suits are mobilized not under specific statutes, but rather under
the Equal Access to Justice Act. However, I argue that the statutory provision for these legal strategies in
the context of specific statutes does provide some useful indication of the likelihood of the mobilization of
organized interests in court with respect to these statutes’ proper implementation.
98The use of citizen suit litigation in the environmental context has been rather limited when compared to
an area such as claims of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After
the passage of the Clean Water Act, the number of suits filed by environmental groups was scarce, with
many organizations lacking the resources to identify violations let alone to bring a case (Environmental Law
Institute 1984.
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that citizen suits are merely a possibility on paper, then capturing the effect of citizen suit
mobilization presents a hard test for the theory. And while one might expect there to be a
correlation between the statutory provision of citizen suits and activity in the DC Circuit, it
is neither a given that organizations will in fact utilize this tool, nor that suits brought will
make it to the DC Circuit as opposed to ending through settlement. I assigned policy codes
to each of the 26 laws under the EPA’s jurisdiction, falling into the following categories:
Air, Water, Public Health and Safety, Public Land and Animals, Energy, and Hazardous
Waste. Each of these policy categories was coded as a dummy variable, and I included these
as policy fixed effects in the models presented below. Finally, significant law is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 if it was identified by Mayhew (2005) as significant, and 0
otherwise.99.
Estimation Method. The data are organized by statute by Congress, with 26 laws over
19 Congresses (93rd to the 111th). This data structure enables me to estimate over time the
institutional and law-level characteristics that shape agency implementation behavior.
Given this data structure, it is appropriate to use a time series cross-sectional model,
whereby the data consist of comparable time series data observed on different units (statutes),
allowing one to test theories of both cross-sectional and cross-temporal variation. A chal-
lenge in applying this procedure to the EPA data is that some of the laws under the EPA’s
jurisdiction were passed recently, thus leaving fewer observations for those units and giving
greater weight to older laws than to those that are newer. Given Beck’s (2010) recommen-
dation of cross-validation of units within time-series cross-sectional data, I compared the full
dataset to the the data from laws enacted between the 93rd and the 111th Congress, as well
as to the laws enacted from the 93rd Congress or earlier (that is, those laws with balanced
panels). I find that the results from the 93rd-forward laws closely parallel the results of
99An exception is the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (1938), which was passed before the start of
Mayhew’s study but has a high level of significance, as indicated by its Lapinski & Clinton (2006) significance
score of 0.819. Thus, I treat the law as significant.
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the full estimation, and while the strength of the specification with older laws is of a weaker
level of significance (with results around p=.10), the direction of the effects remain the same.
Thus, the results do not appear to be driven simply by a subsample of the laws within my
analysis. To address the potential effects of outliers given the relatively small number of
units in the sample, I performed the resampling technique of jackknife estimation,100 and
the main substantive findings were consistent.
The dependent variable agency curbing is the factor score weighted by cosponsorship
support, and ranges from 0 to 0.92 with a mean of 0.22. The dependent variable of EPA
lawsuits lost is the percentage of DC Circuit cases that the EPA lost on substantive grounds,
and it ranges from 0 to 1 with a mean of 0.16. I estimate the effects using Ordinary Least
Squares with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) to account for contemporaneous cor-
relation.101 To account for variable litigation periods – that is, variation in the time between
the agency’s statutory noncompliance and the DC Circuit’s rendering of a decision on that
behavior – as a robustness check I present alongside these main results in Table 2 an al-
ternative specification that lags the EPA lawsuits measure by one period (EPA lawsuits
lostt−1).
102
Because performing statistical analysis of relationships between nonstationary time series
can lead to spurious results, I use a Fisher-type test to test to confirm whether the dataset
contains a unit root. I find overwhelming evidence against the null hypothesis of a unit
root with respect to all variables except for environmental groups and distance between
congresses, which I first-differenced to render stationary. Performance of the Wooldridge test
for autocorrelation in panel data produced a highly significant test statistic, indicating the
100Jacknife is a resampling technique whereby to estimate a parameter, one systematically omits the ith
observation and averages each subsample estimator.
101While the EPA lawsuits variable is not strictly speaking continuous, it is widely dispersed between 0 and
1, and alternatively using a negative binomial specification of the count of lawsuits lost does not produce
meaningfully different results.
102While the cases in the sample overwhelmingly were argued in the same Congress as when the cases were
decided, the time between the case’s initiation and its being argued is more varied.
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presence of first-order autocorrelation, for which PCSEs do not correct. After examining the
autocorrelations across different panels, I specify in the model that there is AR(1) correlation
within the panels and that the coefficient of the AR(1) process is specific to each panel.103
Findings of Noncompliance with Current Congress
I begin by discussing the model estimating the conditions driving agencies to deviate
from Congress’s preferred implementation, as indicated by the agency curbing composite
measure. The models are OLS and thus the coefficients can be interpreted directly. I focus
here on the main variables of theoretical interest, though the full estimations are presented
in Table 2.
In evaluating the effects of interactions, one cannot consider the constitutive terms of
the model as the effects of X on Y as one does in linear models because the assumption
in interacting these variables is that the effect of a variable is conditional upon another
variable (see, e.g., Brambor et al 2006). Thus, the coefficients on legislative-executive distance
and margin of control cannot be construed as the unconditional effects on noncompliance
so measured. I find in model 1 that when the margin of control is equal to zero, the
conditional effect of a unit increase in legislative-executive distance is associated with a 0.44-
unit increase in agency curbing, a value that ranges from 0 to 0.92. Rather than focusing
on the significant and positive independent effect of margin of control, the more meaningful
term is the interaction, given that a large partisan majority in the president’s party would
not be expected to serve as a threat to the agency, whereas under conditions of inter-branch
conflict and a large majority in Congress, there will be both ideological disagreement and an
opposing party well-positioned to punish an agency seeking to move policy toward its own
preferred location. The interaction is powerful and negative – with a standard deviation
103Utilizing a lagged dependent variable specification to address autocorrelation produced similar results
with repect to a number of the core variables of theoretical interest. However, see Achen (2001) on the
problems associated with LDV’s.
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Margin of Control 1.822***
(0.370)




Statute-Agency Distance 0.144*** 0.077**
(0.018) (0.024)
Distance Between Congresses 0.161** 0.243*** 0.008
(0.066) (0.026) (0.036)
Citizen Suits -0.013 -0.011** -0.025***
(0.020) (0.004) (0.007)
Democratic President 0.017 0.004 0.158***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.006)
Environmental Groups -0.002* 0.022*** -0.032***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
DC Circuit Ideology -0.231** 1.406*** -0.445***
(0.074) (0.025) (0.012)
Post-Chevron -0.015† -0.105*** 0.005†
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003)
Significant Law 0.047*** -0.014** -0.008***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.001)
Statutory Fragmentation -0.000 0.004** 0.007**
(0.006) (0.001) (0.003)
EPA Budget 0.000 0.006*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total EPA Legislation 0.001***
(0.000)
Total EPA Lawsuits -0.010*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.000)
Intercept -2.752*** 11.050*** 8.479***
(0.818) (0.186) (0.102)
Policy Fixed Effects X X X
Splines X X X
R2 0.26 0.87 0.87
Total Observations 372 372 372
∗∗∗p < .001,∗∗ p < .01,∗ p < .05,† p < .10
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increase in the interaction term producing a 0.11-standard deviation decline in curbing –
which is consistent with my expectation that amid partisan conflict with the opposing party
holding a large majority, the high risk of punishment will make noncompliance an unlikely
avenue for the agency to take in equilibrium. That is, under this arrangement, Congress
appears well-equipped to induce compliance in the agency.
Because of the complexity of interpreting interactions in which both variables are con-
tinuous, I present in Figure 3 a plot of the interaction effects at different levels of margin
of control. While the plot does not include confidence intervals around the point estimates,
what one can see is that there is – consistent with the effect presented in the regression
result – a markedly negative slope when the margin of control is at its higher values, and
it is not until the Congress is more evenly divided that the slope flattens or moves upward.
This is consistent with my expectation that the effect of legislative-executive disagreement
over policy will be conditional upon the strength of the coalition in Congress and thus its
ability to pass punitive legislation should it so desire.
Consistent with my expectation that divisions between the chambers of Congress would
be associated with increased bureaucratic noncompliance by the EPA, I find a positive effect
of chamber distance, with a unit increase in chamber distance associated with a .14-unit in-
crease in agency curbing.104 The effect of NOMINATE distance between Congresses appears
to be significantly associated with agency curbing from the current Congress. That is, by
exercising greater fidelity to the statutory text passed by an ideologically distant Congress,
the current Congress expresses greater disapproval of the agency’s actions. Increases in the
extent of environmental interest group activity appears to be associated with less noncompli-
ance, though the substantive effect is small. Thus, the effect of having multiple competing
principals appears to prodiuce an inconsistent effect on the agency’s implementation and
104This effect of legislative division is consistent when looking instead to the NOMINATE distance between
the medians of the majority and minority parties.
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how it is received by other institutional actors.
Congressional provision for citizen suits does not appear to effectively constrain agency
actions, despite the theory that the agency may be inclined to seek to avoid costly litigation
from this broader pool of potential litigants. Moreover, contrary to my expectations, adjust-
ment to judicial deference in the aftermath of Chevron appears to have a modestly significant
and negative effect on noncompliance, though the substantive effect is small, with a move
from the pre-to-post-Chevron period associated with only a 0.02-unit decline in agency curb-
ing. The lack of a significant finding with respect to the EPA’s budget suggests that these
acts of noncompliance with the current Congress are not driven primarily by the agency’s
resource constraints as opposed to disagreements over matters of substantive policy.
As a robustness check in Table A3, I estimate additional OLS models with PCSEs com-
bined with Prais Winsten, with the dependent variable of agency curbing weighted instead
by the proportion of agency curbing bills per law per Congress on which some legislative
action was taken105 (model 1), and by the average number of committees to which the agency
curbing bills were referred (model 2). Providing these additional specifications enables me
to better ensure that my findings do not rely on the assumption that the number of cospon-
sors per bill is an adequate indication of legislative sincerity or the seriousness with which a
bill was considered by congressional coalitions. That is, while some pieces of legislation pass
through both chambers of Congress and are signed into law by the President without a single
cosponsor, other laws garner the support of 200 cosponsors without achieving final passage.
Thus, cosponsorship provides an only imperfect signal of congressional support for a given
piece of legislation. Thus, as additional metrics of the seriousness with which congressional
coalitions worked to constrain the EPA (and the credibility of such a threat against the
agency), I also evaluate the rate at which these agency curbing bills received some legislative
action and the rate at which bills were taken under consideration by multiple congressional
105That is, this is the percentage of bills for which the date of last action was not the same as the date of
the bill’s initial introduction.
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committees.
While only 6.9% of agency curbing bills introduced by the president’s co-partisans ulti-
mately passed, 61% had some legislative action taken on them, with wide variation in the
length of those legislative cycles. And while multiple referral was a practice made more
common in recent decades as opposed to the earlier period of this analysis, there were on
average almost two committees though as many as 13 engaged in agency curbing legisla-
tion. While inflation in the number of committees could be attributable to other aspects of
the legislation – for example, when agency curbing provisions were nestled within omnibus
budget reconciliation acts touching on many distinct policy domains – it provides yet an-
other indication of the body of legislators taking under consideration provisions aimed at
constraining the agency’s regulatory latitude. Consistent with the main findings discussed
above, I find in both specifications that there is a significant and positive independent effect
of legislative-executive distance when the margin of control is set to zero, while the interac-
tion between the two is significant and negative. Greater chamber distance is also positively
associated with the growth in agency curbing behavior, such that greater legislative divi-
siveness continues to appear to be associated with the agency’s greater propensity to act
out of accordance with the current Congress’s preferences over implementation. However,
the effects of distance between Congresses and congressional provision of citizen suits do not
reach conventional levels of statistical significance.
As an additional robustness check in Table A4, I estimate additional OLS models with
PCSEs combined with Prais Winsten, with the dependent variables of the individual types
of agency curbing bills introduced, weighted by their cosponsorship support. I argue that all
three of these measures – requirements, prohibitions, and oversight – are, in conceptually dis-
tinct ways, constraining the agency so that it no longer has free reign in its implementation,
a claim that is supported by the variables all loading heavily on a single factor and exhibit-
ing similar patterns over time. However, there is reason to suppose that different patterns
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could emerge when compelling as opposed to prohibiting regulatory action by the agency.
However, both the requirements and prohibitions models – though not oversight – display
patterns consistent with those when using the composite measure: an increase in congres-
sional constraints on the agency amid greater legislative-executive distance, but a significant
and negative interaction term. While the effect of chamber distance is only sustained in
the prohibitions model, the effect of greater ideological distance between the enacting and
contemporary Congresses remains significant and positive with respect to Congress’s intro-
duction of requirements and prohibitions against the agency. Thus, while there is not total
consistency across all three variables, the consistency with respect to the requirements and
prohibitions variables bolters support for the chapter’s main findings on conditions under
which congressional coalitions will seek to curb the agency’s latitude in regulating.
Noncompliance with Statutes Enforced by Courts
The above analysis of agency curbing sheds important new light on agency deviations
from congressional preferences in statutory implementation, but does not answer clearly the
rule of law question regarding the agency’s adherence to statutory text. For that, I turn to
the EPA suits lost dependent variable, the results of which are presented in Table 2 alongside
the agency curbing specification. I expect that considering these substantive lawsuit losses
against the EPA will provide novel insights about adherence to statutory text given variation
in political and legal conditions, with the DC Circuit Court of Appeals able to assess whether
the agency contravened its regulatory authority under the delegating statutes.
In model 2, I find that a unit increase in statute-agency distance – that is, the extent of
disagreement between the policy set by the enacting coalition and the agency – is associated
with a 0.14-unit increase the EPA’s loss rate, significant at the .001 level. I likewise find
this significant and positive effect of statute-agency distance in model 3, bolstering support
for the claim that the agency will exercise less fidelity to the statutory text when it is not
ideologically aligned with the policy that it sets. Consistent with the finding with respect
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to agency curbing activity, I find that greater ideological distance between the enacting and
contemporary Congresses is associated with not just greater legislative constraints on the
agency, but also greater loss rates in court. That is, when adjudicating among ideologically
distinct legislative principals, the EPA appears to ultimately face greater constraints from
both the legislative and judicial branches: fidelity to the statutory text results in a contempo-
rary Congress that expresses opposition to the policy implementation, while responsiveness
to the contemporary Congress results in higher levels of statutory noncompliance. Thus,
amid these dueling political principals, the agency appears to be caught between a rock and
a hard place, highly vulnerable to punishment by the other branches. It should be noted,
however, that this finding is not robust to the lagged lawsuit specification presented in model
3, though the direction remains positively signed.
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, in both models 2 and 3, congressional provision for cit-
izen suit litigation against the agency has a statistically significant and negative effect on
bureaucratic noncompliance, suggesting that the greater pool of potential plaintiffs induces
some degree of constraint on the agency, though the substantive effect is modest. Consis-
tent with the model discussed above, the post-Chevron period appears in both models to
be associated with less noncompliance, a finding that departs from my expectation that
enhanced judicial deference to agency actions would amplify agency latitude and inclination
to maximize or overstep discretionary bounds of implementation authority. Of course, one
explanation with respect to the lawsuit measure is that this period may be associated with
the court’s reduced probability of exercising judicial review of agency actions within the
subset of cases on which I base this analysis. More consistent with expectations with re-
spect to judicial deference, replacing the post-Chevron dummy variable with a post-Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife (1992) dummy variable. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) was a
significant Supreme Court case that narrowed the range of conditions under which plaintiffs
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have standing to sue.106 Thus, the post-Lujan period should be associated with a reduced
threat of potential plaintiffs having standing to sue the EPA. The Lujan variable produces
comparable results on the key variables of theoretical interest and a positively-signed and
significant coefficient on this dummy variable. Thus, when there is a lesser probability that
an individual will be permitted to sue the agency, the agency acts less consistently with the
statutory text and more consistently with its own preferences over policy. Future work will
explore more closely the historical dynamics around these jurisprudential changes and the
subsequent standards of review. While the direction of the effect of environmental interest
group presence is inconsistent across specifications, the substantive effects remain modest,
with a standard deviation increase in interest groups associated with only a .01 standard
deviation increase in noncompliance in model 2, and a .17 standard deviation decrease in
noncompliance in model 3. Thus, the substantive effect of interest group monitoring of
the agency – though also presumably seeking to influence its policy choices – is ultimately
unclear.
Thus, both lawsuit specifications produced reults highly consistent with Hypothesis 5,
that the agency’s statutory compliance will be shaped by its agreement with the policies
they set, and the main lawsuit model (model 2) provided further confirmation of the hy-
pothesis that multiple legislative principals will result in an agency that acts in ways that
are out of compliance with either the current Congress’s preferences (as indicated in model
1) and/or with the statutory text enforced by courts (as indicated in model 3). While the
lawsuit models produce internally consistent findings with respect to the effects of citizen
suits and Chevron, their small effects and their inconsistency with model 1 provides reason
106The Lujan case was brought about due to a 1986 Endangered Species Act (ESA) amendment’s creation
of a geographic restriction on the applicability of the ESA, holding that it only applied to the United
States or on the high seas. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that they were in an “ecosystem
nexus” in which anyone part of a “continuuous ecosystem” that was adversely affected by a government-
funded activity should have standing to sue. And given the Court’s fixation on the production of “actual or
imminent” injuries on the plaintiff, it was made clear that fewer environmental claims could reasonably be
brought before the Court.
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to exercise caution in interpreting the results. However, overall the models provide sup-
port for the claims that the extent of legislative-executive disagreement, moderated by the
strength of congressional opposition, legislative division, and inconsistency between multiple
principals importantly reshape the agency’s incentives in implementation with respect to
the current Congress’s preferences, and that agreement with the delegating statute and that
same inconsistency among legislative principals produces inconsistency with the letter of the
law. Moreover, the inconsistent effects of the agency’s budget on congressional and judicial
responses to the agency’s implementation suggests that while resource constraints on the
agency may provide some explanation for these acts of noncompliance, it can hardly explain
the broader patterns of noncompliance that the data reveal.
Conclusions
This chapter provides a novel large-scale examination of agency noncompliance and sheds
new light on the extent of the rule of law in a world of bureaucratic governance. It provides
robust support for the theory that amid diverging legislative-executive preferences, the EPA
takes more actions that deviate from Congress’s preferred implementation of the delegating
statutes in order to pull policy toward its preferred location, unless the likelihood of pun-
ishment is perceived as being great. It finds that the agency’s own preferences over policy
importantly shape the extent to which it is in fact a faithful implementer of that statute,
again providing support for the argument that agency ideology plays a crucial – though
little-acknowledged – role in the execution of statutes even with the provision of ex ante con-
straints given oversight challenges produced by ongoing coalition drift. The project sheds
important new light on longer-term ramifications of bureaucratic autonomy, suggesting that
while there may be a number of reasons why an agency can initially carve out a space for its
autonomous policymaking, that autonomy is far from path-dependent if it deviates too far
from the preferences of other institutional actors. Thus, in an era of nearly-constant partisan
division as well as marked coalition drift over time, there are clear reasons to rethink the
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traditional delegation story and look farther downstream at the policy outcomes that we
ultimately observe upon implementation.
This paper was motivated by the the desire to understand empirically the limits of
Congress’s ability to effectively induce compliance in those to whom it delegates – with
much theory and little empirical support in extant analyses of the policy effects of con-
gressional oversight and constraint. While compliance may be normatively desirable given
policy’s better reflection on the preferences of directly elected legislators, the complexities in-
herent in policymaking, and the changing preferences among the branches over time, reshape
agencies’ inclination and latitude to exercise strict adherence to the statutory text or to the
Congress currently in power. These agency actions call attention to an important distinction
between the ideals of ex ante constraints on the agency and the ex post implementation that
we ultimately observe, with the magnitude of this disconnect shaped importantly by the
partisan configuration in which the institutions operate.
The issue of noncompliance was addressed here only indirectly. The tests above cap-
ture congressional and judicial interventions into agency policymaking – interventions that
ought not occur if the agency is exercising perfect fidelity to the current Congress or to
the statutory text respectively. However, by identifying a set of conditions under which
compliance was not induced in the agency, the project provides valuable new insights into
the limits of congressional oversight of post-enactment processes, and the conditions under
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Appendix
Because of the potential value in understanding the precise factors contributing toward
congressional efforts to simply prohibit or further oversee the Environmental Protection
Agency, and alongside those choices in no way adding to the Agency’s regulatory agenda,
I created a dummy variable for whether there were only prohibitions and/or oversight pro-
visions, but no frequirements in the bill, and I summed these bills by law by Congress as
before. There were 269 such bills introduced by members of the president’s party. However,
when looking at the law-Congress level, one finds that they are included in only 114 of the
398 observations, and they are entirely absent from 4 of the 26 laws, thus creating for those
cases only a dependent variable of zeros. Thus, there are limitations in what we can glean
from such an analysis.
Nonetheless, I used the count variable of constraints without requirements, which is widely
dispersed and thus more fitting for a negative binomial than for a poisson model specifica-
tion.107 Performance of a Wooldridge test ruled out the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation.
I thus ran panel negative binomial models with unit (law) random effects. The results are
presented in Table 1A, though to interpret the effects one must simulate marginal effects
due to the non-linear nature of this model. Interestingly, the effect of legislative-executive
distance switches to the negative direction, which is inconsistent with all of the prior spec-
ifications discussed above, and the interaction term, though not statistically significant, is
also incorrectly signed. However, the effect of chamber distance on the agency’s propensity
to provoke responses remains statistically significant and positive. The effects of distance
between Congresses and citizen suits become insignificant here. While these results are thus
less consistent with the main models discussed above, and it is worth considering why from
107284 of the observations are 0, there are 50 instances with a count of 1, 32 instances with a count of 2,
12 instances with a count of 3, 9 instances with a count of 4, 6 instances with a count of 5, 1 instance with a
count of 6, 1 instance with a count of 8, 1 instance with a count of 10, 1 instance with a count of 13, and 1
instance with a count of 16. Such data naturally produced a very high variance, whereas Poisson dispersion
requires that the variance equal the mean.
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a substantive standpoint this variable might in fact produce different results than one ob-
tains when pooling all of the different types of regulatory constraints aganist the agency, the
rather scarce amount of data limits the extent to which we can make meaningful inferences
from these findngs. Extending this analysis to more environmental laws – that is, pooling
these laws with those of implemented by the Department of Interior – might provide an op-
portunity explore further, and with more data, the differences between curbing that includes
compulsions to act and curbing that is restricted to precluding action.
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Table A2: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Dependent Variables
Lawsuit Losses 0.16 0.21 0 1
Requirements 0.23 0.59 0 4.39
Prohibitions 0.10 0.38 0 5.03
Oversight 0.12 0.36 0 5
Agency Curbing 0.22 0.09 0 0.92
Political Environment Variables
Floor-President Distance 0.48 0.08 0.31 0.60
Margin of Control 0.10 0.09 0 0.29
LE Distance x Margin 0.05 0.04 0 0.14
Chamber Distance 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.05
Distance Between Congresses .06 .04 0 .17
Environmental Groups -7.45 53.45 -141.25 34.92
Total EPA Legislating 213.57 123.57 0 395
Total EPA Lawsuits 16.39 10.02 1 46
DC Circuit Ideology 0.06 0.14 -0.25 0.25
EPA Budget 61.18 20.83 7.35 89.71
Law Characteristics
Fragmentation 0 0.88 -1.38 2.97
Significant 0.53 0.50 0 1
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Table A3: Predictors of Agency Curbing, Assigning New Weights
(1) (2)
Legislative Action Avg. Number Committees
Legislative-Executive Distance 2.763*** 6.421*
(0.697) (2.721)
Margin of Control 16.050*** 22.729*
(3.088) (9.754)
LE Distance x Margin -25.251*** -33.438*
(4.604) (15.344)
Chamber Distance 1.006*** 2.041*
(0.291) (0.942)
Distance Between Congresses 1.638 1.555
(1.232) (2.004)
Citizen Suits -0.108 -0.511
(0.143) (0.282)
Democratic President -0.050 0.379
(0.088) (0.229)
Environmental Groups -0.013*** -0.015
(0.004) (0.014)




Significant Law 0.140 0.322
(0.216) (0.247)
Statutory Fragmentation 0.058 0.355***
(0.045) (0.044)
EPA Budget -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Total EPA Legislating 0.005* 0.014**
(0.002) (0.005)




Policy Fixed Effects X X
Splines X X
R2 0.36 0.39
Total Observations 372 372
∗∗∗p < .001,∗∗ p < .01,∗ p < .05
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Table A4: Individual Agency Curbing Actions
(1) (2) (3)
Requirements Prohibitions Oversight
Legislative-Executive Distance 1.713† 1.329* 0.253
(1.026) (0.675) (0.440)
Margin of Control 10.298*** 6.574*** -0.028
(2.797) (1.974) (1.305)
LE Distance x Margin -17.892*** -10.359** 1.142
(5.228) (3.721) (2.447)
Chamber Distance 0.004 0.508* -0.014
(0.486) (0.232) (0.215)
Distance Between Congresses 1.425** 1.343*** -0.204
(0.505) (0.164) (0.438)
Citizen Suits -0.170*** -0.017 -0.071
(0.052) (0.049) (0.084)
Democratic President 0.051 -0.027 0.091*
(0.083) (0.061) (0.040)
Environmental Groups -0.019** -0.009* -0.004
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
DC Circuit Ideology -1.120* -1.206** -0.930***
(0.537) (0.368) (0.230)
Post-Chevron -0.057 -0.060 0.052
(0.085) (0.084) (0.042)
Significant Law 0.438*** 0.162*** 0.379***
(0.076) (0.028) (0.054)
Statutory Fragmentation -0.038* -0.071† -0.028
(0.019) (0.041) (0.040)
EPA Budget 0.005 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total EPA Legislating 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Intercept 0.000 -13.445** 0.000
(.) (4.360) (.)
Policy Fixed Effects X X X
Splines X X X
R2 0.34 0.20 0.27
Total Observations 372 372 372
∗∗∗p < .001,∗∗ p < .01,∗ p < .05,† p < .10
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Agency Curbing Codebook
Went to the legislative database THOMAS: http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php
I conducted THOMAS searches for each of the 26 statutes implemented in whole or in
part by the EPA. E.g., searching “Clean Air Act” in the 93rd Congress, 94th Congress, and so
on through the 111th Congress. There were no restrictions on whether it eventually became a
public law or the committee from which it originated. Assigned to the label “agency curbing”
those bills compelling regulatory action (requirements), prohibiting regulatory action or
otherwise stripping agency latitude/authority (prohibitions), or increasing oversight over
agency actions (oversight).
Collected for each bill the following variables:
Law Name: Name of the original law (e.g., Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act)
Congress: Congress of the amending bill
Bill Number: Bill number of the amending bill (e.g., HR 1)
House Origin: 1 if originating in the House, 0 if originating in the Senate
Introduced: Date of the bill’s introduction
Year: Year of the bill’s introduction
Democratic President: 1 if bill was introduced during a Democratic administration,
0 if under a Republican administration
Description: Short description of the content of the bill (e.g., “rules re: toxins in water,
report requirement”)
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Rulemaking: 1 if at least some of the provisions targeting the agency’s authority/obligations
pertained to acts of rulemaking, 0 otherwise
Enforcement: 1 if at least some of the provisions targeting the agency’s authority/obligations
pertained to acts of enforcement (e.g., issuing sanctions, compelling compliance of
regulated entities), 0 otherwise
Not relevant: 1 if no curbing provisions in the bill, 0 otherwise
Rulemaking or Implementation Requirement: 1 if the bill contained at least one
provision that the agency take new regulatory actions, 0 otherwise.
• Ex. 1: “Directs the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, by regu-
lation and after a hearing, to disallow such deduction with respect to any solid waste
material.”
• Ex. 2: “Directs the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, under the
Clean Air Act, to promulgate Federal standards of performance for emission control
devices or systems designed to prevent or reduce air pollution emissions from used
vehicles.”
Grants: 1 if the bill contained at least one provision that the agency issue grants to
programs, states, or other regulated sectors, 0 otherwise.
• Ex. 1: “Requires the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to establish a grant program for projects to: (1) reduce free-flowing elemental mercury
and mercury-added products from the environment; (2) safely dispose of or recycle
mercury...”
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Prohibition: 1 if the bill contained at least one provision that prohibited the agency
from taking some regulatory action (e.g., prohibiting the agency from promulgating
certain rules), retracted existing funds/resources/authority (e.g., reducing funds,
transferring authority from the agency to another agency), or mobilized others to sue
the agency (e.g., adding citizen suit provisions), 0 otherwise
• Ex. 1: “A bill to amend the Clean Air Act to prohibit the Environmental Protection
Agency from requiring motor vehicle inspection and maintenance.”
• Ex. 2: “Removes authority of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency to waive the reformulated gasoline oxygen content requirement for an ozone
nonattainment area.”
Oversight: 1 of the bill contained at least one provision that imposed another oversight
provision/provisions (e.g., report requirement, consultation requirement), 0 otherwise
• Ex. 1: “Requires the Administrator to report on or before January 1, of each year to
the President and to Congress regarding the receipts and expenditures.”
• Ex. 2: “Requires the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to consult with the Secretary regarding each feature of the proposed new or amended
Record of Decision for operable unit 6 of the California Gulch National Priorities
List Site that may require any alteration to, or otherwise affect the operation and
maintenance of, the Tunnel or the water treatment plant.”
Bill Name: Title of the amending bill
Sponsor: Name of the sponsor of the amending bill, along with their state and district
if applicable (e.g., Barbara Boxer (CA), Jerry McNerney (CA-11))
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Democratic Sponsor: 1 if the bill sponsor is a Democrat, 0 if the bill sponsor is a
Republican
Same Sponsor: 1 if the President and the bill sponsor are of the same political party, 0
if they are of different parties
Majority Sponsor: 1 if bill sponsor is in the majority of her chamber, 0 otherwise
Committees: List of the committees to which the amending bill was referred (e.g.,
“Senate Environment and Public Works, Senate Energy and Natural Resources,
Senate Appropriations”)
Number of Committees: Count of the number of committees to which the bill was
referred
Latest Action: Date of the last action taken on the bill
Public Law: PL number (e.g., 93-460) that the bill became, if applicable
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Chapter 5: Evaluating Noncompliance in the
Department of Interior
“Simply stated, short of a crime, anything goes at the highest levels of the
Department of Interior.” – Earl Devaney, Former Dept. of Interior Inspector General
While I evaluated in the previous chapter the manner in which the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency complied – or opted strategically not to comply – with congressional mandates
in a dynamic separation of powers setting, those results are not necessarily generalizeable
to other agencies of different preferences or bureaucratic organization. It is for that reason
that I turn now to the Department of Interior (DOI).
The Department of Interior was statutorily created as a cabinet-level department on
March 3, 1849, the last day of the 30th Congress, has long been regarded by the Supreme
Court as America’s trustee of public land assets (Knight v. United States Land Association
(1891)), and is one of America’s oldest and most important federal agencies. Unlike the
Administrator of the EPA, there is a stronger geographic component to DOI leadership, with
the Secretary of the Interior traditionally being a westerner, which is a concession to western
states, where most public lands are located, though since the 1980s the relationship between
the pro-environment community and the DOI has been combative as it adjudicates between
those seeking to conserve resources and those seeking ample access to them (Rosenbaum
2014: 107-08).
While the Secretary of Interior has vast influence over the allocation of public natural
resources in the United States, the actions of the DOI have tended to garner limited visibility
among the general public as opposed to simply those who have direct stakes in a given
conflict (Coggins & Nagel 1990: 475). As with the the case of the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Department of Interior’s responsibilities are both vast and highly varied, with
the statutes under its jurisdiction covering a wide spectrum of policy domains. Historically
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considered among the more conservative agencies (Clinton & Lewis 2008), the Department of
Interior is comprised of nine separate bureaus: the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), United
States Geological Service (USGS), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), Bureau of Reclamation (BL),
Bureau of Safety and Envronmental Enforcement (BSEE), National Park Service (NPS), and
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE). A number of these agency
sub-units were created much later than the original Department itself as the agency became
better empowered to manage public lands and wildlife refuges and to oversee titles to federal
lands. While these bureaus comprising the Department of Interior carry different statutory
responsibilities (e.g., wildlife protection), they do not operate as independent agencies, but
rather are part of a hierarchical structure with the Secretary of Interior as the most senior
member. In addition to these nine bureaus, the DOI also contains numerous offices falling
under tthe Office of the Secretary; the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management, and
Budget; the Solicitor’s Office; and the Office of Inspector General. Thus, unlike the EPA,
the fragmented nature of the DOI creates different opportunities for conflict with relevant
interest groups and committees, as well as potentially less latitude in implementation should
conflictss arise among the bureaus themselves (for example, competing for limited resources).
As a consequence of this disjointed bureaucratic structure, Coggins & Nagel note that the
history of DOI implementation has been characterized by “lax administration of public land
laws, interjurisdictional squabbles, lack of coordination, increasing agency specialization,
and informal alliances with resource developers” (1990: 479-80) that is perpetuated by the
Department’s status as a “mixed bag of agencies, each subject to mixed mandates” (Id at
485) that the Secretary is forced to mediate.
As Strauss (1974) notes, while mining laws were administered through the Department
of Interior’s Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau carried with it numerous other poli-
cymaking responsibilities, many of which were considered of greater importance than mining
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implementation.108 Thus, within delegated authority, there is an implicit hierarchy of pol-
icymaking priorities within an agency and potentially across units within the agency such
that competing priorities can lead to under- or over-enforcement relative to the statutory
provisions laid out by Congress.
Turning to the agency’s early roots, Carpenter attributes the early challenges of American
land reclamation policy to the Department of Interior’s “stifling administrative structure,
exacerbated by program leadership that emphasized administrative isolation and extreme
centralization,” along with the overcommitment of the Reclamation Service to numerous
costly projects (2001: 338). Given the Reclamation Service’s administrative transgressions,
among them failing to to inform settlers of mounting costs of construction and maintenance,
relations between Interior and Congress came to decline in the early twentieth century (Id
at 346). Carpenter ultimately characterizes “adminsitrative debility” as best characterizing
its decline in the service’s discretion from 1910 to 1914, with the Reclamation Extension Act
of 1914 passed only due to Congress’s hands being tied after it had invested such extensive
funds into the program (Id at 351).
A striking distinction between the EPA and DOI in its statutory implementation – and
relatedly, its entrenchment with various special interests hypothesized by some (e.g., Gordon
& Hafer 2005) to influence the vigor of bureaucratic enforcement – is that within the domain
of mining policy, the DOI’s Bureau of Land Management does not engage primarily with
large corporations capable of attaining extensive legal experience and advising and which are
characteristic of the “haves” as opposed to the “have-nots” in Galanter’s (1974) depiction of
large interests’ benefits reaped in the American legal system. Rather, the Bureau engages in
this domain with small miners with limited such resources, and ultimately experiences that
lead them to suspect the agency of being arbitrary in its implementation and “undeserving”
of its influence (Strauss 1974: 1237). The Bureau of Land Management has received the
108The Bureau of Land Management is in charge of more land than the remaining eight DOI bureaus
combined.
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additional critique that it is emblematic of the agency capture phenomenon, with BLM
operations in important ways controlled by the entities that were meant to be the subject
of its regulation, with its efforts to avoid conflict with the “regulated” entitles leading the
BLM to act in ways out of concert with the delegating legislation (Coggins & Nagel 1990:
483).
With the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 – the last significant legislative change to
the Act – came provisions for the phase-out of ozone-depleting chemicals, and a number of
new frameworks build to promote much-needed air quality reforms, such as the promotion
of energy conservation and the reduction of energy waste. Within these 315 pages of the
Statutes at Large were 86 distinct regulatory commands of private entities now needed to
comply with requirements concerning nonattainment areas, the introduction or use of certain
fuels or fuel additives, vehicle emissions, and permitting requirements, among other things
(Farhang & Yaver 2015). While the Administrator of the EPA was empowered to hold
administrative adjudications and to issue cease and desist orders or petition the court for
injunctive relief against violators, the primary vehicle through which the Environmental
Protection Agency was expected to enforce environmental compliance was the promulgation
of rules.109
While the Environmental Protection Agency governs the various statutes under its jur-
sidiction in large part through its rulemaking authority – for example, promulgating rules
regarding the maximum level of toxin permissible in a body of water, or the maximum ex-
haust levels permissible from certain types of automobiles – the Department of Interior’s
use of its rulemaking powers was “viewed by nearly all as insufficient” (Strauss 1974: 1237),
with rules aimed more at routine matters of implementation as opposed to policy formula-
109It is worth noting that while much rulemaking authority traditionally is of a discretionary nature, most of
the rulemaking delegations to the EPA in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, over which the Department
of Interior also has some jurisdiction, are in fact mandatory rulemaking provisions and specific in nature,
such that Congress is prescribing that on which the Agency must promulgate rules as opposed to providing
that the Agency shall promulgate “the rules necessary to carry out the Act.”
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tion as was the case with the EPA.110 Indeed, within the context of the Energy Policy Act,
over which the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Interior both have
some regulatory jurisdiction, while the Secretary of Interior was provided with some manda-
tory rulemaking responsibilities governing geothermal leases (Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec.
233), the primary tools it was provided with in the Act were administrative sanctions. Yet
rulemaking is considered a more efficient tool for policymaking relative to administrative
adjudication given the greater ease with Congress and individuals can obtain information
and exercise oversight with respect to a body of promulgated rules as opposed to series of
adjudications that may not be consistent across presidential administrations and changes
in admnistration priorities (Id at 1238). Moreover, agencies typically enjoy a high level of
discretion in their rulemaking activities, both with respect to timing as well as the content
of the policy that they create (O’Connell 2011: 482).111
Among the most significant laws in which the Department of Interior is charged with
implementing is the Endangered Species Act, which U.C. Hastings College of Law Profes-
sor John D. Leshy characterized as having a “clear and overriding purpose – to protect the
diversity of life on earth.”112 While the Act provides for citizen suits – thus allowing for
litigation against both private parties and the government to enforce compliance – Leshy
noted that the Act is largely enforced effectively and with only rare resorts to court. When
litigation was the enforcement route, the most common defendant was the United States
government due to alleged inadequate compliance, with relative balance between charges
110Nou & Stiglitz (2015) note that while the Environmental Protection Agency alone proposed over 9,000
rules between 1983 and 2014, the Department of Interior – combining all of its bureaus – proposed only
approximately 3,000 during this same period.
111There are, of course, a number of constraints on rulemaking, such as the imposition of the deadlines
before which rules must be promulgated, or more detailed specifications as to the content of those rules such
that the agency’s discretion here is more bounded. Moreover, political transitions can further constrain the
range of options available to politicized agencies (O’Connell 2011: 483).
112See “The Endangered Species Act: How Litigation is Costing Jobs and Impeding True Recovery Efforts.”
Statement of John D. Leshy, Professor of Law at U.C. Hastings College of Law. Oversight hearing before the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Natural Resources.112th Congress, First Session. December 6,
2011.
169
of over-regulating and under-regulating and the executive branch typically prevailing given
its “relatively conscientious” job of implementing the Act, and losses occurring typically
when the government simply made mistakes.113 Thus, the ESA is a statute characterized by
experts as having a straightforward statutory mandate of the Department of Interior, with
government losses not typically a reflection of nefarious acts on the part of the agency but
rather a consequence of high-profile court cases skewing public perceptions. A complication
with respect to litigation in the ESA – and potentially citizen suits more broadly – is the
potential for counterproductivity, with the Fish and Wildlife Service arguing in its October
2006 critical habitat designation for the Alameda whipsnake claiming that the need to devote
resources to litigation was inducing delays in listing endangered species.114 As a consequence
of these legal costs, the Fish and Wildlife Service petitioned Congress to reduce its authority
with respect to endangered species designations so as to limit the litigation incentives of
environmental groups (Id). Whether or not a consequence of potentially “excessive” liti-
gation, of all of the species that had been listed between 1973 (the ESA’s inception) and
December 2011, only 20 species were recovered, making for only a 1% recovery rate,115 sug-
gesting some potential ineffiency (and at times outright underenforcement) in the Service’s
implementation of the Act, and a need for Congress to revisit its enforcement.
On April 30, 2014, the American Bird Conservatory (ABC) filed a 60-day notice of in-
tent to sue the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) within the Department of Interior due to
its alleged violations in enforcing the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the En-
113Leshy characterizes the decionmaker in these cases, the courts, as a “neutral” body determining whether
the government was doing its job.
114See “The Endangered Species Act: How Litigation is Costing Jobs and Impeding True Recovery Efforts.”
Statement of Brandon M. Middleton, Staff Attorney at Pacific Legal Foundation. Oversight hearing before
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Natural Resources.112th Congress, First Session. December
6, 2011.
115See “The Endangered Species Act: How Litigation is Costing Jobs and Impeding True Recovery Efforts.”
Statement of Representative Doc Hastings (WA). Oversight hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Natural Resources. 112th Congress, First Session. December 6, 2011. Hastings also noted
that in July 2011, the Department of Interior agreed to a settlement that covered 779 species in 85 lawsuits
and legal actions against the government, with over 180 pending lawsuits with respect to the ESA still
remaining.
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dangered Species Act (ESA), and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA). The
American Bird Conservatory argued thath the FWS’s December 9, 2013 final regulation,
which “extend[ed] the maximum term for programmatic permits” to kill or otherwise take
bald and golden eagles from five to thirty years, was adopted in violation of the aforemen-
tioned statutes and thus should be invalidated. This 30-year eagle permit rule, they note,
was adopted without the legal safeguards of any NEPA documents (which were deemed of
legal importance given the rule’s explicit intention of having an environmental impact) or
any consultations under section 7 of the ESA, and in contravention of the core purpose of
the BGEPA. The FWS’s refusal to consider the environmental impact or to comply with the
legal and procedural safeguards in place for the protection of plant and animal species thus
led the Conservatory to find the agency noncompliant and warranting litigation (Notice of
Intent to Sue, April 30, 2014).
Additional allegations of noncompliance by the Department of Interior can be found
under Gale Norton’s term as Secretary of Interior, with Forest Guardians, Biodiversity Con-
servation Alliance, Center for Biological Diversity, Center for Native Ecosystems, Predator
Conservation Alliance, and other interested parties joining forces in providing on August
12, 2004 a notice of intent to sue the DOI due to the promulgation of an arbitrary and
capricious rule opting not to list the black-tailed prairie dog as an endangered species, the
Department’s failure to ground the rule in best available science, and in turn its contra-
vention of Section 4(b) of the Endangered Species Act. Moreover, in their challenge with
respect to grazing permits, the Western Watersheds Project and the American Lands Al-
liance provided notice of intent to sue for violations of the Federal Land Management Act,
the Taylor Grazing Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Code of Federal Regulations.
Within this challenge emerged a pattern that was discussed in Chapter 4 in the context of
EPA scientists’ and lawyers’ views being squelched by those in leadership positions, in this
case with the plaintiffs holding that in making its determination with respect to the grazing
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permit, “this political decision has been made by policy-makers in Washington D.C., over
the advice and scientific conclusions of BLM’s field staff charged with managing the subject
allotments, overriding their professional judgment and authority – to the point where local
staff have been expressly excluded from involvement in management of the allotments, which
is now being determined out of BLM’s national offices.”116 Thus, while looking within the
context of a different administrative agency and in some cases different statutes, the nature
of the legal challenges and the accusations directed at the agency appear to be quite similar
rather than being unique to the Environmental Protection Agency, which admittedly gar-
ners vastly more public attention. And with a number of former Secretaries argued to be
close to the industries they were meant to regulate (e.g., James G. Watt, Gale Norton, Dirk
Kempthorne), there have been a number of opportunities for such conflict to emerge.
The fact that both of the above notices of intent to sue were under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) is of little surprise, with the ESA known as the “pitbull of environmental
statutes” in compelling federal agencies to avoid putting in harm’s way protectect species,
though the “ESA’s bar is often worse than its bite, especially in the hands of its bureaucratic
handlers” (Parenteau 2004: 321). It is these bureaucrats who work to ensure that the statute
be as reasonable and user-friendly as possible, potentially at the cost of being left with a
statute less aggressive in addressing threats to animal and plant species than the statute
originally set out for. Contained within the ESA, of course, is the provision for citizen suit
litigation, a provision deemed in this case to be a “potent weapon for conservationists,” but
one whose use has historically led to some degree of backlash (Id at 351). The enforcement
of the ESA then becomes a balancing act, with litigation often the only way to ensure the
Act’s enforcement in protecting endangered species, but also with the desire to avoid political
conflicts that may be difficult to overcome.
Creating the Department of Interior Data
116See “Notice of Intent to Sue for Violations of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Taylor
Grazing Act, Endangered Species Act, and the Code of Federal Regulations.” July 7, 2003.
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To evaluate the extent of, and conditions under which we can expect to observe bureau-
cratic noncompliance in statutory implementation in the Department of Interior over the
same time period of 1973 to 2010, I first identified from the DOI’s website the 22 laws that it
implements in whole or in part, half of which are jointly implemented with the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency. While a comprehensive list of implemented laws was not provided
on the main DOI website, I went to the individual bureau sites to gather the laws that they
implemented and provided as comprehensive a list of laws as I was able. These laws consist
of: the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, the Clean Water Act, the Community Environmental Response Facilitations Act, the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, the Endangered Species Act, the
Energy Policy Act, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments, the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act, the Federal Land Management and Policy Act, the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, the Oil Pollution Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the Pollu-
tion Prevention Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Safe Drinking Water
Act, the Soiil and Water Resources Conservation Act, Submerged Lands Act, the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,
and the Wilderness Act.
While half of these laws have some degree of overlapping jurisdiction with the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, it is typically the case that the agencies are tasked with imple-
menting different aspects of the same laws, as opposed to engaging in joint implementation
efforts (e.g., congressional provision for joint rulemaking). For example, while the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990 housed the vast majority of implementation authority (e.g.,
rulemaking, adjudicatory hearings, cease and desist orders and civil penalties) in the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, as well as with the Attorney General when invoking judicial
action (e.g., petitioning courts for injunctive relief), the 1990 Amendments also preserved
the Department of Interior’s authority to regulate air emissions in particular regions. And
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Table 1: Department of Interior Laws
Law Name Year Bureau(s) Also EPA
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 1980 BLM No
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 1990 BLM Yes
Clean Water Act 1972 BLM Yes
Community Environmental Response Facilitations Act 1992 BLM No
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 1986 BLM Yes
Endangered Species Act 1973 BLM, FWS Yes
Energy Policy Act 1992 USGS, BLM, BOEM Yes
Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments 2000 BLM No
Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act 1976 USGS No
Federal Land Management and Policy Act 1976 BLM, USGS No
Migratory Bird Treaty Act 1918 USGS No
National Environmental Policy Act 1969 BLM Yes
Oil Pollution Act 1990 BOEM Yes
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 1953 BOEM, BSEE No
Pollution Prevention Act 1990 BLM Yes
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 1976 BLM Yes
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments 1977 BLM Yes
Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act 1977 BLM No
Submerged Lands Act 1953 BOEM No
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 1986 BLM Yes
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 1977 BLM, USGS, OSMRE No
Wilderness Act 1964 USGS No
while the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 – a significant law providing a program for
the conservation of threatened and endangered plants and animals – is largely in the terrain
of the Department of Interior (specifically, the US Fish and Wildlife Service and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), the Environmental Protection Agency’s Office
of Pesticide Programs (OPP) regulates the use of all pesticides in the United States, which
in turn affects the preservation of certain species relevant to the ESA.
Consistent with the analysis performed in Chapter 4, I evaluate here the data with respect
to this new set of laws and new implementing actors. In evaluating noncompliance in the
Department of Interior, I replicated the agency curbing coding procedure discussed in the
previous chapter, as applied to the DOI statutes. Thus, consistent with the EPA agency
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curbing, I conducted THOMAS searches for the statutes from the 93rd (or first relevant
Congress, if the law was passed later) to the 111th Congress and hand-coded the CRS
summaries to identify whether or not there were agency curbing provisions. Because unlike
with the Environmental Protection Agency, there are a number of different units within
the Department of Interior, rather than looking for simply “the Department of Interior” or
“the Secretary,” I also counted mandates, prohibitions, and oversight of the DOI’s subunits,
such as the Bureau of Land Management or the Fish and Wilidlife Service.117 I coded for
whether a bill compelled new action from the Department of Interior (or its Secretary) or
the subunit(s) within it (requirements), whether it prohibited action of those same parties
or otherwise sought to strip regulatory latitude from them (prohibitions), and whether it
imposed new oversight provisions such as reporting or consultation requirements or sunset
provisions (oversight). When a bill’s CRS summary contained a requirement, a prohibition,
or oversight measures, or some combination of those three efforts, it was considered an
agency curbing bill.
Replicating this method for the DOI statutes produced a total of 745 agency curbing
bills from the president’s co-partisans over the 1973 to 2010 time period, a noticeable decline
from the volume of such bills observed in the case of the EPA.118 This from was from a
pool of 5,378 total bills introduced on the subject of these statutes, 2,475 of which were
introduced by the president’s co-partisans in Congress. This is compared with 11,272 bills
introduced on the Environmental Protection Agency’s Laws, 5,169 of which were curbing bills
introduced by the president’s co-partisans.119 Consistent with the case of the EPA curbing,
requirements are by far the most common form of constraint taken by Congress – a notion
117These bureaus were by far the most common targets of congressional attention relative to the other
bureaus within the Department of Interior, though there were many agency-level constraints and authoriza-
tions.
118However, a difference-in-means test reveals a statistically significant and nearly doubled amount of De-
partment of Interior agency curbing legislation within the domain of legislation over which the EPA also has
regulatory authority.
119It is worth noting that there were also considerably fewer lawsuits filed in the United States Court of
Appeals against the Department of Interior or the units within it.
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consistent with anecdotal evidence of congressional and interest group dissatisfaction with
the pace of environmental protection progress – with 822 of the 2,475 bills containing such
commands, though both efforts to prohibit DOI activity (417 instances) and to impose new
oversight (492 instances) were also quite common. In performing principal components factor
analysis, the three variables all loaded heavily on a single factor with an eigenvalue of 2.23,
with individual factor loadings of .90, .84, and .84, which suggests that the variables are all
contributing significantly toward the composite measure and to a similar degree. Averaging
the standardized scores produced a Chronbach’s alpha of 0.88, which is considered excellent
for scale reliability (DeVillis 2012), providing further support for these measures being used
as a composite measure for the purpose of evaluating noncompliance in the Department of
Interior. Figure 1 provides lowess plots of the agency curbing composite measure alongside
the three individual components of the measure. Consistent with the expectations given the
analysis discussed above, one finds that the trend of the variables over the time series are
very similar to one another, with relatively low and flat levels of curbing activity with only
minor ebbs and flows, and a noticeable increase in the later part of the data.
One concern about evaluating bill introductions is that there is the potential for such bills
merely to be “cheap talk” attacks on an agency controlled by the opposing political party.
In Figure 2, I present time series plots of each of the 22 statutes under the Department
of Interior’s jurisdiction. If the bill activity were in fact blanket attempts to attack the
agency (for example, to eliminate a bureau or to make an enormous funding reduction), one
might expect far more similarity in the patterns of agency curbing than what one in fact
finds when looking at the patterns and persistence of curbing activity among the various
statutes. What we find instead is a high level of variation in the extent of curbing behavior
from statute to statute, suggesting a more careful consideration of the nuances of the laws
and their proper implementation (or improper as the case may be). This claim is reinforced
further by the specificity of the agency curbing bills, which address such nuanced subjects
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Table 2: Department of Interior Curbing Bills
Law Name Requirements Prohibitions Oversight
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 51 20 17
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 15 5 8
Clean Water Act 15 7 15
Community Environmental Response 0 0 0
Facilitations Act
Emergency Planning and Community 2 0 1
Right-to-Know Act
Endangered Species Act 122 72 62
Energy Policy Act 45 18 33
Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments 12 4 11
Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act 6 2 4
Federal Land Management and Policy Act 2 0 2
Migratory Bird Treaty Act 21 2 11
National Environmental Policy Act 135 83 124
Oil Pollution Act 20 11 15
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 165 130 80
Pollution Prevention Act 1 0 1
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 2 0 0
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments 19 5 20
Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act 2 2 2
Submerged Lands Act 20 11 7
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 0 0 1
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 35 20 15
Wilderness Act 132 25 63
as “Prohibits the Secretary from conveying or leasing any such land unless he or she has
received assurance from the Nevada State Engineer that an alternative groundwater source
is or could be available to Aerojet” (S. 854, 100th Congress), detail that requires costly effort
on the part of the sponsor to gauge the level at which a policy currently is being enforced.
Thus, I am confident that the concerns raised in these bills are about the important details
of the agency’s statutory implementation as opposed to efforts to merely signal partisan
opposition.
Distinguishing Differences in EPA versus Interior Data
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Apart from the reduced number of such bills, another striking distinction among the De-
partment of Interior curbing bills is its greater prevalence of discretionary provisions along-
side curbing provisions. While a random sample of 200 curbing bills addressing the EPA
had revealed just under a 20% rate of discretion-granting provisions, in the Department of
Interior context the rate of discretion-granting provisions was approximately doubled within
a random sample of the same size.120 This raises certain questions that did not appear as
important in the EPA case, such as the information that the requirements variable is really
giving us. Might Congress simply be more trusting of the Department of Interior, whether
given that historically it has been less politicized, or given that it is more structurally frag-
mented nature such that departures from status quo policies are more difficult to effectuate?
Might the evaluation of congressionally-provided requirements provide less informative a sig-
nal of congressional effort to micromanage the range of its regulatory latitude than in the
case of stricter mandatory requirements in the absence of discretion as was largely the case
with the EPA?
Because it is potentially valuable to know those conditions under which Congress is solely
constraining the agency through the use of authority retraction in the form of prohibiting
action or further overseeing it, one can also look separately at those agency curbing bills
containing prohibitions and/or oversight but no requirements whatsoever. There were 272
such cases, compared with 269 in the EPA case. A limitation here is that not only is this a
small amount of data over the time series, but when evaluating these data by law-Congress,
one finds that in only 94 of the 345 observations of the dataset are there such bills involving
constraints without requirements, and in 6 of the 22 laws there were no instances at all,
rendering panels with only zeros and thus no variation. Thus, the inferential challenges
here preclude me from presenting a separate analysis with this data, though future work
evaluating the fuller universe of environmental laws could provide enough data with which
12077 of the 200 randomly-selected curbing bills also granted some measure of discretion to a division of
the Department of Interior.
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to understand better what leads Congress to micromanage agency capacity in ways only
precluding and not not also compelling some regulatory action. And so despite some of
the skepticism with which we might want to evaluate the requirements variable, the fact
that it loads heavily on a single factor and in the alternative specification helped produce
a Chronbach’s alpha of nearly .9 provides strong support for its inclusion in the composite
agency curbing measure.
The statutory agenda similarities between the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Department of Interior allow for direct comparisons of congressional responses to different
agencies’ implementation of (potentially different aspects of) the same statutes. One might
expect that if congressional coalitions’ primary concern is with the policy outputs from the
law, we might find the patterns in agency curbing behavior to track one another reason-
ably closely, whereas one might expect greater deviations in the patterns of agency curbing
if it is driven more by ideology given that the Environmental Protection Agency typically
is considered more politicized and is far to the left ideologically from the Department of
Interior. Figure 3 presents lowess plots the agency curbing activity of both the EPA and
the Department of Interior with respect to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA), a significant statute that required federal agencies to take into account environ-
mental impacts of their proposed actions and reasonable (potentially more environmentally
sound) alternatives. While enforcement is housed largely within the Department of Interior,
it shares regulatory responsibilities with the Environmental Protection Agency. What we
can see clearly from Figure 2 is that vastly more congressional constraint with respect to
NEPA is being aimed at the Department of Interior than at the Environmental Protection
Agency, though some of the rises and declines in agency curbing appear to coincide quite
closely with one another. Thus, while the patterns in congressional concern as to NEPA’s
implementation (and the compliance thereof) appear not to vary by agency, there is a high
level of discernment between which agency is responsible for actions that must be curbed.
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A similar pattern presents itself with respect to the Oil Pollution Act, a law that is also
jointly implemented by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Interior
and which worked to improve the nation’s ability to prevent and respond to oil spills, as well
as the government’s ability to respond to oil spills should they occur. With respect to this
statute, the Environmental Protection Agency has promulgated regulations for above ground
storage facilities121 toward the end of reducing hazardous conditions. The Act also provided
that for consultations with the Fish and Wildlife Service in the development of contingency
plans so as to provide damage assessments associated with oil spills. As with the case of
NEPA, one agency has more regulatory authority with respect to the Act than does the
other case (with respect to the Oil Pollution Act, the EPA is featured more prominently).
Consistent with that, we find that the overall patterns between agency curbing of the EPA
and the DOI, there is a noticeable difference in the volume with which Congress acts to
constrain the agency’s capacity, with EPA curbing being at a much higher level in particular
toward the end of the time series. Thus, while Congress and mobilized interest groups may
have directed their attention toward the Act in consistent times, the extent of the concern
about each agency’s implementation appears to vary noticeably between the EPA and DOI.
Empirical Estimation
I turn now to the analysis of agency curbing behavior, in this case directed at the Depart-
ment of Interior. Within the domain of environmental policy is extensive heterogeneity, with
the laws (listed above) covering such diverse topics as species and wildlife protection, energy,
public lands, toxic chemicals, air, and water, all of which have different health implications
and may garner different types of attention from Congress and organized interests. For ex-
ample, while the regulation of clean air has become a global challenge addressing climate
change, the regulation of water and public lands tends to be more local in nature, and the
regulation of oil and energy tends to engage big business such as oil companies.122 While in
121http://http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-oil-pollution-act
122Battles over resources such as lands and water also tend to reflect regional differences, with western
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the case of the Environmental Protection Agency laws, I assigned policy fixed effects based
on a judgment about the main substance of the statute at hand (for example, assigning
the Food Quality Protection Act as being about public health and safety, and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act as being water regulation), in the case of the Department of
Interior I instead assigned bureau fixed effects given the subunit(s) of the Department of
Interior tasked with implementing the given law. Thus, I created dummy variables for each
of the bureaus that were engaged in implementing one or more of the statutes under the
Department of Interior’s jurisdiction.123
Chapter 4 discussed the limitations inherent in the use of congressional bill introductions,
in part because bills may be introduced for any number of reasons, with high variation in
the plausibility of ultimate passage. The introduction of legislation can serve a number of
different benefits, including showing to constituents an interest (sincere or not) in a given
local issue or popular local position; it can support partisan agendas that might or might not
succeed on the floor given the degree of polarization and gridlock pervading the legislative
dynamics; it can facilitate bargaining processes among legislators; or it can be a sincere
expression of legislative intent to pass policy. Because at face value it is not necessarily
clear whether a bill is sincere versus cheap talk (outside the domain of purely “symbolic”
legislation that would never pass124), interpretation of curbing bills can be rather unclear.
In addition to estimating the predictors of noncompliance in the DOI using the main
agency curbing measure, I thus made a number of attempts to gauge the seriousness with
states feeling denied their right to influence decisions affecting their lands as well as arguing for federal
divestment of land within some state borders (Rosenbaum 2014: 332), while other states are reliant upon
less environment-friendly industries for the sustaining of their labor forces.
123While there are nine bureaus within the DOI, only five bureaus – the Bureau of Land Management, the
United States Geological Survey, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement – identified statutes under thier jurisdictions, and
thus these are the only ones accounted for in the bureau fixed effects.
124Clark (2011) notes in the context of court curbing that some such symbolic legisative action against the
judicial branch included efforts to reduce the number of justices, an act which had not succeeded in several
decades. In the context of agency curbing, one such example might be the legislative attempt to eliminate
the Environmental Protection Agency, as opposed to simply impose additional constraints on it.
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which congressional coalitions were introducing these bills, so as to better differentiate sincere
opposition to buireaucratic behavior and mere cheap talk that may not be as firmly rooted in
the Department’s actions. First, I weighted the bills by cosponsorship support by normalizing
between the values of 0 and 1 the average number of cosponsors for the curbing bills, with the
expectation that those bills garnering the support of only their sponsor are less indicative of
widespread congressional opposition to bureaucratic regulatory behavior than are those that
receive high numbers of cosponsors such that large coalitions in Congress are united in those
efforts to constrain agency capacity. While there was an average of 6.3 cosponsors, the values
ranged widely from an average of 0 to 113 per statute per Congress.125 I additionally weighted
the curbing composite measure by the normalized value of the number of committees to which
the curbing bills were referred over the course of their legislative lifetimes. The theory is
that those bills drawing upon the expertise of multiple committees, and being exposed to
the coalitions of multiple committees, will have greater sincerity than those introduced in a
single committee and potentially receiving no further legislative action, given some members’
judgment that the bill be considered by a broader legislative audience. There was an average
of 1.1 committees, though with a range of 0 to 9 committees per law per Congress. This
measure likewise is imperfect in that multiple referral became a more common practice
beginning in the 1980s – that is, well after the study begins – and thus it may erroneously
appear as though “sincerity” is increasing over time, in addition to which some laws are
simply more complex (or omnibus) and thus draw on the knowledge of more committees
rather than necessarily being more sincerely aimed at constraining the agency in reality as
opposed to cheap talk signaling of opposition. This is particularly true of omnibus legislation,
which likewise has become more common practice since the 1980s.126
125There are, of course, limitations to the usefulness of this measure, with some laws reaching final passage
without any cosponsors, and others achieving as many as two hundred cosponsors while failing ultimately
to pass.
126Hanson (2014) notes that the shift toward the use of omnibus packages to pass legislation is “the
most important change to take place in the appropriations process since the passage of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2014: 25), though they are not without their fair share
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A further metric of sincerity of legislative efforts to curb bureaucratic capacity – in turn, I
argue, raising the plausibility that the congressional action was targeted at the bureaucratic
behavior as opposed to being partisan efforts unlikely to succeed – is whether or not the bill
ultimately was signed into law. Over one third of the bills – 1,013 – did not receive any
legislative action, and thus they were killed immediately upon introduction. There is ample
variation in the length of the legislative cycles among those bills on which some action was
taken, with some having their final action taken only a couple days later, others lasting more
than a session before dying, and others reaching a floor vote and ultimately passing and
being signed by the president. From the rate at which such legislative achievement occurs,
we may be able to glean the overall seriousness of legislative efforts to constrain the agency,
which may bolster confidence in it being a reflection of the agency’s implementation behavior
as opposed to mere partisan differences between one or a few members of Congress and the
executive branch.
Upon examination of the Department of Interior curbing bills, one finds that as compared
with the 6.8% passage rate of Environmental Protection Agency curbing bills introduced by
the president’s co-partisans, the passage rate among Department of Interior curbing bills
is somewhat higher at 9.8% (280 of the 2,856 curbing bills introduced by the president’s
co-partisans), though the extent of cosponsorship support and the number of committee
referrals for the two sets of bill introductions were nearly identical to one another.127 Thus,
while there is considerably less agency curbing activity aimed at the Department of Interior,
when Congress does take such action it is slightly more likely to succeed in that endeavor.
The dependent variables that I utilize in the analyses below are: the main (unweighted)
of controversy given their great influence but limited opportunity for legislative participation. They are
thought to be associated with more periods of greater difficulty achieving legislative passage, and thus their
rise can be seen alongside the growth of legislative polarization, which I argue is central to the reshaping of
agencies’ implementation incentives.
127The Environmental Protection Agency curbing bills had an average of 9.5 cosponsors and 1.5 congres-
sional committees, compared with 9.4 cosponsors and 1.7 committees among the Department of Interior
curbing bills.
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variable DOI Agency Curbing (continuous, ranging from 0-6.11), DOI Curbing Weighted
by Cosponsorship (continuous, ranging from 0-1.12), DOI Curbing Weighted by Comittees
(continuous, ranging from 0-1.17), and DOI Curbing Weighted by Percent Passed (continu-
ous, ranging from 0-1.43).128 These estimations are presented separately in Table 3 below.
Performance of a Wooldridge test yielded statistically significant results in all of these vari-
ables except for DOI Curbing Weighted by Cosponsorship, indicating the presence of AR(1)
autocorrelation in the other three specifications. Thus, because panel-corrected standard er-
rors do not correct for AR(1) autocorrelation, I include in the model a panel-specific AR(1)
autocorrelation structure, accounting for these processes varying across statutes.
The independent variables in the model specifications that I present below are largely
the same as those discussed in Chapter 4, and discuss here only those of main theoretical
interest. Because I expect that agencies will be less responsive to congressional preferences
over implementation when there is greater legislative-executive distance unless the opposing
party is well-positioned to punish the agency, I estimate the legislative-executive distance,
which is the NOMINATE distance between the president and the floor median.129 I include
the margin of control, which is the absolute value of the margin by which the party oppos-
ing the president controls the seats in Congress, and to test the theory that bureaucratic
inclination toward noncompliance will be conditioned by their likelihood of punishment, I
interact legislative-executive distance and margin of control. I expect that when Congress
is more constrained by polarization – which has become all the more common in recent
decades (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) – it will be less capable of being an effective
monitor of its administrative agents, resulting in policies farther from its preferences. Thus,
128Before assigning weights, I assigned the cosponsors, committees, and percentage passed to fall between
the values of 0 and 1.
129Estimating executive branch preferences is particularly difficult in this case given that there are multiple
bureaus within the Department of Interior, each of which may have different preferences from one another,
such as Fish and Wildlife Service potentially being to the left of the USGS. However, existing alternative
measures of executive branch preferences do not allow for variation over time for the period at which I am
looking, and so the president’s ideology serves as the best available proxy.
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I estimate the chamber distance, which is the NOMINATE distance between the House and
Senate median members.130.
I expect that when there is greater competition between legislative principals – that is,
when the authorizing Congress that passed the statute and the law currently empowered to
punish the DOI are more at odds with one another ideologically – bureaucratic compliance
will be less likely. That is, by being faithful to the statutory text, the agency is under these
circumstances by definition going against the preferences of its current legislative principal,
resulting in the agency curbing activity that I capture here. Thus, I evaluate the distance
between Congresses, which is the NOMINATE distance between the floor median of the
Congress in power when the statute was enacted and the floor median of the Congress
currently in power.131 I identified from the text of each of the 22 statutes whether or not
it provided for citizen suit litigation, which I argue expands the pool of potential plaintiffs
against the administrative agency and thus should serve as a check on its implementation
behavior, inducing greater compliance. Seven of the 22 statutes provided for citizen suits,
while the remaining 15 did not.132
I include a dummy variable for whether or not it is post-Chevron given its (purported) in-
fluence on the extent of judicial discretion toward agencies’ statutory interpretations. While
the case was aimed at the Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of the Clean
Air Act, not only is it likely the most cited case in American administrative law, but its
reach has been felt across agencies when faced with challenges of statutory interpretation
and ascertaining how those interpretations will be received should they go to court. Environ-
mental policy is particularly litigious in this respect given the complexity and technicality of
the policy, with “a steady flow of political hot potatoes [coming] to the bureaucracy, which
130I also evaluated the effect of the distance between the majority and minority party medians, and utilizing
this measure produced similar, often slightly stronger results
131Thus, if the preferences are perfectly aligned, the value of this variable would be 0.
132This relatively low number of citizen suit laws under the Department of Interior’s jurisdiction may help
to account for the quite low rates of litigation against the DOI.
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must untangle and clarify this legal language – often to the accompaniment of political con-
flict and legislative criticism” (Rosenbaum 2014: 96). If it is in fact the case that judges
have changed their course of action with respect to affording agencies greater deference in
interpreting the laws that they are tasked with implementing, this greater latitude should
mean that there is weaker third-party review of agencies by the judiciary, and thus greater
opportunity for more opportunity for the agency to skirt the edges of its authority should it
choose to do so.
The holding of Chevron v. NRDC thus provides a valuable cutpoint in the data for
evaluating any potential change in congressional behavior with respect to monitoring agency
implementation. Such structural breaks are prominent in data analysis over long time peri-
ods, with significant events taking place and reshaping the relationships among variables.133
A difference-in-means test reveals that there is a somewhat higher rate of agency curbing
against the Department of Interior in the post-Chevron period – suggesting that with re-
duced deference came a need for greater congressional supervision – though it does not
achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. Figure 4 plots the time series of each
of the laws under the DOI’s jurisdiction, with the vertical line on the x-axis marking the
point at which the Chevron decision was rendered (the 98th Congress). Given the marked
variation in response – or in many cases, lack thereof – it is difficult to assess what, if any,
impact the holding had on the congressional monitoring of individual statutes.
To identify the extent to which each of these statutes exhibited fragmentation, I repli-
cated the methods utilized by Farhang & Yaver (2015), identifying for each of these 22 laws
the number of actors, agencies, and instances of overlapping jurisdiction with respect to
core regulatory functions (defined as rulemaking, adjudications, administrative sanctions,
or lawsuits), and then creating a fragmentation factor score for each law. Within this set
133There is, of course, the challenge in assigning merely a time dummy variable to distinguish observations
before and after the event, in that it may take time to observe the effect of the event (Katznelson & Wawro
2014).
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of laws, there was an average of just over three administrative actors, and as many as six
implementing in a single law. With more administrative actors needed for the purposes
of coordinating a policy change, as well as the greater level of diffused authority, agencies
should be better kept in check and induced to be compliant in implementing laws at higher
levels of the fragmentation spectrum.
The data are time-series cross-section in structure, with an N of the 22 laws implemented
in whole or in part by the Department of Interior and a T of the 19 Congresses covered
in this dissertation (93rd-111th), yielding a total of 345 observations in the dataset. As
with the case of the Environmental Protection Agency, the passage of these laws over a
long span of time poses some challenges to the empirical estimation due to the creation of
imbalanced panels. However, this effect is moderated in the case of the Department of Inte-
rior, whose implemented laws were largely passed in the earlier time period, whether before
1973 or shortly thereafter.134 Because all four of the dependent variables are continuous, I
am utilizing OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs). Because PCSEs address
contemporaneous correlation but not serial correlation, I combine them with Prais Winsten
except in the case of the cosponsors model, and I specify that it is a panel-specific AR(1) au-
tocorrelation structure. Because performing statistical analysis on nonstationary time series
can yield spurious results, I perform a Fisher-type test to confirm whether the data contain
a unit root. Performance of this test revealed nonstationarity in the total environmental
groups variable, and so I first-differenced it, which rendered it stationary. While I include
cubic splines in the models presented here, performance of sensitivity analysis with respect
to the number and location of the knots did not produce significantly different results, and
nor did the inclusion of the simple linear time trend of Congress. Because the models being
analyzed here are OLS, the results can be interpreted directly.
134Forcing balance among the panels carries the great disadvantage of losing half of the data, which are
valuable sources of information in evaluating the Department of Interior’s implementation strategy with
respect to those laws, many significant.
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Results
While I discuss here only the findings of main theoretical interest, the full model specifi-
cations are presented in Table 3. It is immediately clear that while the unweighted curbing
measure produces results that are highly consistent with those produced in the case of the
Environmental Protection Agency in Chapter 4, the results in the Department of Interior
case are far less robust to alternative specifications.
Turning first to model 1, consistent with the expectation that legislative-executive conflict
would motivate greater agency noncompliance resulting in agency curbing, conditional upon
the strength of the opposing party in Congress (and thus its capacity to potentially punish the
agency), I find a strong, positive, and significant effect of legislative-executive distance but the
interaction term is powerful, significant, and negative. To put the effects into perspective, a
standard deviation increase in legislative-executive distance is associated with a .37-standard
deviation increase in agency curbing when the margin of control is zero, but when the
opposing political party is in a strong position in Congress, I find that a standard deviation
increase in this interaction term is associated with a 1.19-standard deviation decline in
agency curbing. These powerful effects are consistent both with my hypotheses about the
legislative-executive conflict dynamics I expect to produce noncompliance implementation
choices, as well as my findings with respect to the EPA. However, I do not find in this case
that the extent of legislative division is associated with noncompliance.
Consistent with expectations, I find that amid greater ideological conflict between leg-
islative principals, the Department of Interior is more prone to act in ways that result in
punishment, with a standard deviation increase in distance between Congresses associated
with a .09 standard deviation increase in agency curbing, albeit significant only at the .10
level and rather small in magnitude. However, unlike in the case of the EPA, I find here
that congressional provision for citizen suit litigation not only has a significant and negative
effect, but is also great in magnitude, with a move from a non-citizen suit law to a citizen
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suit law associated with approximately a 0.44-unit decline in agency curbing by Congress.
The effects of Chevron and fragmentation appear both to be insignificant, which is consistent
with the findings in the previous chapter.
Model 2, in which I weight the agency curbing measure by the extent of its cosponsor
support, does not display support for any of the findings discussed above, with the exceptions
of citizen suits and fragmentation, both of whose substantive effects are close to zero. Model
3 provides support (albeit weakened) for the legislative-executive conflict hypothesis, with a
standard deviation increase in legislative-executive distance associated with a .07 increase in
agency curbing when the margin of control is zero, and a standard deviation increase in the
interaction term producing a .17 standard deviation decline in agency curbing, significant
at the .10 level. While distance between Congresses becomes insignificant and post-Chevron
and fragmentation remain insignificant, the effect of citizen suits remains significant and
negative, with a move from a non-citizen suit law to a citizen suit law associated with a
.15-unit decline in agency curbing by Congress. Finally, in model 4 I find that while there
is not a statistically significant main effect of legislative-executive distance, the interaction is
significant at the .10 level, with a standard deviation increase in the interaction associated
with a .24-unit decline in agency curbing. We again find that the growth of the distance
between Congresses contributes toward agencies implementing in ways that provoke curbing
legislation, though the substantive effect is small and its effect has been insignificant across
model specifications and thus must be interpreted with caution. While the effect of citizen
suits remains negatively signed here, it is no longer statistically significant and its substan-
tive effect is vastly diminished relative to models 1 and 3. The effect of Chevron remains
insignificant, and while the effect of fragmentation reaches statistical significance, as in model
2, the substantive effect is very small and is inconsistent across the models presented.
Robustness Checks
As a robustness check, rather than using panel-corrected standard errors along with
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Prais Winsten, I instead run the models using GLS with an AR(1) disturbance and unit
(law) random effects. Doing so allows for me to account for unit heterogeneity that might
not be adequately specified through the use of PCSEs, and which if left unmodeled could
yield biased inferences (Kristensen & Wawro 2003). I present the results in Table A1 of the
Appendix. Using this alternative model specification, the results are largely identical, with
powerful and significant effects in model 1 with respect to legislative-executive distance, LE
distance x margin, distance between Congresses, and citizen suits, but no effect of chamber
distance, Chevron, or statutory fragmentation. Weighting by cosponsorship support continues
to produce no statistically significant effects on any of the variables of interest. Models 3
and 4 both produce results supporting the legislative-executive hypotheses as well as the
effects of citizen suit provisions, and in this case model 4 provides support for both the
chamber distance and distance between Congresses claims made here and in Chapter 4. The
similarity among the model two sets of model specifications leaves me confident that unit
heterogeneity is not a driving factor in the results. The results are also highly comparable
when performing GLS with unit random effects and using a lagged dependent variable to
address the issue of autocorrelation (however, see Achen 2001 on problems associated with
the use of lagged dependent variables and their impact on other explanatory variables).
In Table A2 of the Appendix, I provide also separate count model specifications of the
individual agency curbing actions – requirement, prohibitions, and oversight. While I argue
that they can meaningfully be collapsed into a single measure of agency curbing given that
they all work in different ways to micromanage what the agency must or must not do, because
of the possibility of effects being different when compelling versus precluding regulatory
action (see, e.g., Ting 2001), I provide individual count model specifications to decompose
the curbing measure. In all three constituent variables, the variance exceeded the mean
in violation of the assumption of Poisson dispersion, and thus instead run panel negative
binomal models with lagged dependent variables and unit random effects. Because these
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are non-linear models, their effects cannot be interpreted directly (though their direction
can be) – one must turn instead to their marginal effects to evaluate the magnitudes. I
find that a unit increase in rulemaking is associated with just over an 8 percentage point
increase in agency curbing, while a unit increase in the interaction term is associated with
more than a 300 percentage point decline in agency curbing, a finding that is consistent
with my hypothesis and with the main model discussed above and in Chapter 4. I find that
a move from a non-citizen suit law to a citizen suit law is assocaited with approximately
an 84 percentage point decline in agency curbing, which again lends support toward the
broadened pool of potential litigants providing a useful constraint on agency actions. As
with the models discussed above, I do not find support for the effect of chamber distance
or Chevron. I find similar effects with respect to the legislative-executive distance, chamber
distance, and citizen suit hypotheses in the oversight model 3. While the main effect of
legislative-executive distance is positive and significant at the .10 level in the prohibitions
model, the interaction term – though properly signed – falls short of conventional levels of
statistical significance, though in this specification I do find some evidence in favor of greater
chamber distance providing useful regulatory latitude for the agency and producing what I
refer to as noncompliance. While the results are not the same across every variable, their
relative consistency gives me confidence that the results do not hinge on their being treated
as a single composite measure, and moreover that there do not appear to be particularly
different processes at work with respect to mandates versus prohibitions of the agency.
While scholars have debated the true effect of Chevron with respect to its change in
judicial norms (and in turn, for these purposes, bureaucratic behavior), Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife (1992) unambiguously raised the bar for environmental litigation and the ability
to obtain standing in court. While replacing the post-Chevron dummy with a post-Lujan
dummy has very little effect on the legislative-executive and intra-branch conflict hypotheses,
it does in the unweighted model produce a statistically significant, powerful, and positive
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effect, which is consistent with expectations. That is, (even with statutory authority to
sue) in the absence of a credible threat of having standing to press one’s claims against the
agency, it has greater regulatory freedom given the reduced threat of costly litigation.135
Conclusion
This chapter sought to explore to what extent, if at all, the hypotheses laid out and
tested in Chapter 4 would in fact be born out in this different institutional environment
of the Department of Interior. While the theory applies broadly to separation-of-powers
interactions among Congress, courts, and administrative agencies, the extensive variation
among agencies creates uncertainty as to what one may find from one agency to the next. And
while the Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Interior share the features of
being environmental agencies with some overlapping statutory jurisdiction, the Department
of Interior provided variation with respect to ideology, bureaucratic structure, and the extent
to which it is in the public eye and viewed politically as the EPA undoubtedly is.
I found that congressional use of the agency curbing strategy is used with much lower
frequency with the Department of Interior than it is with the Environmental Protection
Agency. However, the manner in which they use this tool appears to mirror the case with
the the EPA, with the patterns in bills appearing similar across agencies amid shared pol-
icy space, and similar distributions of the frequency with which Congress compelled new
actions, prohibited existing authority from being used, and/or imposed new oversight provi-
sions. However, unlike with the EPA case, the results are only modestly consistent with the
hypotheses outlined in Chapter 4 and tested again here.
Further research should explore the clearly quite different roles of cosponsorship behav-
ior in the context of EPA and DOI curbing efforts. While weighting the agency curbing
measure by cosponsorship support did little to affect the results in Chapter 4, in this case
135It may also be the case that knowing that it will be harder for litigants to go to trial, Congress became
more assertive in pressing for regulatory constraints on the agency, filling the role that otherwise plaintiffs
could not.
192
the incorporation of that information made all effects disappear, and the findings were quite
reliant on whether the curbing measure was weighted, and with what information, whether
cosponsorship, committee referrals, or passage rates. However, looking to the main model
specification provided in model 1 of Table 3, I find that the results are largely consistent
with the story that I articulated and found support for in Chapter 4: that amid ideological
conflict between the legislative and executive branches, the agency will exercise considerably
less fidelity to that legislative principal unless that Congress is strong enough to credibly im-
pose sanctions; that greater ideological disagreement between delegating and contemporary
legislative principals leads the agency to act in ways out of concert with the preferred im-
plementation; but that the increasing of the threat of lawsuits and thus judicial involvement
seems to temper the agency in its policy choices. I now proceed to evaluate how – if at all
– Congress manages to successfully respond to this bureaucratic behavior when it observes
these defections.
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Table 3: Agency Curbing Against the Department of Interior
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Cosponsors Committees Percent
Curbing Passed
Legislative-Executive Distance 4.968** 0.041 0.978* 0.859
(1.849) (0.306) (0.480) (0.603)
Margin of Control 19.609*** 0.688 3.062* 4.122*
(5.734) (1.002) (1.568) (1.922)
LE Distance x Margin -31.166** -0.774 -4.670† -6.262†
(10.400) (1.806) (2.862) (3.511)
Chamber Distance 0.981 0.083 0.070 0.295
(0.805) (0.110) (0.227) (0.252)
Distance Between Congresses 0.706† 0.022 0.115 0.205**
(0.424) (0.072) (0.108) (0.082)
Citizen Suits -0.440** -0.014* -0.150** -0.026
(0.160) (0.007) (0.059) (0.036)
Democratic President -0.160 -0.022 -0.040 -0.081†
(0.165) (0.022) (0.040) (0.047)
Environmental Groups 0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.000
(0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
DC Circuit Ideology -1.900† -0.264 -0.232 -0.877*
(1.120) (0.184) (0.291) (0.365)
Post-Chevron -0.258 -0.042 -0.058 -0.072
(0.166) (0.032) (0.043) (0.066)
Significant Law 0.373** 0.033* 0.034 0.098*
(0.142) (0.014) (0.055) (0.042)
Fragmentation -0.023 -0.008* 0.014 -0.023***
(0.045) (0.004) (0.020) (0.006)
Total DOI Legislating 0.018*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.002**
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Electoral Uncertainty -1.892 -0.261 -0.426 -1.093*
(1.651) (0.297) (0.423) (0.532)
Intercept -23.974** -2.846 -4.061* -6.112*
(7.862) (1.502) (1.851) (2.575)
Bureau Fixed Effects X X X X
Splines X X X X
R2 0.55 0.39 0.48 0.32
Total Observations 336 336 336 336





























































































































95 100 105 110 95 100 105 110 95 100 105 110
95 100 105 110 95 100 105 110
Alaska Nat'l Interest Clean Air Act of 1990 Clean Water Act Community Enviro Response Emergency Planning
Endangered Species Act Energy Policy Act Energy Policy & Conservation Federal Coal Leasing Federal Land Management
Migratory Bird Treaty NEPA Oil Pollution Act Outer Continental Shelf Pollution Prevention Act
RCRA Safe Drinking Water Act Soil and Water Resources Submerged Lands Act Superfund Amendments
Surface Mining Control Wilderness Act
Congress 






































































































DOI Oil Pollution Curbing























95 100 105 110 95 100 105 110 95 100 105 110
95 100 105 110 95 100 105 110
Alaska Nat'l Interest Clean Air Act of 1990 Clean Water Act Community Enviro Response Emergency Planning
Endangered Species Act Energy Policy Act Energy Policy & Conservation Federal Coal Leasing Federal Land Management
Migratory Bird Treaty NEPA Oil Pollution Act Outer Continental Shelf Pollution Prevention Act
RCRA Safe Drinking Water Act Soil and Water Resources Submerged Lands Act Superfund Amendments











Figure 4: DOI Agency Curbing Pre- and Post-Chevron
198
Appendix
I went to the legislative database THOMAS:
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php
I conducted THOMAS searches for each of the 22 statutes implemented in whole or
in part by the Department of Interior. E.g., searching “National Environmental Policy
Act” in the 93rd Congress, 94th Congress, and so on through the 111th Congress. There
were no restrictions on whether it eventually became a public law or the committee from
which it originated. I assigned to the label “agency curbing” those bills compelling reg-
ulatory action (requirements), prohibiting regulatory action or otherwise stripping agency
latitude/authority (prohibitions), or increasing oversight over agency actions (oversight).
See Chapter 4 Appendix for detailed codebook replicated here as applied to the Depart-
ment of Interior.
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Table A1: Modeling Agency Curbing with GLS and AR(1) Disturbance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Cosponsors Committees Percent
Curbing Passed
Legislative-Executive Distance 5.116* 0.041 1.123* 0.863
(2.137) (0.421) (0.547) (0.554)
Margin of Control 21.094** 0.688 3.467† 4.625**
(7.420) (1.417) (1.880) (1.893)
LE Distance x Margin -34.059** -0.774 -5.458 -7.129*
(13.548) (2.585) (3.431) (3.454)
Chamber Distance 0.668 0.083 -0.012 0.385
(0.928) (0.169) (0.232) (0.232)
Distance Between Congresses 0.963* 0.022 0.128 0.226**
(0.412) (0.059) (0.095) (0.090)
Citizen Suits -0.462* -0.014 -0.142** -0.037
(0.224) (0.022) (0.049) (0.038)
Democratic President -0.214 -0.022 -0.051 -0.080
(0.201) (0.032) (0.048) (0.046)
Environmental Groups 0.004 -0.003 0.001 -0.001
(0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
DC Circuit Ideology -2.150 -0.264 -0.274 -0.944**
(1.494) (0.250) (0.360) (0.352)
Post-Chevron -0.247 -0.042 -0.071 -0.074
(0.240) (0.042) (0.059) (0.058)
Significant Law 0.312† 0.033† 0.023 0.070*
(0.174) (0.018) (0.038) (0.030)
Statutory Fragmentation -0.014 -0.008 0.015 -0.015
(0.068) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012)
Total DOI Legislating 0.017*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.001**
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Electoral Uncertainty -2.543 -0.261 -0.623 -1.093*
(2.188) (0.378) (0.535) (0.527)
Intercept -24.538* -2.846 -4.118† -6.984**
(10.207) (1.777) (2.485) (2.456)
Bureau Fixed Effects X X X X
Splines X X X X
Total Observations 336 336 336 336
∗∗∗p < .001,∗∗ p < .01,∗ p < .05,† p < .10
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Table A2: NBREG Models of Individual Curbing Actions Against DOI
(1) (2) (3)
Requirements Prohibitions Oversight
Lagged Curbing 0.079† 0.034 0.057†
(0.044) (0.025) (0.033)
Legislative-Executive Distance 19.430** 13.128† 15.547*
(6.185) (6.991)* (7.393)
Margin of Control 78.999*** 54.997* 62.325**
(20.690) (22.636) (24.029)
LE Distance x Margin -127.588*** -75.260 -95.309*
(37.424) (41.987) (44.042)
Chamber Distance 1.631 7.666** 2.270
(2.296) (2.380) (2.902)
NOMINATE Distance 0.371 0.386 0.428
(0.666) (0.721) (0.841)
Citizen Suits -1.838** -2.493** -2.070**
(0.720) (1.015) (0.766)
Democratic President -1.521** -0.267 -1.004
(0.574) (0.565) (0.636)
Environmental Groups -0.048† -0.031 0.023
(0.028) (0.031) (0.034)
DC Circuit Ideology -11.248** -8.286* -8.634*
(3.755) (3.877) (4.159)
Post-Chevron -0.772 -0.924 -1.596*
(0.527) (0.872) (0.674)
Significant Law 1.252* 1.912** 1.401**
(0.552) (0.732) (0.552)
Statutory Fragmentation 0.449* 0.382 0.448*
(0.205) (0.273) (0.207)
Total DOI Legislating 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Electoral Uncertainty -16.711** -8.253 -10.466
(6.070) (7.448) (6.937)
Intercept -88.849*** -91.483*** -95.271***
(23.488) (25.857) (27.166)
Bureau Fixed Effects X X X
Splines X X X
Total Observations 335 335 335
∗∗∗p < .001,∗∗ p < .01,∗ p < .05,† p < .10
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Chapter 6: Re-Setting the Agenda: Congressional Responses to
Bureaucratic Noncompliance in Environmental Law
Chapters 4 and 5 worked to bring to light the factors yielding bureaucratic implemen-
tation behavior that is out of step with the original statutory delegations and/or with how
the current Congress sees those statutes as being properly implemented. While the agency
curbing measure in a sense indicates how Congress can (and does) respond to observing such
noncompliant behavior by administrative agencies, it is in this chapter that I evaluate more
closely the opportunities that Congress might have to better control agencies statutorily in
the periods of the game that follow.
Central to American lawmaking is the issue of strategic delegation and choices of statutory
implementation, particularly amid rising polarization both within and across the branches
(McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal 2006). In light of this institutional conflict, this chapter raises
the following question within the domain of environmental law: How do expansions in bu-
reaucratic latitude reshape the long-term trajectories of the policy that emerges under their
jurisdiction? While a range of conditions can expand administrative agencies’ policymaking
latitude when their preferences diverge from the policy laid out by Congress, extant meth-
ods do not allow for the evaluation of the policy change that results from this bureaucratic
behavior. By providing a new metric of policy change, this chapter allows for new evalua-
tions of policy (in)stability emerging from growing separation-of-powers conflict, and tests
the predictors of powerful policy change within the domain of environmental law.136
Eskridge & Ferejohn (2010) hold that statutes have been the dominant mode of the
development of American democracy and that amid America’s “republic of statutes,” public
deliberation over fundamental rights and commitments “has migrated, relatively speaking,
away from Constitutionalism and toward legislative and administrative constitutionalism”
136However, it should be stressed that the methods employed here are fully generalizeable to any domain
of public policy.
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(2010: 16). What we then are left with is state statutory expansions of policy and the
entrenchment of federal “superstatutes” such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The study of
statutes to date has neglected their dynamic nature, which I argue is a critical dimension of
how law, policy, and the American state develop over time. Such a dynamic conception of
lawmaking better captures the realities of the increasingly complex, amendment-based nature
of modern statutes, as well as the ongoing nature of inter-branch interactions in shaping
policy outcomes. Indeed, in reference to Moe’s (1989) widely-cited claims that Congress can
constrain agencies through durable but inefficient structural design, Patashnik holds that the
“institutional development story must be followed all the way through” (2008: 157) in order
to capture downstream structural developments in the policies being implemented because
“the game doesn’t end when the laws are adopted” (Id at 10).
A large and growing body of literature has sought to characterize legislative agenda-
setting and to predict the incidence and timing of policy change in that political configuration
(see, e.g., Krehbiel 1998; Binder 2003; Cox & McCubbins 2005; Brady & Volden 2006).
Krehbiel (1998) raises the question of why gridlock – the inability to move policy away from
the status quo – frequently occurs in American government, and finds that gridlock occurs
regularly due to moderate status quo policies, heterogeneous preferences in Congress, and
supermajoritarian procedures that help to explain why winning coalitions tend to be greater
than minimum-majority sized. Brady & Volden (2006) see this gridlock as instrumental to
the American political system, with policy shifts made possible with electoral shifts that
change the locations of the pivots and thus the windows for potential change from the
status quo policy location. A limitation to the modal analyses of gridlock (as well as other
characterizations of the congressional inability to pass major policy; see also Binder 2003)
is their restriction to the policy inputs – that is, the bargaining processes at work and the
logrolling that we observe going into a statute in order to achieve its final passage – making
the stories rendered static lawmaking analyses that end with the passage of the final statute.
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However, with the persistence and growth of divided government, such that Democratic
congresses are relying in part on Republican administrations (or vice versa) to carry laws
into effect, administrators may in fact be more than mere rote implementers of these laws
that emerge through the veto gates.
This chapter argues that evaluating the longer-term effects of bureaucratic behavior –
and in some cases, bureaucratic noncompliance and statutory noncompliance as defined in
the previous chapters – in the system known for high levels of inter-branch conflict requires
the development of a measure of incremental policy change within the laws under these
agencies’ jurisdiction. The chapter provides and evaluates such a measure, based on a novel
and original dataset spanning from 1973 to 2010. Creating an original measure that accounts
for the significance, specificity, and direction of each amendment to each of the 26 laws
under the jurisdiction of the Environmental Protection Agency, I find that there is in fact
significantly more policy volatility than the dominant policymaking theories predict.
To take a prominent recent example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) – famously called “Obamacare” – was signed into law on March 23, 2010 after years
of discourse over the proper reach and nature of the impending health care overhaul. Among
the health laws importantly implicated by the ACA was the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act (FDCA), originally passed in 1938 but subsequently amended several times, and
which among other thing allows the Environmental Protection Agency to establish maximum
residue limits for pesticide residues on foods. The ACA marked the most significant over-
haul of America’s health care system since the 1965 Medicare and Medicaid Acts, seeking
to vastly increase the quality and affordability of both private and public health insurance
coverage. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the ACA would ensure the health
coverage of 94 percent of Americans, addressing such reform components as the provision of
quality affordable health care to all Americans, improving health care efficiency, improving
access to innovative medical therapies, and increasing transparency in the health care system
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(CBO Summary of the ACA). The 2010 congressional midterm elections marked the greatest
loss of a party in a House election since 1938, and the Republican Party’s largest gain in
House seats since that same year.137 Thus, a statute of landmark magnitude was left to be
monitored by a congressional majority strongly ideologically opposed to the coalition that
enacted the law originally, as well as opposed to the presidential administration tasked with
its implementation.
Moreover, the ideological diversity of the states provided additional complexity to the
enforcement landscape as governors and Attorneys General battled over the extent to which
they could in fact be mandated to provide this vast expansion of health care benefits. Twenty-
eight states filed lawsuits seeking to strike down the Affordable Care Act’s individual man-
date provision (Fletcher 2010), with some states (e.g., Virginia) joining in suits together
and others filing separately. In one lawsuit, signed on by 12 Republican Attorneys General
and 1 Democrat Attorney General, there was the challenge that Congress has the authority
“to regulate commerce,” but the Commerce Clause does not allow the federal government
to compel one to purchase something (Williams 2010). It was not until 2012 in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sibelius that the United States Supreme Court would
uphold by a vote of 5-4 the health care mandate as being within Congress’s power to tax,
though not within the scope of its authority under the Commerce Clause. This provides but
one example of the challenges presented by implementing policy amid separated – and often
ideologically conflicted – powers.
Further, rather than creating a new administrative apparatus such as with the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 or the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Congress increasingly has
turned to amendment-based lawmaking strategies which may result in mere incrementalism,
but may also potentially result in marked deviations from the status quo policy. A single law
137The Republican Party gained 63 seats in the House of Representatives as well as gaining 6 seats in the
Senate, thus expanding its minority status. The election also left the Republican Party in control of 26 state
legislatures and 29 of the 50 governorships.
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may receive dozens if not hundreds of statutory amendments over time. However, to date no
work has sought to systematically account for the magnitude and direction of policy change
within a law over time when there is heterogeneity within the statute. Such conditions of
heterogeneous laws is increasingly common as Congress turns to omnibus legislating (Krutz
2001).138 Within “must-pass” omnibus bills often fast-tracked through the committee pro-
cess as single pieces of legislation (Krutz 2001: 2), one may find policies too controversial
to pass on their own, and brought to the floor when debates are focused on “the larger
issue of the omnibus nucleus” (Id at 2) such that members pressured into voting in favor
often are unaware of the law’s other contents. Moreover, even apart from the large omnibus
appropriations packages, the high acceptability of this pork barrel legislating has led to the
passage of laws touching on more diverse arrays of topics than what we observed in earlier
decades (Krutz 2001). These processes make more complex the estimation of policy change
over time.
I begin by discussing legislative design features most conducive to agencies taking more
active role in policymaking relative to the statutory text and leading to outcomes to which
I refer in this project as bureaucratic or statutory noncompliance. I then review existing
theories of policy change and their limitations in permitting systematic evaluation of the
consequences of this noncompliance, given the chapter’s claim that bureaucratic behavior
inconsistent with congressional preferences should trigger greater subsequent policymaking
activity in order to bring legislation closer to their preferred location. I move on to introduce
my original measure of substantive policy change through statute and the volatility that
results from these legislative changes, and use those original data to test the core separation-
of-powers hypotheses. I find that bureaucratic and statutory noncompliance, as well as the
138While many (e.g., Krutz 2001, Hanson 2014) discuss omnibus legislation in the context of appropriations
bills, such as omnibus budget reconciliation acts – and indeed, that is a very frequent venue in which one
finds them – I am treating laws as omnibus if they simply touch on multiple distinct policy domains, such
as having both provisions pertaining to the provision of communication services as well provisions governing
prosecution for drug crimes. Thus, I adopt a broad definition of omnibus legislating, and do not rely on the
name of the statute but rather the text itself to determine whether or not it meets this criteria.
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partisan configuration of Congress and the extent of judicial delegation toward administrative
agencies, fundamentally reshape the extent to which Congress engages in ongoing monitoring
of the policies and locations of the 26 statutes under the jurisdiction of the Environmental
Protection Agency.
Bureaucratic Noncompliance in the United States
A common characterization of the relationship between legislators (principals) and bu-
reaucrats (agents) is the delegation framework of lawmaking. According to this well-developed
line of scholarly inquiry, when Congress writes a law in which there is some complexity or un-
certainty that makes it disadvantageous to risk taking blame for, or when there is ideological
agreement between the branches, Congress opts to delegate rulemaking and/or enforcement
authority to the agency while maintaining certain administrative procedures and statutory
specificity so as to guard against the potential for bureaucratic drift (e.g., McCubbins &
Schwartz 1984; McNollGast 1987, 1989; Banks & Weingast 1992; Bawn 1995; Epstein &
O’Halloran 1999; Bendor, Glazer & Hammond 2001; Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 2001; Huber
& Shipan 2002; Volden 2002). Should the agency fail to act consistent with the statute,
it would face punishment deemed undesirable in equilibrium. Thus, what we observe is
bureaucratic compliance. The earlier chapters of this project challenged that assumption,
holding that scholars have underappreciated the true reach of bureaucratic discretion under
conditions of inter-branch ideological conflict and settings that are not conducive to efficient
bureaucratic oversight – conditions that are all the more prevalent in the recent decades of
rising polarization and legislative gridlock (see also Gailmard 2002; Huber & McCarty 2004).
While theories often articulate the mechanisms of congressional control of bureaucracy
(e.g., McNollGast 1987, 1989; Callander & Krehbiel 2014), absent a metric of bureaucratic
compliance, scholars have been unable to ascertain empirically the extent to which these
constraints on agencies are indeed effective, and the conditions under which this bureau-
cratic control breaks down. This breakdown of effective congressional control of agencies
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can result in noncompliance, defined above. Legislative-executive disagreement and ideo-
logical disagreement between the chambers of Congress were found in previous chapers to
powerfully contribute to the Environmental Protection Agency’s pulling policy toward its
preferences rather than engaging in “rote implementation,” though congressional provision
for citizen suit litigation against the agency appears to effectively constrain the agency’s
range of policymaking choices relative to the statute under its jurisdiction. The support for
the Department of Interior was more modest, though the overarching patterns of legislative-
executive disagreement, conditional upon opposition strength, and the effective of citizen suit
provisions were largely consistent with the findings of Chapter 4 in the context of the EPA.
The findings strongly suggest that the separation-of-powers conflict prevalent since the late
1960s has expanded agency latitude beyond what the dominant delegation theories predict.
However, if our ultimate goal is to better understand what explains policy outcomes, then
we must be able to estimate not simply the extent of noncompliance, but also its effects.
That is the question that this chapter takes up.
Theories of Policy Change
Estimating changes in policy and preferences is of interest to scholars in a vast number of
subfields of political science – from measuring doctrinal change on the Supreme Court (e.g.,
Baum 1995) to measuring moves between liberalism and conservatism in policy adoption to
capturing movement from the status quo when gridlock has been broken – though in every
case, scholars are faced with a number of empirical challenges. While many public policies
are considered subject to drift and others “bombarded by it” (Callander & Krehbiel 2014:
819) with drift caused by sources ranging from changes in demographics to innovations in
technology, delegation has been considered a mechanism through which governments can
accommodate this potentially inevitable drift (Id). A number of scholars have sought to
explain the patterns and extent of policy change that we should expect to observe amid
varied political and institutional arrangements, with policy stability typically increasing with
208
the number of veto players and their distances from one another, and reflecting the dfficulty
of making significant departures from the status quo (Tsebelis 2002: 37). Thus, the number
of significant laws passed by a legislature should be decreasing in the function of ideological
distance between the parties or key players, and increasing as a function of the distance
between the previous government and the one currently in power given the desire to undo
an ideologically distant regime’s policies (Id at 165). Such claims are consistent with the
argument that in evaluating the stability of a given policy over time, we must consider both
the current and the prior institutional configurations, as well as the bureaucratic behavior
in response to congressional allocations of discretion.
There is a further question of whether policy change tends to be incremental, immune to
radical change, or subject to ebbs and flows. Hall (1993) ultimately notes that in the United
States lawmaking system, most changes to policy are only marginal, though there periods
of fundamental changes, or “punctuated equilibria,” at which point Baumgartner & Jones
observe that crises do occur as the American public and policymakers reshape their under-
standings of the problems at hand. That is, a program may exist unchanged for decades,
but then experience a radical reform, a prominent example of which is the aforementioned
ACA. Of course, one important consideration in evaluating significant legislation versus the
politics of incrementalism is whether to think of policy change in the aggregate – that is, over
time producing important changes in the scope of administrative implementation capacity –
versus characterizing incremental legislation as non-significant as Tsebelis (2002: 180) does.
One of the lone treatments of incremental policymaking is that by Ainsworth & Hall,
who outline three strategic reasons for legislators’ pursuit of incremental policy change:
“First, legislators consider the trade-offs between vote maximization and policy gains linked
to proposals. Second, incremental policy change affects members’ incentives for engaging
in legislative effort and legislative sabotage when they are evaluated on their relative per-
formance. Finally, members’ informational constraints affect their pursuits of incremental
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policy change” (2011: 39-40). Thus, among the considerations of legislators is – consistent
with median voter models of legislative decisionmaking and traditional bargaining theories –
the interest in ensuring passage, often by way of moving to the center so as to gain the nec-
essary majority. Moreover, legislative gatekeepers’ risk aversion leads them to trade policy
gains for votes as the prospects of legislative passage increase. Amid heightened partisan con-
flict and difficulty in moving legislation through the legislative process, incremental changes
may be easier to explain and defend than radical reforms that may be highly discordant with
key coalitions in Congress (Id at 43). Thus, the barriers to final passage are simply lower
when putting forward more modest policy proposals than a new administrative apparatus
that will provide a shock to the existing system. And while incremental changes minimize
the policy gains that ultimately are reaped at each individual stage of congressional attention
to an issue, on their face each incremental move may push policy forward in important ways
over time.
A number of well-cited theories of lawmaking have sought to explain the conditions
under which policy change is feasible, though such efforts have not resulted in a systematic
quantifying of that policy change and its direction. Krehbiel (1998) argues that legislative
productivity varies according to the location of the status quo with respect to the gridlock
interval, with changes to the status quo possible only when the status quo policy lies outside
the gridlock interval. Brady and Volden (2006) instead employ a median voter model, holding
that to explain and define gridlock, one can think of members of Congress as being arrayed
on a left-right continuum, and to determine whether effective policy change is possible, one
must know the policy preferences of those members of Congress who are near the median and
determine where their preferences lie in relation to the status quo policy. Thus, the median
voter’s preferences are a critical determinant of the policies ultimately adopted. In both
models, we will observe major policy change only when the status quo is further from crucial
members’ (whether the median or the pivot) preferences than the proposed alternative policy.
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In the discussion below, and consistent with the median voter theorem, I focus on the
preferences of coalition members near the center rather than on the location of the filibuster
and veto pivots, though this is not to say that these veto gates are irrelevant to the pol-
icymaking process. I argue that we must look at the statute (e.g., Clean Air Act) rather
than policy level (e.g., the more macro level of environmental policy) given the heteroge-
neous nature of environmental policy (as well as other policies such as transportation, which
intersects with such diverse domains as the environment and energy, labor, and civil rights).
The importance of evaluating the particulars of policy substance has not gone entirely unno-
ticed, with Lapinski (2013) holding that there is a great risk of mischaracterizing lawmaing
and policymaking processes when pooling in our analyses all laws across issue areas, with
even accepted theories of the patterns and persistence of polarization over time not holding
across policy issue areas. While his disaggregation of issue areas is at the level of four policy
categories – sovereignty, organization and scope, international affairs, and domestic affairs
– and thus does not disaggregate to the level of particular domestic affairs agendas (Id at
62), it suggests a need to consider more closely the effect of policy substance in shaping
institutional interactions and the polarization degrees that impact bureaucratic capacity in
policymaking.139
Rosenbaum (2014: 101) notes that the EPA administers both regulatory (e.g., clean
air) and distributive programs (e.g., federal waste treatment grants), along with research
activities, and as discussed previously, the statutes under its jurisdiction span environmental,
energy, food and agriculture, and labor policies. This affects not just the array of problems
that the agency faces over time, but also the composition of the groups lobbying for policy
change and the agency’s relationships to branches of the federal, as well as state and local,
governments. That is, while Chevron and Exxon Mobil may seek to assert themselves and
139Lapinski’s (2013) findings on variation in lawmaking productivity within these four issue domains further
supports the importance of looking at policy in more nuanced levels than does much of the extant lawmaking
literature.
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signal a willingness to fight decisions with respect to the Oil Pollution Act and the Clean
Water Act, it may be Pacific Gas and Electric Company that flexes its muscles with respect
to the implementation of the Energy Policy Act, and still different companies mobilizing
around the Clean Air Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act. Thus, there are implications
for lobbying and interest group pressures, as well as the local/regional versus national versus
global aspects of some of the laws that are at stake, affecting the agency’s decisionmaking
processes and those who seek to influence them.
Estimating the effects of statutory amendment behavior is most relevant when we can
understand the ultimate impact on the policies that we observe over time. That is, while
Congress may revisit legislation with high frequency, it is not necessarily of great relevance
if precious little change is actually being enacted and it is merely the politics of incremen-
talism in action.140 Given what clearly are dynamic processes at work in US lawmaking
in the separation-of-powers setting, the ability to estimate the significance, magnitude, and
direction of policy change in a statute (or even policy area, e.g., consumer protection) would
open the door toward allowing us to understand better at the law level the conditions nec-
essary or sufficient for meaningful policy change, and the key factors at work in shaping the
outcomes we observe in this politics of potentially only incrementalism. This has important
implications for the studies not just of lawmaking, but also bureaucratic behavior, policy
stability, and the impact on the legal landscape.
Why Not Roll Calls?
To determine the extent of policy change over time, one must first identify all of the
instances in which Congress takes up and ultimately amended the given statute. One way
that this has been achieved in existing literature is through the identification of roll calls
140For example, Huber (2007) notes that the main way that Congress works to monitor the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (a share of which the Environmental Protection Agency also enforces) is through the
process of constraining the agency’s appropriations as opposed to utilizing other legislative tools such as
providing for administrative sanctions, whereas the Clean Air Act has received much more widespread and
well-noted congressional attention and revision.
212
on the subject of interest, with roll call data and NOMINATE scores of the relevant leg-
islators all easily accessible. The use of roll call votes to identify statutory amendments
will systematically identify the bills for which the provisions of interest are central, as in
Clinton’s (2012) analysis of wage and hour amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act,
which importantly calls attention to certain disconnects between lawmaking theoretical pre-
dictions and empirics, at least under certain conditions of partisan conflict. However, I argue
that such a strategy will not capture the wealth of amendment activity that occurs within
other laws, whether in related statutes of different names (e.g., other, more heterogeneous
labor legislation or a comprehensive environmental package) or in omnibus legislation (e.g.,
Omnibus Budget Reconcilliation Acts).
For example, while Congress may choose to pass a new environmental law, it may also
insert a handful of environmental provisions into an omnibus budget reconciliation act, which
makes the estimation of policy change (particularly that which is only incremental) consid-
erably more challenging. After all, apart from the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress
also amended the Clean Air Act in laws with titles including “Steel Industry Compliance
Extension Act 1981,” “Tax Reform Act of 1986,” and the “Airport and Airway Safety, Ca-
pacity, Noise Improvement, and Intermodal Transportation Act of 1992,” none of which
would likely be reflected in analyses of roll call votes on Clean Air Act amendments over
time. Thus, while Clinton’s (2012) study provides an excellent contribution toward under-
standing empirically the actual reach of statutory policy change under varied conditions, its
confinement to congressional revision of a single, well-defined statute rather than providing
comparative analyses of policy change or addressing laws that intersect more with other
legislation leaves us without a roadmap for addressing the measurement of policy change in
more heterogeneous laws.
This issue is of particular importance given that the policy captured by these different
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statutes may be substantively different in ways that are central to this study. Krutz (2000:
533) notes that not only has the use of omnibus legislation proliferated since World War
II, but such laws are often assembled in order to ensure passage of policy that otherwise
faces uncertainty. Thus, within these often must-pass omnibus bills in which one will find
some widely-supported policies, one may also find policies that might well have been too
controversial to garner the support necessary for final passage on their own merits.141 Such
information might well be important to an analysis of the extent to which policy changes
are ultimately enacted.
By instead identifying each public law in which Congress revisited a law to any extent –
and providing a novel indicator of each amendment’s scope (and, in a sense, complexity) – we
can not only gain a better grasp on the mechanisms through which Congress typically seeks
to achieve statutory policy changes as it sees previously established policies being carried
into effect, but we can also systematically evaluate the relationship between policymaking
theories and empirics in recent decades.
A New Measure of Statutory Policy Change
This chapter proposes a more inclusive (though still imperfect) mode of estimating de-
viations from the status quo policy. To develop the measure and test its performance in
the context of noncompliant environmental policy implementation, I utilized the 26 laws
implemented in whole or in part by the Environmental Protection Agency, and on which
I based my analysis in Chapter 4. I conducted through Lexis Congressional’s database of
public laws searches for the name of each of the 26 statutes under the EPA’s jurisdiction.
The laws returned through these searches thus revisited in some way one (or more) of the
laws implemented by the EPA. These searches returned a total of 2,000 observations between
141Krutz (2000) acknowledges the potential benefits of using omnibus legislating in this manner, citing
proponents who claim that it enables legislative productivity in a process otherwise rife with gridlock and
veto players.
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1973 and 2010 and form the basis of this chapter’s analysis.142 Over the course of the time
series, there were an average of 5 amending laws per Congress per EPA statute. This number
is roughly comparable when evaluating separately those laws that the EPA shares with the
Department of Interior and those laws that the EPA does not, and the performance of a
difference-in-means test produces an insignificant test statistic. However, when looking to
the entire pool of Department of Interior laws, one finds a strikingly lower average of 1.5
amending laws per Congress per DOI statute, though of course the number is higher when
restricting analysis to those laws over which there is joint jurisdiction between the EPA and
DOI.
To estimate policy change, I first identified the DW-NOMINATE score of the median
legislator in the coalitions supporting the passage of each of the laws in the sample, as well
as indicators of the significance and the specificity of the amendment that Congress made to
one (or more) of these 26 statutes under the EPA’s jurisdiction.143 In obtaining the coalition
ideologies, I rely on the final vote cast by the chamber on the entirety of the bill, whether the
conference committee vote to accept all changes or the final floor vote in favor of passage.
Utilizing the NOMINATE median of these coalitions is consistent with legislative median-
voter theories, which – as with Black’s (1958) median voter theorem – propose that policy
outcomes will be consistent with the preferences of the median legislator.144
A limitation of this measure is that to determine the direction of policy change, I am
considering the votes on the bills taken as a whole, and not on the individual amendments
142While there are 2,000 observations, they are only 917 separate laws. Omnibus appropriations packages
often amended multiple environmental laws in a single statute, as many as 10.
143An important limitation is that a number of these statutory amendments received voice votes. In these
cases, I assign the DW-NOMINATE score of the median legislator in Congress. Thus, for coding purposes
that are not distinguishable from unanimous votes.
144Wiseman & Wright (2008) find that the median legislator is “unambiguously closer” to the majority
party median than to the minority party median and is predisposed to support the agenda advocated by
the majority party, giving one reason to expect that looking to the preferences of the median legislator will
be highly informative. There is, of course, also much value in looking also at the preferences of other key
members of the legislature, such as the committee chair and the veto and filibuster pivots. See, e.g. Krehbiel
(1998).
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pertaining to the EPA or the Clean Water Act if the amending law is in fact omnibus.145
However, I argue that this measure can provide us with valuable leverage in understanding
better the nature and scope of policy changes given ongoing inter-branch battles over imple-
mentation. For example, I expect that if one law amending the Clean Air Act was passed
by a coalition with a NOMINATE median of -.3 and the next amendment has a coalition
median of .2, one can reasonably reach the conclusion that there was a swing in the conser-
vative direction with respect to the Clean Air Act. Alternatively, if the next amendment is
passed with a coalition median of .18, one can hold that the difference is small, if significant
at all.
Examining the coalition medians of these laws reveals a marked amount of volatility. For
example, the Clean Air Act from the 93rd to the 111th Congress has an average coalition
NOMINATE median of -0.017 with a standard deviation of .179, and the amendments range
from -0.236 to 0.322 (though given its controversial nature, it should come as little surprise
that few amendments to the Act have ultimately passed relative to the other statutes imple-
mented by the EPA). Moreover, consistent with what we might expect to find, the average
coalition median for those laws amending the Clean Air Act in the 103rd Congress was -0.110,
while in the 104th Congress it shifts to 0.203 – a .313 swing in the conservative direction
amid the marked partisan turnover with the 1994 midterm elections amid the Contract with
America. Contrary to expectations, the Toxic Substances Control Act – regulating by way
of disclosure as opposed to more direct specification of regulatory policies, and remaining
largely intact since its initial passage – has a quite broad range of movement, from -.226 to
.473. While this is inconsistent with accounts of TSCA’s stability, this measure addresses
only the location and not the significance or specificity of the statutory amendments, which
if small would reconcile the competing TSCA accounts. Moreover, this measure captures
145Moreover, there is the challenge of estimating the location of new policies in isolation, as opposed to
comparing policies to their proposed alternatives. There is thus a question of to what extent it is valuable
to know whether a given policy is the more conservative one available, the most centrist option, etc. in
assigning based on the voting coalition whether it was in fact liberal or conservative.
216
only the location of the law as a whole, rather than the relevant portions of the law, and
with a growing need for supermajority support in order to pass legislation (see, e.g., Wawro
& Schickler 2006), one can 1.) infer less from the coalition ideology alone given the extent of
compromise needed to achieve final passage, and 2.) observe that the resulting policy change
is potentially watered down, or at least touching less directly upon the more salient policies
given the bargaining processes at work.
To assign greater weight to those amending laws in which there was more extensive revi-
sion of the statute, I created the variable specificity, which is a scale comprised of information
on whether each of the following were present in each of the 2,000 statutory amendments:
whether the law was simply mentioned, whether there were changes to appropriations or ap-
propriations cycles, changes to statutory enforcement (e.g., administrative adjudications or
the creation of a private right of action), oversight provisions (e.g., reporting or consultation
requirements), definitions, prohibitions, requirements of regulated entities, rules/regulations,
exemptions from the Act, provisions specifying to whom the law does apply, and rules of
construction. These variables were identified by hand-coding each of the 2,000 amendments
from the Statutes at Large.146 Those laws coded as having prohibitions or requirements
contained – it is important to note – regulatory commands of private entities and not of the
administrative agency as was the case in Chapters 4 and 5. That is, these are identifying
language such as “it shall be unlawful for any owner or operator of any new source to operate
such source in violation of any standard of performance applicable to such source.” Those
laws coded as containing regulations provided that an administrative actor such as a Secre-
tary or Administrator (whether or not it was in the EPA or DOI, so long as it was in the
relevant statutory amendment) should promulgate rules or standards (for example, “[The
Secretary] shall promulgate such revised drinking water regulations with such modifications
as he deems appropriate”) Both mandatory and discretionary rulemaking provisions were
146In long statutes, word searches were used to identify the relevant section(s) of the law.
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included here, as the variable seeks only to evaluate whether Congress was working to pro-
vide for more detail with respect to the rulemaking role of the relevant administrator. Rules
of application and exemption are those passages in laws where Congress provided for greater
detail as to the conditions under which certain statutory provisions do (or don’t) apply, and
who is (or isn’t) responsible for complying with the provisions. Rules of construction likewise
create bounds on the statute and contain such language as, “Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to limit or prohibit any other authority the Administrator may have under
this Act.” Through this coding process I also identified the number of pages in each of these
2,000 amendments that were dedicated to amending the original EPA statute (that is, the
number of pages of the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986 that specifically
address the Toxic Substances Control Act (22 pages) as well as the number of pages of that
same Act that specifically address the Occupational Safety and Health Act (1 page)).
The Chronbach’s alpha, or indication of scale reliability, is .76, which is sufficient evidence
in support of the measures being incorporated into a single scale (DeVellis 2003), and thus I
take the sum of the dummy variables to create this index. Table 1 reports the distribution
of occurrences of each type of statutory amendment in the dataset. While appropriations
are clearly a heavily-utilized tool in congressional amendments of these laws, evaluating ap-
propriations changes hardly tells the complete story, with extensive numbers of oversight
provisions being integrated into the legislation, as well as changes to the enforcement appa-
ratus. The addition of different types of language can be construed to reduce bureaucratic
discretion to read between the lines should Congress be dissatisfied with its statutory imple-
mentation decisions (Huber & Shipan 2002), but it can also indicate new regulatory efforts
on the part of Congress and which are independent of the agency’s behavior. Thus, less can
be gleaned by looking at the addition of language alone. However, this reflects that there
are in fact a number of ways in which Congress works to revise legislation, which it takes up
with far more frequency than one would guess if basing analysis on the amending law titles
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Table 1: Types of Statutory Amendments (93rd-111th)
Yes No
Mentioned/Incorporated Only 777 1,223
Just Technical Amendment 121 1,879
Appropriations 690 1,310
Oversight Provisions 267 1,733







Rules of Construction 137 1,863
as opposed to the body of the statutes. The presence of a greater number of these types of
statutory amendments suggests a greater degree of congressional attention to the particular
law, which could well be an indicator of dissatisfaction with its prior implementation. Ta-
ble 2 reports the distribution of the values of the specificity scale, which ranges from 1 to
11, with lower values indicating only modest attention to the authorizing statute and high
values indicating that Congress was aggressively taking the act to task. While the majority
of these 2,000 statutory amendments are of a smaller nature, there are still quite a number
that engage in extensive reshaping of substantive policy and the manner in which it will be
carried into effect.
Lastly, in estimating policy change I incorporated information on the overall significance
of each of the statutory amendments. Common measures of law-level significance are those
drawn from David Mayhew (1991/2005) and from Lapinski & Clinton (2006). However, the
more ideal granular-level codes that the Lapinski & Clinton data assign all public laws are
not only restricted to the law-level significance, but also do not extend beyond the 103rd
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Congress, whereas I am evaluating the 93rd to the 111th Congress. I instead created an
amendment significance measure which is, for each of the 2,000 observations, the ratio of
the number of pages revising the authorizing statute relative to the number of pages in the
original law.147 The intention is to downweight those laws that appear to be amending in ways
more trivial and to give more stature to those that are taking on more extensive regulatory
change. The expectation is that having a greater number of amending pages relative to the
length of the original statute is indicative of a more extensive regulatory effort on the part
of Congress. The advantage of such an approach is that it works to evaluate the significance
of the amendment and not the law as a whole (that is, it does not erroneously attribute a
high level of significance to a trivial amendment embedded in a vitally important omnibus
budget reconciliation act). However, there nevertheless are limitations in that it imposes the
assumption that the length of the amending content is associated with the significance of that
147Thus, if 3 pages were dedicated to amending the 10 page-long original Clean Air Act, the significance
score would be 3/10, or 0.3. If 45 pages were dedicated to amending that same law, the significance score
would be 4.5. All calculations were based on the number of pages in the Statutes at Large, the structure
of which is consistent over time. In alternative specifications, I calculated the ratio of pages amending the
statute to the number of pages in the amending law – that is, the share of the law dedicated to the given
EPA statute. The results produced were similar.
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amendment, when it might instead reflect the more technical nature of the subject matter
(for example, addressing clean air regulations with the introduction of new technologies) as
opposed to the importance of that particular content.148
I averaged the standardized specificity and amendment significance variables to create
a composite indication of the magnitude of amendment. I then treated this magnitude of
amendment variable as a weight on the DW-NOMINATE median of the legislators voting
in favor of the statutory revision. Thus, it allows for differentiation between a marked
ideological swing between statutory amendments that are extensive, which would appear as
considerable policy volatility, and a marked ideological swing between statutory amendments
that are relatively trivial, which would appear as very modest deviations from the status
quo. The resulting value is the novel estimate of each statutory amendment’s policy location
that allows for comparison across iterations of each of the statutes.
Tracking Policy Change
Figure 1 plots the time trends of the specificity with which Congress amended each of
the statutes under the jurisdiction of the EPA. The y-axis is the specificity scale, averaged
by law by Congress. It is immediately clear that there is marked variation in the extent to
which Congress takes laws to task when choosing to amend it to some degree. While the
Ocean Dumping Act and Pollution Prevention Act have been virtually untouched, I find in
a number of these statutes that there are vast differences not only the level of the specificity
scale, but also the patterns of when Congress took on more versus less amending activity.
While we see a sharp peak in the extent of amendments to the Endangered Species Act
(largely implemented by the Department of Interior) in the beginning of the time series and
then a decline and relative plateau, the Oil Pollution Act peaks in the beginning of the data
148However, such concerns about the confusion between significance and technicality are likely to be con-
sistent across most environmental legislation, which typically is highly detailed and complex, and this is the
exclusive domain under my microscope here. Thus, the ability to assess relative statutory significance should
be more feasible when looking within this one policy domain.
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and then declines sharply and then remains at the bottom third level of specificity, while
still others such as the Clean Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and the
Safe Drinking Water Act all display considerable volatility throughout the time series. That
is, the forces aligned to reshape these laws do not appear to be taking to task the whole
of the issues under the umbrella of the Environmental Protection Agency or more broadly,
environmental policy. Rather, it appears highly specific to the issues at hand, suggesting
congressional attention to statutory implementation as opposed to macro-level environmental
policy preferences, and further supporting the chapter’s claim of the importance of examining
within-statute policy changes over time.
The wide variation in the extent of statutory amendment activity both over time and
across laws provies for greater reinforcement of the value of studying amendments of par-
ticular statutes rather than evaluating the extent to which Congress has moved more liber-
ally (conservatively) overall or in environmental policy generally. This is further supported
by the marked variation in the significance of these statutory amendments using the mea-
sure discussed above (see Figure 2). While none of the National Environmental Policy Act
amendments achieve much significance at all using this metric, the Endangered Species Act
exhibits more significant amendment activity that is also more volatile and peaks at the end
of the time series, there are perids during which the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
enjoys more modestly significant amendment activity, and the Safe Drinking Water Act has
marked spikes in its amendments’ significance levels in the late 1980s and the mid to late
1990s. Thus, we can observe important variation across the statutes under the Agency’s
jurisdiction, lending greater credence to this chapter’s claim that important information is
missed when we pool laws together as constituting a single policy domain, and when we fail
to consider Congress’s numerous methods for amending policy in ways not reflected merely
in legislators’ votes but that have important implications for the policies that we ultimately
observe. Most importantly for the purpose of this project, the creation of this measure en-
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ables me to match my law-Congress bureaucratic noncompliance measures with law-Congress
amendment measures, thus evaluating not just blanket opposition to the agency but rather
opposition to the agency with respect to its implementation of a particular statute.
Testing Theories of Policy Change
Having described the construction of this novel measure of statutory policy movement and
displayed the patterns apparent in this measure of policy change from the status quo, I now
turn to evaluate its performance by testing the core theories of policy change in a complex
inter-branch setting, beginning with the most central motivating question of congressional
attention to bureaucratic noncompliance with the laws in which it delegates to the agency.
The dominant delegation models implicitly assume that agencies’ ranges of possible ac-
tions lie only within the discretionary windows allotted by the delegating Congress, thus
taking only actions that Congress at some level prefers (though for alternative arguments,
see Gailmard (2002), Huber & McCarty (2004)). However, I argue in earlier chapters that a
number of political conditions (e.g., heightened partisan conflict within Congress, statutory
design, and fragmented oversight of the agency) fundamentally reshape and expand adminis-
trative agencies’ latitude to be active policymakers and pull the policy location toward their
preferences rather than adhering strictly to the statutory text. While Congress routinely in-
troduces bills that signal dissatisfaction with agency actions, particularly in turbulent times,
few such bills ultimately reach final passage. Thus, I expect that major policy change will
occur when the agency has been found to be not just ideologically distant (that is, out of
alignment with the opposing party), but noncompliant in its implementation:
H1: Policy changes by Congress should be the greatest when the EPA was charged with
bureaucratic or statutory noncompliance in the previous Congress.
The above hypothesis addresses congressional responses to agencies’ overstepping of their
discretionary windows, with an assumption of congressional concern about the preferences
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of the executive branch and its implementation of the laws that Congress drafts. Farhang
& Yaver (2015) argue that Congress works to fragment the administrative state so as to in-
sulate policy against bureaucratic drift, as well as against coalition drift should the present
congressional majority lose power in the upcoming election. The idea of fragmentation is
that with greater numbers of actors and agencies involved in the implementation process,
the president must consult with more actors in order to change policy, and the added co-
ordination costs among the agencies involved should induce a status quo bias, insulating
policy consistent with the preferences of the enacting coalition. It is with an eye to guarding
against bureaucratic drift, thus creating a “sticky” status quo given the potentially different
composition of preferences in the future (see also Moe 1989), as well as the greater number of
agencies with which the president must consult should he seek a departure from the current
policy. If these efforts are successful, laws that are drafted in a highly fragmented manner
should require less ongoing statutory amendment activity to revise the policy location than
is required of laws in which there is centralized authority that would afford the implementing
agency greater latitude in setting policy.
H2: More fragmented laws should result in less subsequent policy change.
Consistent with the political economy models of lawmaking discussed above (e.g., Kre-
hbiel 1998; Brady & Volden 2006), I expect that under conditions of heightened legislative
conflict, any policy change that occurs will be more incremental rather than marked in its
magnitude. With high levels of consensus within Congress, the passage of more significant
amendments to legislation may be possible, depending upon the preferences of those in office.
Indeed, powerful majorities may be quite motivated to secure large policy victories and to
secure programs before political conditions change, thus paving the way for more significant
policy movement if there is an alternative policy location that is preferred. In contrast,
chambers that are ideologically distant from one another find it challenging to reach the
consensus necessary to pass new laws (and presumably, amending legislation as well), and
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Wawro & Schickler (2006) observe an increase in de facto supermajority requirements for
the Senate’s passage of legislation of significance. Thus:
H3: Policy change should be the smallest when there is heightened intra-branch conflict
in Congress, as measured by the NOMINATE distance between the chambers.
Relatedly, in examining the durability of statutes as indicated by their time to amend-
ment, Maltzman & Shipan (2008) argue that fragmented authorizing coalitions yield laws
that ultimately prove to be more fragile. However, in addition to the limitations presented
by their measuring statutory complexity in terms of page length, their use of a hazard model
to estimate the time to amendment does not allow us to test theories of the types of laws
most liable to experience major overhauls as opposed to minor (if any) adjustments, and the
extent to which those amendments are ongoing or infrequent. Here, I test this theory:
H4: Policy change should be the greatest when the enacting legislation was passed by
ideologically distant chambers.
Other Predictors of Major Policy Change
A number of other conditions could have important effects on congressional propensity to
significantly alter the legislation under the EPA’s jurisdiction. A long literature has worked
to explore the effects of third-party oversight on administrative behavior (e.g.. McCubbins
& Schwartz (1984). Consistent with these arguments, legal scholars have argued that the
mobilization of private litigants provides a potent mechanism of policy enforcement indepen-
dent of (and potentially despite) agency preferences (Farhang 2008, 2010).149 More specific
to environmental law, the use of citizen suits, which were first introduced in the Clean Air
Act of 1970 – along with their broadly-construed attorney’s fees and injunctive relief for
prevailing parties – worked to “mobilize private litigation against the targets of regulation
149The effectiveness of citizen suits appears particularly potent in recent years, in the aftermath of Friends
of the Earth, Inc, et al v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. (2000), in which the Supreme Court lowered
the bar for standing to sue.
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as well as... to control the bureaucracy” (Farhang 2011: 673), given agencies’ interest in
avoiding the burdens of legal suits. These provisions are a particularly meaningful departure
from the broader legal landscape in which one must have suffered a personal, tangible injury
in order to have standing to sue. Rather, within this domain of law, individuals can be
(though certainly are not always) empowered to bring suits against agencies due to their
action or inaction, regardless of personal harm suffered, providing a particularly meaningful
constraint on agency behavior that might not otherwise have been vigilant with respect to
enforcement. Making the reasonable assumption that agencies are well aware of the extent
of potential legal threats, I argue that it reshapes bureaucratic behavior in implementation,
and in turn the necessity of ongoing congressional monitoring through statutory amendment.
Just as the availability of citizen suits should have the effect of providing an additional
monitor on bureaucratic decisionmaking, so too should the extent of deference afforded
agency decisions by the judiciary. The Supreme Court’s landmark holding of Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council (1984) provided a clear articulation of administrative
deference to agency actions provided that they are not arbitrary or capricious. In the absence
of more vigorous judicial oversight, agencies were left to satisfy the low threshold of inquiry
– a permissible reading of the statute – and thus could be said to have had expanded latitude
moving forward in setting policy, and leaving Congress with more responsibility to perform
that oversight function.
Lastly, the electoral uncertainty of the political conditions will affect Congress’s ability
and inclination to make major changes. Fenno (1978) notes that legislators implicitly be-
lieve that their effectiveness in moving bills through the legislative cycle is valued by the
constituents on whom they depend for reelection. There may be greater incentive to reshape
policy to be consistent with legislators’ preferences while still in a position of power, and in




I use the novel statutory specificity and policy change measures as the continuous depen-
dent variables for models working to test central claims regarding institutional conflict and
policy movement in the context of these 26 statutes.
Political Environment Variables.
A range of political conditions including intra-branch conflict and the fragmentation of
bureaucratic oversight vastly expands agencies’ capacity to be active policymakers by pulling
policy toward their preferences rather than exercising strict statutory compliance. Here I turn
again to the two measures of statutory and bureaucratic noncompliance that were introduced
in Chapter 4: the percentage of cases in which the EPA was sued in the DC Circuit and
lost on substantive grounds, and an agency curbing factor score based on bill introductions
from the president’s co-partisans which sought to constrain the agency’s regulatory actions.
While both the statutory amendment and agency curbing datasets evaluate congressional
efforts to revise the way in which the given statute is being carried into effect, they are
crucially quite different in that the amendment data contain only passed legislation, and
such legislation may or may not target the powers of the agency or its leadership, and by
way of statutory amendment discretion may be limited in ways more diverse than those
captured in the agency curbing data (for example, the addition of specificity and in turn,
reduction of bureaucratic discretion even if not imposing additional oversight provisions).
Because the effect of bureaucratic noncompliance on subsequent policy change is a core
hypothesis examined here and because these measures tap into importantly distinct dimen-
sions of noncompliance, I examine them in separate statistical models, with the former
150However, there is the possibility that electoral uncertainty will give legislators less focus on passing
statutory amendments as opposed to working to better ensure electoral safety (that is, spending more time
campaigning), and also have less leverage in pressing for major policy changes.
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estimating judicial determinations that the agency has transgressed its authority, and the
latter indicating congressional dissatisfaction with agency implementation. To allow time for
a congressional response to the bureaucratic behavior and to avoid inducing post-treatment
bias, I lag both variables by one Congress. I expect the coefficients on both indicators of
bureaucratic noncompliance to be significant and positive.
Divided Government is a dummy variable coded as 0 when the President’s party controls
both chambers of Congress, and coded 1 otherwise.151 Successful policy adoption requires
some overlap of preferences between the chambers of Congress, with greater ideological
disagreement affecting markedly the transaction costs associated with passing legislation,
and in turn the potential for the policy location to move. To estimate this effect, I use the
variable Chamber Distance, which is the absolute value of the Common Space NOMINATE
distance between the House and Senate medians. If the chambers are ideologically opposed,
a conference committee would require the moderation – and thus, reduced movement – of
the policy, while a Congress with a more unified opposition to the status quo would be
better capable of organizing to deliver more significant overhaul. I expect the coefficient to
be significant and negative.
To test Maltzman & Shipan’s (2008) claim that ideological disagreement at the time of
a law’s enactment contributes adversely toward its ultimate durability, I include the vari-
able Authorizing Chamber Distance, which is the absolute value of the distance between the
Common Space NOMINATE medians of the authorizing chambers of Congress (thus, for
example, it is the chamber distance in the 93rd Congress in the case of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973). This enables me to estimate to what extent ideological disagreement
and legislative polarization – potentially contributing to additional complexity and bargain-
ing as legislators seek to buy support of coalitions – contributes to the long-run growth and
persistence in these policy changes rather than legal stability over time.
151The only divided Congresses in the data are the 97th-99th Congresses, and thus limited leverage can be
gained from analyzing such partisan configurations separately.
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There is a possibility that statutory amendments will be more likely to occur amid condi-
tions of electoral uncertainty, so as to solidify policy better before any partisan regime change
in the next election cycle. To estimate this, I utilize the uncertainty measure developed by
Yaver (2015b), which is the percentage of races won in the previous election by margins of
five percentage points or fewer, with the expectation that having many tightly contested
seats will induce in Congress a sense of uncertainty about future political conditions.152
I argue that a greater presence of environmental interest groups will be more likely to
pressure Congress and agencies to act on these issues, yielding more marked policy move-
ment. Boehmke, Gailmard, & Patty (2012) note that interest groups often lobby both the
legislature and bureaucracies, suggesting that they receive at least some of the same signals
and pressures. I expect that these pressures will result in increased congressional attention
to the reshaping of substantive policy objectives and implementation by the EPA. Thus,
I draw from the Policy Agendas Project the number of environmental interest groups per
Congress in order to control for the extent of potential pressures and lobbying to change
environmental policy over time.153
I include the absolute value of the NOMINATE Distance between the authorizing and
contemporary Congress medians. That is, with greater disagreement between the authorizing
Congress and that currently empowered, there should be greater volatility in the policies set
forth. I include a dummy variable for whether the statutory amendments are post- Chevron,
with the variable taking the value of 1 if the amendment was passed after the landmark case
and 0 otherwise. Finally, to account for the non-linear patterns of statutory amendment
activity over time, I include smooth cubic splines to model time. However, using the linear
time trend of Congress produced similar results.
152A common metric of electoral uncertainty is that created by Binder (1997), though due to its inducement
of post-treatment bias, I do not utilize it here. Moreover, there is the additionally problematic assumption
that legislators are cognizant of future (potential) losses. However, its inclusion in the model in lieu of the
narrow elections indicator does not substantially affect the main results.
153I divide the number of environmental groups by 1000 so as to allow for easier interpretation of the results.
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Law-Level Variables.
To test the effect of a statute’s original design on its subsequent policy durability, I
estimate the extent of the statutory fragmentation, a variable created using Farhang & Yaver’s
(2015) methodology and utilized in Chapters 4 and 5. This variable captures the extent to
which Congress has constructed a law that diffuses authority across different institutional
actors in effort to achieve policy insulation, as opposed to centralizing enforcement powers
in a single administrative entity (in this case, the EPA). I include a dummy variable for
whether the authorizing statute was significant according to David Mayhew’s (1991/2005)
list of significant post-war laws, taking the value of 1 if it is a significant law and 0 otherwise.
I include a dummy variable for whether the authorizing statute provided for citizen suits. To
address the fact that laws may have been long and policy-dense to begin with and thus by
nature have more content that can be amended, I control for the page length of the original
statute. Finally, to control for variation specific to certain domains of environmental policy,
I include policy fixed effects.
Estimation
I averaged the statutory amendment data by law by Congress to yield a total of 398
observations over the time period of the 93rd to the 111th Congress. The first dependent
variable that I present is specificity, which is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 8.
The data discussed in this project cover 26 laws154 over 19 Congresses, with an aim of
examining variation over both units and time. It thus takes the form of time series cross-
sectional data (TSCS), in which we have repeated observations over N units and T time
periods. An advantage of the TSCS structure is that one obtains greater variation across
a greater number of observations, and allows one to evaluate predictions in space and time
that cannot be estimated through exploiting pure cross-section or pure time-series (Beck &
Katz 2010). I employ panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs), which are utilized for linear
154Two of the laws under the EPA’s jurisdiction were passed after 2006.
230
time-series cross-section models and which correct for contemporaneous correlation.
A common concern – and thus a necessary diagnostic – in time series data is that of
serial correlation, for which PCSEs do not correct. I began by plotting the residuals against
the lagged residuals, and I did not observe a clear pattern, which is not suggestive of a serial
correlation problem in the data. Subsequent performance of a Wooldridge test for autocor-
relation in panel data allowed me to strongly rule out that there is first-order autocorrelation
in these data (p > .4), such that it does not require correction in the models presented. To
test whether the variables in the TSCS dataset are stationary, I performed a Fisher-type
test.155 The null hypothesis being tested by a Fisher-type test is that all panels contain
a unit root – that is, we are testing the hypothesis that ρ = 1, where ρ is the coefficient
on the lagged dependent variable. For a finite number of panels, the alternative is that at
least one panel is stationary. Nonstationarity was revealed in the variables NOMINATE
Distance and Environmental Groups, and I first-differenced these variables, which rendered
them stationary.
Below, I use the measures and methods to estimate the effects of bureaucratic behavior,
legislative design, partisan conflict, and the legal environment on statutory policy change
and in turn, the scope of administrative capacity that we ultimately observe.
Findings on the Specificity of Amendment Activity
The OLS results with panel-corrected standard errors are reported in Table 3. I begin
by discussing model 1, in which I estimate the effects driving policy change when using the
agency curbing metric of bureaucratic noncompliance. I find that a unit increase in agency
curbing in the previous Congress is associated with a 0.23-unit increase in the magnitude
of policy. To put this magnitude into better perspective, a standard deviation increase in
agency curbing in the previous period is associated with a .17 increase in the specificity with
155I use this test for a unit root because it does not require strongly balanced panels, and a number of laws
under the EPA’s jurisdiction were passed since 1973.
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which an amending law makes its revisions. Thus, with greater congressional dissatisfaction
with bureaucratic implementation, there is a greater likelihood that Congress returns to the
legislation with greater care and specificity, resulting in heightened policy change.
Turning to the lawsuit loss measure, I continue to find a powerful and significant effect,
with a standard deviation increase in the agency’s losses in court in the previous period
associated with a .39 standard deviation increase in the specificity of amending laws. This
is consistent with both the agency curbing measure, as well as the theory discussed above.
Thus, both of the indicators of punishment for bureaucratic misbehavior appear to be sig-
nificantly and positively associated with the specificity with which Congress revisits laws to
make policies more consistent with its present preferences. It further lends credence to the
chapter’s claim that these measures of bureaucratic noncompliance, while clearly distinct,
both tap into a single core concept with respect to the agency’s implementation behavior,
and in turn Congress’s response to it.
While congressional coalitions’ observations about bureaucratic behavior appear to pow-
erfully shape the magnitude with which they revise the delegating legislation, the degree
of fragmentation in the original statutory design – in theory structured to insulate against
drift and thus subsequent continued monitoring – does not appear to have any continued
effect on congressional amendment activity with respect to those laws. Divided government
has a significant and positive effect on the specificity of amendments to these laws in model
2, suggesting that while there may be evidence of diminished production of significant laws
amid divided government, there is in fact greater attention paid to administrative implemen-
tation of its laws and Congress’s willingness to meaningfully provide greater detail (and in
turn, less discretion to the executive branch). However, this finding’s inconsistency between
model specification requires that it be interpreted with caution.
The effect of chamber distance is in the expected (negative) direction but it is only sta-
tistically significant in model 2. Despite Maltzman & Shipan’s (2008) claim that statutes
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crafted amid ideological disagreement as indicated by ideological distance between the cham-
bers, I find that the authorizing Congress’s inter-chamber disagreement does not affect the
extent to which we observe major policy overhauls. And in fact, an authorizing statute’s
page length, a rough proxy for the complexity that might emerge from a divided authorizing
legislature, is actually negatively associated with its subsequent overhaul by Congress.
The NOMINATE distance between the enacting and contemporary Congresses does not
appear to be associated with the extent to which Congress takes a law to task in its amend-
ments. More marked statutory amendments appear to occur within the domain of significant
laws, which is consistent with the expectation that battles will be more likely to be waged
over issues of greater significance rather than over ordinary legislation. While the influence
of courts through citizen suits does not appear to be meaningful in shaping congressional
incentives with respect to drastic statutory changes, the effect of Chevron’s articulation of
deference toward agency decisions appears to have markedly increased the need for ongoing
congressional attention to these statutes, with the post-Chevron period associated with a
.90 and .72-unit increase in statutory amendment specificity in models 1 and 2 respectively,
or approximately 57% increases over the mean of specificity.
While a congressional coalition may have particular motivation to shift policy while still
in power to do so, it is unclear to what extent that coalition is well-positioned to enact more
striking policy changes to the statutes implemented by the EPA, with electoral uncertainty
significant and positive in model 2 but insignificant (albeit correctly signed) in model 1. The
effect of environmental interest groups is positively signed but is only significant in model
1, thus giving reason for caution in interpreting the result, and future work should explore
the effect of not simply the volume of interest groups, but also their activities with respect
to these particular policies.
Incorporating Policy Direction
To examine when we will observe greater swings in policy and not just the detail with
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which a law is being amended (potentially in the same direction as that established in the
authorizing statute), I turn now to the policy change dependent variable, which is the policy
location weighted by the average of the standardized significance and specificity variables.
This policy change dependent variable is continuous and ranges from 0 to 2.75. I again
use ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEts). Performance of
a Wooldridge test again did not produce a significant test statistic, suggesting that AR(1)
autocorrelation is not of concern in these data.
Here, bureaucratic noncompliance produces an inconsistent result, falling well short of
significance and incorrectly signed in the case of the agency curbing specification, though
remaining positive and significant in the lawsuit specification. However, the substantive
effect of noncompliance ascertained by the DC Circuit is much diminished, with a standard
deviation increase in lawsuit losses associated with a .03 standard deviation increase in policy
change. Divided government continues to powerfully and significantly predict the increase in
policy volatility over time in the lawsuit specification, with a move from unified to divided
government associated with a .03-unit increase in policy change. The fragmented versus
centralized nature of a statute continues not to be associated with subsequent statutory
amendment activity, either in looking at the specificity of those amendments as in Table 3,
or the policy volatility resulting from those amendments as here in Table 4. The effect of
authorizing chamber distance remains insignificant as in the models discussed above, though
here in both models 3 and 4 the effect of chamber distance is significant and positive. While I
argued that heightened divisions within Congress should be associated with smaller degrees
of policy change, the results have the potential to be skewed in that I am looking only at
passed legislation, which requires some threshold degree of preference overlap.
While the post-Chevron period appeared to be associated with more detailed statutory
amendments, those changes do not appear to be associated with significant policy shifts
in those laws, with the variable insignificant in model 3 and negatively signed though with
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a small substantive effect in model 4. Consistent with model 2’s predictions of statutory
specificity of amending laws, here electoral uncertainty has a significant and positive effect on
policy change. The effects of distance between Congresses and the authorizing statute’s status
as significant do not appear to be associated with greater policy change. The inconsistency
in the findings of bureaucratic noncompliance in the form of the agency curbing measure is
deserving of further inquiry. Of course, it is important to bear in mind that the congressional
decision to overhaul a statute both in substance and direction may be quite different from
the congressional decision to merely provide policy clarity in complex terrain, given that the
latter case may not be with the mindset of moving the statute’s location. Such a distinction
could produce a highly specific amendment – that is, one that provides lots of additional
language and provisions – by a coalition that is ideologically aligned with that which passed
the authorizing statute, and thus one that is not inclined to shift the policy location, scoring
high on specificity while scoring low on policy change.
Overall, however, the core claim of the role of bureaucratic behavior in shaping legislative
behavior and in turn the policy outcomes we observe is supported when looking at the detail
with which Congress is revising laws upon observing that bureaucratic behavior, and when
looking at the volatility of policy as Congress works to monitor the statute’s implementation
and guard against further bureaucratic drift. And these inter-branch dynamics in re-setting
the policy agenda appear to result in greater ongoing policy change than the dominant
lawmaking theories predict.
Conclusions
While it is the case that the prospects of congressional passage of the Clean Air Act of
2014 indeed look grim given the present level of partisan polarization in the legislature, it
is far from the case that Congress has been entirely hampered in its ability to address – to
varying degrees – the environmental legislation enforced by the Environmental Protection
Agency. Rather, through the dynamic, amendment-based processes of lawmaking through
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incrementalism, Congress is able to impose additional constraints on the agency and provide
for some degree of continued monitoring that importantly shapes policy. Indeed, it is in a
sense a different lawmaking game than that previously specified in the Congress literature,
which focuses largely on the bargaining processes at work with respect to passing new legis-
lation. This chapter instead works to demonstrate the conditions under which Congress can
successfully pass legislation that revises the location of the delegating statute, with bureau-
cratic behavior contrary to congressional preferences over implementation having marked
effects on the law’s ultimate policy trajectory. This project thus bridges the gap between
the literatures emphasizing the bargaining processes at work in congressional writing and
passage of legislation, and those who seek to understand the predictors and nature of the
policies that we ultimately observe. It additionally calls into question the generalizeability
of theories predicting the potential for policy change by Congress given the marked volatility
observed in a number of the statutes examined here, and the variation observed even among
this subset of environmental laws.
While prior work provided evidence of the conditions under which agencies’ latitude in
implementation might be expanded relative to the policy locations of the statutes under their
jurisdiction, this chapter provides the first evidence of the consequences of this bureaucratic
noncompliance. The results of this chapter call attention to the need to consider more
carefully the more precise ways in which Congress is changing the policy location of laws
given not just the broader political environment and changing preferences, but also the
agency’s implementation of those laws and their original implementation designs. While
extant research based on roll call votes has shed important new light on the extent to which
policymaking theories are confirmed in practice, the increasing use of omnibus legislation, as
well as the wealth of ways in which Congress can revisit laws – whether through oversight,
the tool of appropriations, the changing of enforcement, or the addition of specificity – makes
it all the more important to look at the broader legislative landscape in which these policy
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battles are being waged.
The chapter further provides a roadmap for evaluating policy change in a number of other
policy contexts, allowing us to gain greater insights into the trajectories of law and the scope
of capacity with which institutional actors are endowed over time. Extending the methods to
a greater range of policies and agencies will give us greater traction on the factors that predict
policy change, but these robust results suggest that the conditions enhancing bureaucratic
latitude have important consequences with respect to the stability of the policies we observe,
and potentially the longer-term scope of administrative capacity with which they operate.
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Table 3: Specificity of Policy Change in the SOP System
Model 1 Model 2
Agency Curbing Lawsuit Losses
Bureaucratic Noncompliance 0.234*** 1.211***
(0.060) (0.103)
Divided Government 0.140 0.229***
(0.175) (0.035)
Chamber Distance -4.142 -5.886***
(3.426) (0.765)
Authorizing Chamber Distance 4.718 -0.043
(4.472) (1.693)
Environmental Groups 0.050** 0.005
(0.016) (0.006)
Distance Between Congresses 1.669* 3.088***
(0.761) (0.600)
Significant Law 0.815*** 0.599***
(0.162) (0.120)
Statutory Fragmentation -0.171 -0.003
(0.117) (0.078)




Electoral Uncertainty 1.587 1.094***
(0.911) (0.167)




Policy Fixed Effects X X
Splines X X
R2 0.29 0.28
Total Observations 359 359
∗∗∗p < .001,∗∗ p < .01,∗ p < .05
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Table 4: Policy Volatility in the SOP System
Model 3 Model 4
Agency Curbing Lawsuit Losses
Bureaucratic Noncompliance -0.005 0.116***
(0.012) (0.035)
Divided Government 0.024 0.030**
(0.016) (0.010)
Chamber Distance 0.240** 0.164***
(0.081) (0.033)
Authorizing Chamber Distance 0.325 0.248
(0.660) (0.223)
Environmental Groups -0.000 -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Distance Between Congresses -0.043 -0.069
(0.115) (0.085)
Significant Law 0.002 0.007
(0.032) (0.006)
Statutory Fragmentation -0.021 -0.019*
(0.024) (0.008)




Electoral Uncertainty 0.305*** 0.255***
(0.063) (0.038)




Policy Fixed Effects X X
Splines X X
R2 0.10 0.09
Total Observations 359 359
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Figure 2: Significance Levels of Amendments Over Time
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Appendix
Measuring Policy Change Codebook
I conducted Lexis searches for each of the 26 statutes implemented in whole or in part
by the EPA. E.g., searching “Clean Air Act” in the 93rd Congress, 94th Congress, and so
on through the 111th Congress. There were no restrictions on whether that name was in
the title or description of the Act, provided that it be an enacted piece of legislation. This
generated a total of 2,000 amendments from 1973 to 2010 (though coming from 917 unique
statutes, some of which amended multiple laws). Each of these laws was downloaded from
the Statutes at Large through Hein and was coded by hand.
Conducting the same searches for amending public laws on THOMAS garnered a smaller
set of laws with which to work. All those accounted for in THOMAS were included in
Lexis, but THOMAS was missing some, presumably due to the particulars of their searches.
Analysis here was based on the universe of statutes identified through Lexis.
Collected for each amending statute the following variables:
Law Name: Name of the original law (e.g., Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act)
Original Congress: Congress that enacted the statute
Original Pages: Number of pages of original statute in the Statutes at Large
Amending Congress: Congress that is amending the statute
Bill Number: Bill number of the amending statute (e.g., HR 1, S49)
House Origin: 1 if originating in the House, 0 if originating in the Senate
Final House Vote Number: Number of last recorded House vote on entirety of the
law (conference committee vote if applicable, otherwise the full chamber vote) – got
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from GovTrack
Final Senate Vote Number: Number of last recorded Senate vote on entirety of the
law (conference committee vote if applicable, otherwise the full chamber vote) – got
from GovTrack
Final House Coalition Median: First-dimension DW NOMINATE score of median
House member voting in favor of the law in the final vote
Final Senate Coalition Median: First-dimension DW NOMINATE score of median
Senate member voting in favor of the law in the final vote
Sponsor: Name of the sponsor of the amending law, along with their state and district
if applicable (e.g., Barbara Boxer (CA), Jerry McNerney (CA-11))
Democratic Sponsor: 1 if the law sponsor is a Democrat, 0 if the bill sponsor is a
Republican
Same Sponsor: 1 if the President and the law sponsor are of the same political party, 0
if they are of different parties
Majority Sponsor: 1 if law’s sponsor is in her chamber’s majority party, 0
if she is not
Committees: List of the committees to which the amending law was referred (e.g.,
“Senate Environment and Public Works, Senate Energy and Natural Resources,
Senate Appropriations”)
Number of Committees: Count of the number of committees to which the law was
referred
Introduced: Date of the law’s introduction
Year: Year of the law’s introduction
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Democratic President: 1 if the law was passed by a Democratic administration,
0 if under a Republican administration
Amending PL: Public law number of amending statute (e.g., 110-5)
Amendment Name: Name of the law amending one (or more) of the environmental
statutes (e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Environmental Research,
Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act of 1976)
Pages of Amending Law: Total number of pages of amending law in Statutes at Large
Amending Pages: Number of pages of amending law dedicated to addressing the
particular law (e.g., the share of the law addressing the Clean Air Act – perhaps in a
40 page law that is making some amendment to the Clean Air Act, 12 of those pages
address the CAA and the remaining 28 pages address other issues entirely, so this
would get a code of 12 amending pages)
Number mentions: Number of times the original law was mentioned in amending law
Number sections: Number of sections in the amending law in which the original law
was addressed (perhaps it was only in 1 section of the law, perhaps the law amended
the Clean Air Act in 4 separate sections of the law)
Administrative Actors Mentioned: List of administrative actors mentioned in the
amending pages (e.g., Secretary, Secretary of the Interior, Administrator, President)
Mentioned Only: 1 if the law made no changes to the original statute and only
mentioned it in passing
Technical Amendment: 1 if the law was a technical amendment rather than
containing subtantive amendment provisions (for example, replacing “and” with “or,”
or reordering sections of a statute, punctuation changes, etc.), 0 otherwise
Appropriations: 1 if the amending law provided for appropriations for the original
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law (e.g., “There shall me appropriated for the fiscal year 2012 $12,000,000 toward
the preservation of...” or “There shall be appropriated such sums as may be necessary
to carry out the Act”), 0 otherwise
Oversight: 1 if the Act contained any oversight provisions (e.g., reporting requirements,
consultation requirements, public hearings, sunset provisions, appointment limits,
direct audits), 0 otherwise
Definitions: 1 if the law added or revised any definitions in the original law, 0 otherwise
Prohibitions: 1 if the law added or revised any prohibitions in the original law, 0
otherwise. Prohibitions here do not refer to the agency, but rather are aimed at the
regulated entities (for example, “No person shall discharge pollutants” or “No
person shall operate a vehicle without a permit and verification of emissions
compliance” or “Tampering with smoke detectors is prohibited.”)
Requirements: 1 if the law added or revised any requirements in the original law, 0
otherwise. As with prohibitions, this is aimed at private entities rather than the state
itself, and here is simply looking at whether the law required new things of the
regulated parties (e.g., All persons must comply with emissions requirements
pertaining to certain cars).
Regulations: 1 if the law added or revised any rules or regulations in the original law,
0 otherwise. This has to do with the rules being promulgated by the
administrative actor (Administrator, Secretary, etc.) and counts whenever the
amending law adds to the original law that the Secretary (etc.) shall promulgate rules
on XYZ. Also counting discretionary rules here, not just mandatory.
Exemptions: 1 if the law contains language specifying when the original law does not
apply, or if there are other provisions in the amending text clarifying who is exempt
from various requirements/provisions, 0 otherwise
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Application: 1 if the law contains language specifying when the original law does apply,
or if there other provisions in the amending text clarifying how a law/policy applies,
0 otherwise.
Construct: 1 if the law contained rules of construction, 0 otherwise. Rules of
construction come in the form of “Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit
X” or “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to require Y under the Endangered
Species Act.”
Amend to Enforcement: 1 if were were amendments made to the way in which the
original Act is enforced (for example, the amending law might lay out an
administrative hearing or provide information about an administrative sanction or
criminal penalties, or a private right of action), 0 otherwise
Number of Laws Amended: Number of environmental laws amended by this law (ex:
1 if only the Clean Air Act was amended, 2 if both the Clean Air Act and the Energy
Policy Act were amended)
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
With nearly constant discussion of polarization in the United States Congress, it is strik-
ing to what political scientists have emphasized its causes, while paying relatively little
attention to its consequences with respect to the manner in which agencies come to operate
and the policy outcomes that emerge. This dissertation set out to evaluate to what extent
the weakening of Congress as a monitor on bureaucratic latitude could in fact reshape agency
incentives with respect to whether or not to comply with the laws that they are tasked with
implementing. With so many anecdotes about foot-dragging in the EPA under President
Reagan and in the EEOC under President Bush Sr., it seemed altogether likely that within
the domain of politically salient issues, if given the opportunity not to implement a given
policy with which it is at odds ideologically, it might well take advantage of that latitude.
True enough, this was in large part what I found.
We see this dynamic play out in the data that I presented in Chapters 3 and 4, with
politically advantageous (from the agency’s point of view) institutional configurations pro-
moting bureaucratic behavior that is found by the DC Circuit to be out of accordance with
the statutory text, and/or found by the contemporary Congress to be out of accordance with
how it views the law should properly be implemented. And behind the data are rich stories
of legal debate over the proper reach of agency authority, and to what extent the agency is
in fact fulfilling its mandatory statutory obligations as in the previous chapters’ examples of
agency failures to promulgate rules or their regulating to lesser degrees than the delegating
legislation provided for (see, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train (1976)).
When evaluating these questions of bureaucratic implementation – the story not simply
of how a bill becomes a law but of how the law becomes policy – we inherently are evaluating
the scope and functioning of the American administrative state. When such cases as NRDC
v. Train occur – with an administrative agency unwilling to perform mandatory regulatory
duties – individuals and industries are affected, potentially quite heavily. This raises an
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important question as to who exactly is winning or losing when these battles are waged?
While a cynical response would be to say that the answer depends on who is sitting on the
Court of Appeals at a given time (and such a claim is not wholly without merit), this question
strikes deeper and calls attention to the need for a greater understanding of the ways in which
corporate industries are inducing noncompliant behavior – or potentially inducing compliant
behavior – and the political pressures to which agencies are most sensitive in shaping their
regulatory agenda relative to the delegating statutes. I found that that inclination not to
comply was also powerfully predicted by the extent to which the executive branch preferences
are aligned with those who formed the authorizing legislation.
In the preceding chapters, I tested a number of institutional conflict hypotheses as to
the conditions under which agencies would exploit their regulatory latitude and when the
agency would exercise greater caution and compliance so as to avoid, for example, costly
litigation. I found that legislative-executive conflict powerfully predicts when the Environ-
mental Protection Agency will be motivated to act contrary to the preferences of its current
legislative principal, but that that inclination to skirt the edges of its authority is dramati-
cally tempered when the opposing political party is in a strong position of power and thus
able to provide a more credible threat of punishment in the form of retracting some level of
discretion or much-valued resources.
A challenge with which administrative agencies ultimately are forced to cope is one of
multiple principals: one legislative principal delegates to the agency, and another legislative
principal subsequently monitors this agent, and while these legislative principals may be
aligned, it is by no means a guarantee, nor is it a guarantee that the contemporary Congress
will be committed to an agency’s faithful upholding of a past bargain. And when there
is a greater clash between the delegating and contemporary Congresses, agencies may find
themselves caught between a rock and a hard place: fideility to the statutory text leaves
the agency in the judiciary’s good graces but means deviating from the current Congress’s
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preferences over implementation and thus risking losing discretion or resources, while being
responsive to that current legislative principal will likely mean straying from the statutory
text and in turn facing costly litigation and potential losses in court.
It can be easy amid polarization and accounts of bureaucratic noncompliance to see
Congress as unable to perform its monitoring functions effectively. And to an extent, the
findings of Chapters 3 and 4 show that that can be true in the cases of the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Department of Interior. Yet as I show in Chapter 5, despite
the numerous veto players constraining legislative action from moving forward amid this
heightened partisan conflict, Congress nevertheless manages on many occasions to pass leg-
islation that, while not significant on the whole in most cases, has important ramifications
with respect to agency discretion in implementation. Moreover, bureaucratic noncompliance
powerfully predicts the legislative choice to provide such detailed amendments to the statutes
under the agency’s jurisdiction, often in ways that rein in bureaucratic discretion. A ques-
tion then emerges: If agencies know that congressional coalitions can insert into legislation
amendments that curb their regulatory capacity, why do we continue to see noncompliance
over the course of the 1973 to 2010 time series? To be sure, the agency is aware of statutory
adjustments to its authority and obligations, and the imposition of new oversight provisions
was quite a common occurrence in the data and burdensome to the agency. One might
expect instead to observe a decline in bureaucratic noncompliance in the aftermath of being
being punished by Congress. However, this is not the pattern that one actually finds in the
data. So why is this?
One answer is that just as there are changing legislative principals that create monitoring
problems for Congress and for the agency, so also are there changing administrative actors,
with new presidential administrations and even within presidential administrations some-
times a change in leadership. With new administrative implementers means gaining new
familiarity with the key political players and the environment in which they operate. And
249
this political environment itself is changing frequently, with new developments in technology
opening new discussions (and battles) over environmental impact, natural disasters forcing
new discussions on such issues as water quality and the protection of certain lands. Thus,
with these frequent upsets to the system, learning becomes far more difficult, rendering the
agency less able to update its beliefs about other institutions’ capacity to punish and adjust
implementation strength accordingly.
The other answer is that the agency may simply be taking a gamble. While I evaluate
as one of my noncompliance measures the agency’s loss rate in the DC Circuit, it should
be noted that even in those challenging cases that reach the DC Circuit, the agency is
winning three quarters of the time, with those three quarters of the cases potentially being
the avoidance of rules that would have required extensive costly effort and resources to
promulgate. Thus, what may appear to be nonstrategic behavior on the part of the agency –
continuing not to comply after havnig received a prior punishment – may instead simply be
the agency guessing (sometimes accurately, sometimes inaccurately) that its probability of
being punished is still low enough to justify skirting the edges of authority such as by being
particularly aggressive or particularly lax with rulemaking.
Overall, I found broad support for the core separation of powers hypotheses as to the
conditions under which this noncompliance occurs. To the extent that public opinion is
reflected in the makeup of Congress, the findings have important implications for the extent
to which we in fact have adequate substantive representation in bureaucratic administration
in these times of clashing over compliance – and what that representation means in the
context of implementing statutes passed by long-past Congresses but the text of which is
still intact. And given the congressional propensity to not simply propose but actually
continue to pass extensive substantive revisions of statutes upon observing noncompliant
implementation by the agency, the subsequent reining in of bureaucratic discretion makes for
a potentially increasingly rigid statutory structure with incremental gestures made frequently
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to the effect of leaving little room to read between the lines or to operate without multiple
forms of oversight. Moreover, one might ponder the normative implications of these continued
efforts at imposing new oversight and further reducing discretion when one of the purposes of
delegation to administrative agencies is to capitalize on their greater expertise and resources.
Ultimately, of course, it is a balancing act of giving the agency just enough regulatory latitude
to be responsive but also compliant.
Normative Implications
What this dissertation has not taken up is the normative question or whether we should
have compliance with the laws passed by Congress. The answer to this has important
bearings on the state of American democracy and the proper forces shaping observable
policy outcomes. On the one hand, there is a potentially more normatively desirable notion
that the directly elected branch of government have the reins with respect to lawmaking and
shaping the direction in which policy takes shape over time. Yet if we consider the basis of
congressional delegation to agencies being their advantage in technical expertise in matters
of substantive policy, there is merit in considering the value of agencies capitalizing on that
knowledge rather than (potentially blindly) implementing the statutes passed by Congress.
The extent of normative desirability (or lack thereof) with respect to compliance may be
shaped in part by the winners and losers emerging from these policy battles, though there
often is a lack of consensus around the ideal policy given dueling corporate and interest
group stakes. The further question that emerges is who ought to be driving policy deci-
sions that stray from the original delegating legislation, whether the expert agency to which
authority was delegated, or the democratically-elected legislature which could (in theory,
though perhaps not in practice amid gridlock) pass new remedial legislation. If we permit
the agency to formulate judgments about the appropriateness of the delegating legislation
given who is benefiting or else harmed by the law at hand, then compliance for the sake of
compliance may in fact be undesirable and yield bad outcomes. Yet these agencies, while
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with leadership appointed by an elected president and confirmed by the elected Senate, are
not as directly accountable to the public as is Congress, and moreover are subject to the
same interest group pressures with respect to policy choices, suggesting that there are risks
inherent in leaving these implementation judgments to appointed administrators, without a
clear ideal regulatory pathway when the faithful implementation of the delegating statute
produces outcomes either objectively harmful or contrary to the legislative purpose. And
while the judiciary provides a valuable oversight mechanism with respect to the interpreta-
tion and application of these delegating statutes to new policy conditions and the proper
reach of administrative authority in carrying these laws into effect, there are limits to the
extent to which judges can truly be considered neutral arbiters in these debates.
While there is not a clear-cut answer to the question of whether compliance is necessarily
the desirable outcome on the part of the agency, future work can evaluate more squarely
the conditions under which compliance yields more positive versus negative outcomes for the
interests at whom the legislation was originally aimed at protecting and those who are most
in need of federal protections.
Limitations
While I have presented evidence in support of my hypotheses in both the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Department of Interior, a dissertation focused on environmen-
tal agencies alone is limited in its ability to explain broader swaths of regulatory dynamics
among the branches. This is particularly the case given the environmental movement’s
common association with the Democratic Party, making it somewhat of an “owned” issue.
Anecdotal empirics from other scholars (e.g., Johnson 2011; Carpenter 2010) support the
claim that bureaucratic noncompliance as defined in this project is a phenomenon more gen-
erally applicable than examined within these pages, extending to such realms as agriculture,
health policy, and civil rights.
Among the goals of the dissertation was to provide a novel dataset with which to evalu-
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ate the limitations of effective bureaucratic control as evidenced by institutional constraints
on agency capacity to regulate, in a manner that would be generalizeable to a number of
other domains to which this theory also applies. However, extensions of the analysis are
constrained by the necessity that one have a large number of statutes under the jurisdiction
of the administrative agency so as to evaluate in a time-series cross-section manner the insti-
tutional (time-varying) and statutory (law-varying) conditions that shape these regulatory
outcomes. Both the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Interior carry
the advantage that they have large regulatory agendas, taking on in whole or in part the
implementation of 26 and 22 statutes respectively. While the EEOC’s failure to investigate
claims of employment discrimination under the leadership of Clarence Thomas is a case that
is highly compatible with this project’s theory and core findings, the EEOC’s quite smaller
regulatory agenda156 makes for more limited opportunities to conduct rigorous statistical
analyses of the Commission’s implementation decisions vis-a-vis the other branches. Like-
wise, an agency that carries with it a large regulatory agenda concentrated in a very small
number of large and highly influential laws (e.g., the Internal Revenue Code, implemented
by the Internal Revenue Service) creates challenges in the way of a small N dimension of
the data. Thus, replication of this procedure is best suited to those agencies with extensive
statutory agendas, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Labor, or the
Department of Transportation,157 as opposed to more targeted agencies such as the Federal
Elections Commission or the Federal Communications Commission. Thus, while I argue
that the theory that I put forward and test here applies broadly to a wide array of policy
156The EEOC is responsible, in whole or in part, for the implementation of seven statutes: Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008.
157The Department of Transportation has the advantage of not only implementing in some measure well
over 40 statutes, but those laws cut across different domains including the environmental implications of
transportation technology, the labor conditions in which transportation works operate, the disability access
to which people are entitled in different transportation modes, and energy efficiency, thus providing extensive
variation across time, statute, and policy area.
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domains, replicability may be constrained to a smaller number of administrative agencies as
opposed to being able to evaluate the full universe of agencies.
Next Steps
While this dissertation has gone to great efforts to evaluate the factors leading to bureau-
cratic behavior straying from statutory commands and/or current congressional commands
of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Interior, the study’s iso-
lation to a single policy domain is a limitation to be remedied by the inclusion of a third
case, the Internal Revenue Service. Doing so will allow the study to take on a new policy
domain – one that is not so closely aligned with with the political left – in addition to eval-
uating to what extent these inter-branch dynamics in fact play out in highly important but
particularly contentious policy settings.
Furthermore, an advantage exploited throughout the dissertation – the overlapping ju-
risdiction between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Interior –
points to an important extention to this avenue of research. While the EPA and DOI are
naturally going to receive the clearest signals from one another in the context of the statutes
over which they both have jurisdiction (e.g., the Oil Pollution Act), the fact that they share
jurisdiction over not one, not two, but eleven statutes gives one reason to expect that they
are highly familiar with one another’s broader regulatory agendas. Thus, might there be
information spillovers with respect to the implementation of additional laws and other in-
stitutions’ likely responses? One might plausibly assume that the Environmental Protection
Agency’s observation of a flurry of lawsuits directed at the Department of Interior might
give it reason to exercise caution so as not to find itself caught up in litigation as well. And
indeed, preliminary evaluations of the agency curbing data reflect that high levels of DOI
agency curbing in the previous period are often associated with decreases in EPA agency
curbing in the current period.
Much work will need to be done in the future to better understand how agencies learn
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from one another the extent of the political constraints in which they operate (for example,
their likelihood of punishment), and the ways in which that shapes decisions regarding
bureaucratic compliance. The findings of this project and those that it motivates address
important issues of bureaucratic performance – that is, the factors shaping the effectiveness
of agency implementation and the ways in which changing political configurations reshape
incentives to respond to legal binds and the Democratically-elected legislature – in turn,
helping us to derive and test more hypotheses as to the policy outcomes we will be more
likely to observe as agencies carry laws into effect. However, the pages here present at least
a starting point for understanding better the ways in which agencies find ways to maximize
their regulatory latitude, and the consequences of those agency choices in subsequent periods.
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